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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Were the traffic stop and the ensuing drug investigation supported by 
reasonable suspicion? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to sup pro- ^!r(r v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,f11,100 P.3d 1222 (citations omitted). The Court reviews 
the trial court's legal conclusions non-deferentially for correctness, including its 
application or t;K . ^ i standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,1 15, 103 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2008); possession of a controlled substance 
(diazepam), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 
Supp. 2008); and driving with defective equipment, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604 (West Supp. 2008). Rl-2. 
Defendant, who had been stopped for a traffic violation, filed a motion to 
suppress his statements to the officer during the stop and the evidence seized in a 
subsequent search of his car. R27-28. Following an evidentiary hearing and 
argument on the motion, see R35-61,62-89,90; see also R34 (transcript of evidentiary 
hearing), the trial court filed a memorandum decision denying the motion. See R91-
124. The trial court also denied Defendant's motion asking the court to reconsider 
the memorandum decision. See R130-32,133-36. 
2 
reservi ng the right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress, and the State 
dismissed the other counts. R189-90 (minutes, change of plea), 182-88 (plea 
statement). 
. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of zero to five years, 
suspended the prison term, p ^ ^ a . ^ ^ i w ; ^ , on probation, u,;^ ; requ^vd .rui 
cause staying execution of the jail term pendine the resolution of this appeal R220, 
224-25. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
*• offer ise. Oi t, J anuar} 14, 2009, just after 11 :00 p.n L, Utal i J:I^I • . 
Pa-r, 1 Ofricer NielEkbergsa v\ a I i ncolnTo^ ^  • "n Cat t< • i thl exas plates *r 
eastbound on 1-80 in Summit County. R34:4-5; see also R92 (findings). Gmcer 
1
 References to the video are references to State's Exhibit 1 fa compact disc 
' X 
recorded at the time of the traffic stop), included in an envelope in the record. The 
video is time-stamped (military time) and runs for approximately 32 minutes 
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on January 14, 2009. To facilitate the location of 
statements on the video, staff in the Utah Attorney General's Office have prepared 
an unofficial transcript of the d isc referencing approximate times. 
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Ekberg ran a license plate check on the car and determined that the car was a 
rental car. See 34:27; see also R92. The car's back rear license plate was very hard 
to read, and the trooper noticed that it did not have a working rear plate light. 
See R34:5; see also video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10) (officer's later showing 
Defendant the non-working light); video at 23:38 (video transcript at 16) (officer's 
later recounting the observed violation to other officers who arrived on the 
scene); R92. Officer Ekberg pulled the car over at approximately 11:06 p.m. 
R34:7. 
Officer Ekberg approached the car from the passenger side and observed 
Defendant, the driver, and an apparently sleeping woman, Defendant's wife, the 
front seat passenger. R34:9; see also R93. Defendant's wife appeared to remain 
sleeping for a "couple of minutes" after the officer approached, even though it was 
cold and the officer had a flashlight turned on. R34:15-16; see also R93. The officer 
found the passenger's behavior odd, as in his experience, even sleeping passengers 
awaken when a police officer stops a car. R34:15-16. "They don't stay asleep while 
[an officer is] talking to them and shining [his] light with the weather coming in and 
so on." Id. 
The officer made several quick observations. He saw "four cell phones and 
chargers in the center console," "a large quantity of cell phones" for just two 
occupants. R34:15; see also R93. The phones appeared to be "connected together." 
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R93. He saw fast food papers. R34:15; R93. He also saw that the couple's luggage 
was in the back seat, rather than in the trunk. R34:14. A map and a cup of coffee 
were in the center console. R34:15. The GPS was turned on. Id. 
Officer Ekberg introduced himself and asked the couple where they were 
headed. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). Defendant said they were heading to 
Chicago. Id. The officer asked where they were from, and Defendant said they were 
from Oakland, traveling to visit family in Chicago. Id. 
The officer then explained that he had stopped them because the driver had 
made an improper lane change and because the light that should have illuminated 
their rear plate was not working. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1-2); R93-94. 
Officer Ekberg asked how long they were going to stay in Chicago, and 
Defendant answered "probably for a few days/' Video at 23:09 (video transcript at 
2). The officer then asked to see the rental agreement. Id. Defendant had difficulty 
finding the rental agreement. See video at 23:09-23:10. Officer Ekberg talked with 
Defendant as Defendant looked for the agreement. See id. The officer asked what 
family members Defendant planned to visit in Chicago. Video at 23:09 (video 
transcript at 3). Defendant "had a hard time telling [the officer] what family 
member/7 R34:ll. Defendant answered, T m actually visiting my, my, uh, my 
uncle over there/7 Video at 23:09 (video transcript at 3). "It seemed like he had a 
frog in his throat and he had a hard time answering those questions/7 R34:ll. 
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Defendant"acted very nervous and unsure of these simple questions/' R34.15. This 
increased the officer's suspicions about possible criminal activity. R34:10. 
When Defendant finally produced the rental papers, he presented only a pre-
rental inspection form. Video at 23:09-23:10) (video transcript at 3). As Defendant 
continued to search for the actual rental agreement, Officer Ekberg continued 
talking with him. Video at 23:09-23:10. Defendant produced the actual rental 
agreement as the officer noted, "You're missing all the scenery here in Utah." Video 
at 23:10:17 (video transcript at 3). Defendant responded, //[W]e're trying to get, 
trying to do a mad drive out there." Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). 
Reading the rental agreement, Officer Ekberg learned that the rental was for a 
one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago, due back at Chicago Midway Airport in a 
couple of days. R34:9; video at 23:38 (video transcript at 14-15). The agreement also 
showed the cost of the rental—$1200 for the one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago. 
Video at 23:20, 28 (video transcript at 9,14) (later recounting information to other 
officers who arrived at the scene). The "very expensive" rental drew the officer's 
attention. R34:8. In addition, based on his past experience, the officer was aware 
that "drug traffickers fly from the east to the west coast, pick up the drugs and drive 
them back east." R34:10. He also knew that "Interstate 80 is a known drug 
trafficking corridor." R34:14. These factors increased his suspicions. See R34:10. 
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When Officer Ekberg finished looking through the rental agreement, he asked 
Defendant whether he had a valid driver's license. See video at 23:10 (video 
transcript at 4). Defendant said that he did. Id. As Defendant looked for his license, 
the officer asked Defendant whether "[a]ll your guy[s'] luggage is just sitting in the 
back seat here?" Id. Defendant said, "No." Id.2 
When Defendant produced his license, it was not a California license, but a 
driver's license issued by Hawaii. See video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). The 
officer then asked Defendant additional questions about where Defendant lived and 
about his planned trip — why he was driving instead of flying and how he planned 
to make the return trip. Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4-5). 
Defendant said that he was driving because "we are going to be 
enjoying... the ride." Video at 23:11 (video transcript at 5). He also stated that he 
was driving because it was "just less expensive." Id. That was not "consistent with 
[Officer Ekberg's] experience." R34:13. Defendant also stated that he and his wife 
might travel to Memphis and/or Birmingham, but he did not know whether they 
2
 The video and video transcript show that the officer asked Defendant 
whether all of their luggage was on the back seat, and Defendant said that it was 
not. See video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). At the evidentiary hearing, the officer 
mistakenly attributed that statement to Defendant's wife. See R34:14. 
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would fly or drive if they did. Video at 23:12-13 (video transcript at 5-6). 
Defendant's wife offered that they "ha[d] no really good plan." Video at 23:12 
(video transcript at 6). The officer noted that Defendant "was very, very nervous in 
answering questions about his trip, his origination and his destination. He was very 
unsure of his answers." R34:10. "[H]e would look up and stall as if he was seeking 
and making up the answer as he was going along. He avoided eye contact when 
answering those simple questions." Id. 
The officer then asked whether the couple planned to stay anywhere before 
they finished the trip to Chicago. Video at 23:13 (video transcript at 6). Defendant, 
who had previously stated that they would likely travel another hour before 
stopping, video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5), said that they would probably stop 
in Utah, video at 23:13 (video transcript at 7). The officer noted that they only had 
another five miles in Utah before they crossed the border into Wyoming. Id. 
Finally, the officer asked again whether all of their luggage was in the back seat or 
whether they had any luggage in the trunk. Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7). 
This time, Defendant said that pretty much all of their luggage was in the back seat 
8 
and that they had nothing in the trunk. Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7-8). 
Officer Ekberg thought that this reply was "weird/' given that Defendant had 
previously stated that they did have additional luggage. R34:14; see also video at 
23:10 (video transcript at 4). Officer Ekberg then told Defendant to wait while he 
returned to his police car to check on the validity of the driver's license. Video at 
23:14 (video transcript at 8). 
At his car, Officer Ekberg called for a drug-sniffing dog, a license report, and a 
criminal background check ("a triple I"). Video at 23:14-15 (video transcript at 8). 
He then returned to Defendant's car and showed Defendant the non-working light 
that should have illuminated the plate. Video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10). 
Defendant said, "We'll get that taken care of." Id. The officer returned Defendant's 
license and the rental agreement. Video at 23:23; see also R34:57. The officer asked 
Defendant whether he had anything illegal in his car. Video at 23:24 (transcript at 
11). Defendant said that he did not. Id. The officer asked for permission to search 
the car. Id. Defendant refused consent. Id. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Ekberg also mistakenly attributed this 
statement to the passenger. See R34:14. 
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Officer Ekberg then told Defendant that he would be detained while they 
awaited a drug-sniffing dog. Id. Based on everything he had observed, the officer 
believed he had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for a few minutes to wait 
for the dog. R34:20. Another officer arrived on the scene, and Officer Ekberg took 
Defendant's keys and allowed him to wait in his car. Video at 23:25 (video 
transcript at 12). When Officer Ekberg returned to his car, he learned that 
Defendant had a criminal history for marijuana possession in the 1960's and a valid 
driver's license. Id. 
The drug-sniffing dog arrived about three minutes after Officer Ekberg told 
Defendant that he would be detained to await it. Video at 23:24,27 (video transcript 
at 11,14). When the dog alerted on the trunk, the officers opened the trunk and 
found 76 one-pound vacuum-sealed bags of marijuana. R34:22; video at 23:29 
(video transcript at 17). 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the facts 
essentially as outlined above. See R92-97. The trial court found that Officer Ekberg's 
testimony was credible. See R97. Specifically, the court found that the officer 
testified truthfully when he testified that the license plate light was not functioning. 
See R97. The court found that any minor inconsistencies in his testimony were not 
"fabrication/' but possibly "exaggeration to superiors" or "a failure to communicate 
precisely" or "a failure to recall specifics." See R98. 
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Although Officer Ekberg also believed that Defendant's lane changes violated 
the law, see R34:6, the court concluded that the officer misunderstood the law about 
lane changes and ruled that the Defendant's lane changes were legal. R98-99. But 
the court ruled that the stop was valid because of the observed equipment violation. 
R99. 
The court rejected the State's argument that the officer's questions about 
Defendant's travel itinerary were within the scope of a proper traffic stop. Rl06-07. 
But the court concluded that Officer Ekberg's observations on approaching the car 
gave him reasonable suspicion of some further illegality, i.e., drug trafficking, to 
justify his asking Defendant questions about his travel plans. R114-20. The court 
further determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify detaining Defendant for a dog sniff of his car. R121. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, each stage of the stop —the initial 
traffic stop, the questions about Defendant's travel itinerary, and the detention to 
await the drug-detection dog—was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
The traffic stop was reasonable because it was based on the officer's 
observation of an equipment violation. The trial court found that the light that 
should have illuminated the license plate on Defendant's car was not 
functioning. The trial court did not clearly err in making this finding. The 
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officer testified that the light was not working. No testimony to the contrary was 
offered. The video did not show whether the light was or was not functioning, 
but it did show the officer pointing out the non-functioning light to Defendant 
and Defendant stating, "We'll get that taken care of." Defendant cannot prevail 
on his claim that the officer lied about the equipment violation and that 
consequently the traffic stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 
Moreover, an officer may ask questions about travel plans without 
exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop. And, even if questions about travel 
plans were not permissible, the officer had reasonable suspicion of a further 
illegality — drug trafficking— at the time he first looked in the car and before he 
asked any questions about travel plans. What he saw when he first looked into 
the rental vehicle —the woman passenger feigning sleep, luggage on the back 
seat of the car despite its large trunk, four cell phones carried by only two 
occupants, fast food wrappers indicating hurried travel, etc. —supported 
reasonable suspicion and justified questioning the occupants to confirm or dispel 
his suspicions. 
Likewise, the detention to await a drug dog was reasonable. By the time 
the officer detained Defendant for the drug dog, the officer was aware not only 
of the circumstances set forth above, but also had received hesitant, evasive, and 
inconsistent answers to his questions about Defendant's travel plans and had 
12 
observed his extreme nervousness and lack of eye contact while responding. 
Thus, the detention for the drug dog was supported by reasonable suspicion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRAFFIC STOP AND THE ENSUING DRUG 
INVESTIGATION WERE SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
Defendant claims that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the 
traffic stop. See Br. Appellant at 1,11. He claims that the trial court erred when it 
found that the officer's testimony that he had observed an equipment violation was 
credible. He asserts that the officer did not observe an equipment violation and 
consequently that the stop was unjustified. See id. at 11-22. He further claims that 
the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful traffic stop by "questioning [him] about 
his travel itinerary" and " detaining [him] to await the arrival of a drug detection 
dog." Id. 24; see also id. at 1-2. Defendant cannot prevail on any of these claims. 
Each stage of the stop — the initial traffic stop, the questions about Defendant's travel 
itinerary, and the detention to await the drug-detection dog—was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment principles governing a traffic stop are 
straightforward and simple. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," Illinois 
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005), i.e., the officer must "have probable cause or 
reasonable articulable suspicion of [a] traffic violation or other criminal activity," 
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State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,116,229 P.3d 650, citing Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 
784 (2009). Second, the stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner/' Cahalles, 
543 U.S. at 408, i.e., "the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ 17 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). "If, during the scope of [a lawful] traffic 
stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the 
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." Baker, 2010 UT 18, ^ f 13. 
Otherwise, "the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of 
the stop has concluded." Id. 
A. The traffic stop was justified at its inception because the 
officer observed a traffic violation, 
A "traffic stop is justified at its inception when the stop is incident to a traffic 
violation committed in [the officer's] presence." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 30, 
63 P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
see also United States v. Botero-0spina, 71 F.3d 783,787 (10th Cir. 1995) {en baric) (stop 
is valid at its inception if based on an observed violation). A traffic stop is also valid 
at its inception where the "officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic 
or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." See Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 
787. 
A traffic violation occurs when an individual drives an improperly equipped 
vehicle on a public highway. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601 (West Supp. 2008). 
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Utah law provides that a motor vehicle must be equipped with "[ejither a tail lamp 
or a separate lamp . . . constructed and placed so as to illuminate with a white light 
the rear registration plate/7 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
An officer thus has reasonable suspicion that an equipment violation has occurred 
when he sees a vehicle traveling on the highway and such a light is not working. 
See Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 30 (holding that a stop is justified at its inception when 
made in response to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence). 
Defendant does not dispute that Utah law requires "[e]ither a tail lamp or 
separate lamp . . . constructed and placed so as to illuminate with a white light the 
rear registration plate/' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
Rather, Defendant disputes only whether the trial court properly credited the 
officer's testimony that he observed the tail lamp violation. See R97-98. Defendant 
contends that his tail lamp was in fact working, that Officer Ekberg lied when he 
testified that the light was not working, and, therefore, that the trial court clearly 
erred in finding the officer credible. 
Marshaling. This Court should not address Defendant's claim. When 
challenging a trial court's finding of fact, a party must marshal the evidence in 
support of that finding and then explain why that evidence is legally insufficient. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Proper marshaling requires a defendant to amass "every 
scrap of competent evidence and reasonable inferences that support the adverse 
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decision and then show why that evidence, "even when viewjed] in a light most 
favorable to the court below" is "legally insufficient." United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Stichting Mayflower Mt Fonds, 2006 UT 35, I f 24 & 39,140 P.3d 1200 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991). Consequently, "'[e]ven where [a defendant] purportjs] to 
challenge only the legal ruling,. . . if a determination of the correctness of a court's 
application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendant]] also ha[s] 
a duty to marshal the evidence/" Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 22, 217 
P.3d 733 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 20,100 P.3d 1177). 
Here, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence relevant to his underlying 
claim that the trial court erred when it found that Officer Ekberg was credible or to 
his overarching claim that the evidence was therefore insufficient to demonstrate 
reasonable suspicion of an equipment violation. See Br. Appellant at 12-20. For 
example, Defendant ignores the portion of the videotape that recorded the officer 
pointing out to him the non-functioning light, his viewing it, and his telling the 
officer, "We'll get that taken care of." Video at 23:23 (video transcript at 10). 
Because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting the trial 
court's ruling, this Court should reject his claim that the officer's testimony lacked 
credibility and his related claim that the evidence was insufficient. See State v. 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, % 16, 989 P.2d 1065 ("On appeal, Hopkins describes only 
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fragmented and selective portions of [the relevant] evidence. Because Hopkins has 
not satisfied his burden to marshal the evidence, we decline to treat his contention 
that the evidence was insufficient/7). 
Merits. In any case, the trial court did not clearly err in finding Officer 
Ekberg credible. Officer Ekberg testified that the license plate was not functioning 
and that he could not see the license plate clearly. R92, 97. No testimony to the 
contrary was offered. See id. Comparing Officer Ekberg's testimony and the video, 
the trial court found that the officer was not fabricating his account. R97. The video 
did not clearly show whether the light was or was not functioning. R92. "[T]he 
license [wa]s visible [on the video], but it may [have been] from the reflection of the 
headlights from Ekberg's vehicle." R92. 
Moreover, as explained, the video showed Officer Ekberg taking Defendant to 
the back of the car and showing him the non-working light. Video at 23:23 (video 
transcript at 10). It then showed Defendant agreeing to get the light fixed. Id. 
(Defendant stating, "We'll get that taken care of/'). That evidence demonstrates that 
Defendant actually saw that the light was broken or had burned out. It thus 
supports the trial court's finding that Officer Ekberg testified truthfully when he 
said he stopped the car because the light that should have illuminated the rear 
license plate was not functioning. 
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Defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding the 
officer credible or in finding that the light was, in fact, not functioning. Thus, the 
evidence sufficed to support the trial court's conclusions that a traffic violation had 
occurred and that the violation justified the traffic stop. 
B. The traffic stop, including the officer's drug investigation, was 
executed in a reasonable manner. 
Defendant next claims that Officer Ekberg exceeded the scope of the traffic 
stop by asking questions about Defendant's travel plans before requesting and 
checking his rental agreement and driver's license. Br. Appellant at 22-28. 
Defendant asserts that the officer had no reasonable suspicion of any illegality other 
than the equipment violation and therefore that the officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion to ask about the travel plans. 
Typically, "an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation" or warning. State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT125 f 31,63 P.3d 650 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An officer 
may also "ran[] a warrants check." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1133 (Utah 1994). 
The officer is also permitted to ask about the driver's travel plans as part of the 
traffic stop detention. "[Q]uestions relating to a driver's travel plans ordinarily fall 
within the scope of a traffic stop." United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1267 (10th 
Cir. 2001). These matters are "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place," i.e., the traffic violation. Id. at 1266-67. 
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Travel questions "are routine and may be asked as a matter of course/' United States 
v. West, 219 F.3d 1171,1176 (10th Or. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).4 
But "[o]nce the purpose of the initial stop is concluded . . . the person must be 
allowed to depart . . . unless [the] officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality/' Hansen, 2002 UT125, | 31 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here, because Officer Ekberg reasonably suspected that 
Defendant and his wife were involved in drug trafficking, the officer was justified in 
extending the traffic stop. 
In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, reviewing courts 
"must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each case." United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, officers are permitted 
"to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from 
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well 
elude an untrained person/7 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
4
 In fact, an officer may even inquire ''into matters unrelated to the 
justification for the traffic stop, . . . so long as those [actions] do not measurably 
extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) 
(citation omitted). 
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Factors that taken alone are each "susceptible of innocent explanation" may, 
"[t]aken together,... form a particularized and objective basis" for a detention, 
making it "reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 277-
78. "Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a 
s top, . . . the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for 
probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard." Id. at 274 (citations and additional quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective inquiry. See 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) ("an officer's motive" does not 
"invalidate^ objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment"). 
Where reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists to support a stop, the "actual 
motivation of the individual officers involved" makes no difference. Id. at 813. 
"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause [or reasonable-
suspicion] Fourth Amendment analysis." Id. 
Applying the above standards, Officer Ekberg's questions about Defendant's 
travel plans were justified on two separate bases: first, they were permissible as 
part of the traffic stop. After stopping Defendant's car, Officer Ekberg first 
introduced himself. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). Then, before requesting 
the vehicle registration, he asked a few brief questions about the occupants' travel 
plans, including where they were headed, where they were from, and how long 
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they planned to stay at their destination. Video at 23:08-23:09 (video transcript at 
1-2). These questions were permissible because they were within the scope of the 
traffic stop. As explained, "questions about travel plans are routine and may be 
asked as a matter of course." West, 219 F.3d at 1176 (10th Or. 2000) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the trial court erred when it ruled that the 
questions were not permissible as part of the traffic stop. See R106-07. 
But while permissible as part of the traffic stop, the questions were also 
justified by reasonable suspicion of a further illegality—drug trafficking. Based on 
the observations Officer Ekberg made as he approached Defendant's car, the trial 
court correctly concluded that the officer "form[ed] new reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity" that justified a continued detention to "investigate his 
new suspicion." Baker, 2010 UT 18, f^ 13. Based on his observations as he 
approached and looked into the car, Officer Ekberg had reasonable suspicion of a 
further illegality — drug trafficking—before he asked Defendant any questions. See 
R120. Officer Ekberg approached the car from the passenger side and observed the 
driver, Defendant, and a woman asleep in the front passenger seat. R93. The 
woman appeared to "remain[] asleep a few moments, though it was cold and [the 
officer] had a flash light turned on." Id. The officer could see four cell phones 
evidently connected together and a charger. Id. He could see luggage in the rear 
seat. Id. The vehicle had a GPS unit, and a map was visible. Id. The officer also 
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saw fast food papers, "indicating to him the occupants were driving in a hurry and 
not desiring to stop/' Id. In addition, the officer knew that Defendant was driving a 
rental car. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 2); see also R34:27.5 
These observations, viewed together, provided "reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminal activity [drug trafficking] mfight] be afoot." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 
273 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). They justified the officer's 
asking additional questions about the couple's travel plans to confirm or dispel his 
5
 The trial court found that Officer Ekberg approached the car from the 
passenger side, saw the female passenger who appeared to be asleep "though it was 
cold and [though] he had a flash light turned on," R. 93. The court found that he 
saw the "luggage in the rear seat," "four (4) cell phones evidently connected 
together," a GPS unit, a map, a coffee cup, and fast food wrappers. Id. Defendant 
apparently asserts that this finding was clearly erroneous because the officer did not 
testify that he saw these things upon approaching the car. See Br. Appellant at 26-
27. But the trial court is entitled not only to find the facts, but also to draw the 
reasonable inferences supported by the evidence. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 
626 (Utah App. 1993) ("When acting as the fact-finder, the trial court is entitled to 
assess the witnesses and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences 
therefrom"). Here, Officer Ekberg testified that he approached the car on the 
passenger side, the window was down, and his flashlight was "in the vehicle." 
R34:15. He testified that the luggage was on the rear seat and "fast food wrappers" 
and the "four cell phones and chargers" were "in plain view." R34:14-15. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably infer that the officer, who was 
alone on the road near midnight, approached the car with some caution. His 
flashlight being "in the window" suggests that he immediately looked about the 
passenger compartment as a safety measure and, in so doing, saw the car's contents. 
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suspicions.6 Based on his training and experience, the officer was entitled to 
conclude that the passenger was feigning sleep when she did not awaken despite 
having the passenger door window down—when she appeared to "stay[] asleep for 
a couple of minutes" despite the "very cold" night air, and despite his flashing his 
light into the car. See R34:15. Based on his experience, "passengers ha[d] always 
been wide awake even if they [had been] sleeping" before the stop. Id. As he 
explained, passengers "don't stay asleep while I'm talking to them and shining my 
light with the weather coming in and so on." R34:15-16. The apparently feigned 
sleep was a factor giving rise to suspicion of some possibly criminal activity because 
it suggested that the passenger had something to hide and was "buying time" to 
consider what she might say, if questioned. See United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 
1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (passenger's "feigning grogginess in an attempt to avoid 
answering questions" a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity); Nathan v. State, 805 A.2d 1086,1096 (Md. 2002) (noting that passenger's 
6
 The trial court ruled that the following factors gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity: "[Four] cell phones immediately visible, luggage in 
the rear seat of a large car, and defendant was extremely nervous." Ri l l . The 
officer did not testify explicitly that the driver exhibited nervousness before any 
questions were asked. See R34 (evidentiary hearing). The court could, however, 
have inferred that from the video tape. See video at 23:08. In any case, the factors to 
which the officer did testify sufficed to establish reasonable suspicion. 
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"apparent pretense of sleep when the vehicle was initially stopped" was a factor, in 
combination with others, supporting reasonable suspicion to support an 
investigative stop). 
Further, the officer's observation of four cell phones in a car with just two 
occupants was a factor that, in combination with others, supported reasonable 
suspicion. "[D]rug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers for use to stay 
in contact throughout the trip/7 See United States v. Arana-Duarte, 244 Fed. Appx. 
121,122, 2007 WL 1852139 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). For that reason, multiple 
cell phones, especially more cell phones than vehicle occupants, suggest drug 
trafficking. See State v. Riclmrds, 2009 UT App 397, f 11,224 P.3d 733 (observing that 
case law and officer's training indicated that the presence of multiple cell phones is 
suggestive of drug trafficking); see also United States v. Diaz, 356 Fed. Appx. 117,123-
24, 2009 WL 4730422 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D) 
(possession of multiple cell phones by trailer-tractor operator a factor contributing 
to reasonable suspicion to believe truck contained contraband); United States v. 
Lopez-Gutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880, 883, 2009 WL 1579798 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D) (presence in a vehicle of more cell 
phones than occupants among factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion); State v. 
Bennett, 2006-Ohio-4274, tH 25-26,2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 2006) (unpublished) 
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(reproduced in Addendum D) (officer's observation of multiple cell phones a factor 
supporting reasonable suspicion). 
In addition, the presence of the couple's luggage on the back seat of the 
Lincoln Town Car, rather than in its large trunk, was a factor supporting reasonable 
suspicion. See R34:14. Carrying luggage on the back seat, rather than in the trunk, 
"indicates] the possibility that there [a]re drugs in the trunk that the [occupants] 
d[o] not want to expose to the senses by repeatedly opening the trunk to access 
[their] luggage." Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY123, t 6,163 P.3d 833. Moreover, as the 
trial court observed, "A trained officer could readily conclude, objectively, that the 
reason the luggage is in the back seat and not in the trunk of a large vehicle with 
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the trunk." R117. 
Moreover, Office Ekberg knew that Defendant was driving a rental car. Video 
at 23:08 (video transcript at 2); see also R34:27. "The status of a vehicle as a rentfal] 
can be considered a factor to support the existence of reasonable suspicion, because 
it is accepted that drug traffickers frequently use rental vehicles to transport illegal 
drugs." United States v. Avezov, F. Supp. 2d , 2010 WL 3022909 (N.D. Okla. 
2010) (citing cases) (included in Addendum D); see also United States v. Blaylock, 421 
F.3d 758,769 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,1280 (7th Or. 1996); 
United States v. Martin, 155 F. Supp. 2d 381,385 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing cases); State v. 
Morlock, 218 P.3d 801, 811 (Kan. 2009). 
25 
While none of these circumstances standing alone may have sufficed to 
establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, when considered in their totality 
they did. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78. Moreover, Officer Ekberg was permitted to 
draw inferences and deductions about the cumulative information available to him 
that "might well [have] elude[d] an untrained person/' Id. at 273 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also R34:4, 10, 14, 16, 29. The trial court 
therefore correctly concluded that the officer's observations, upon looking into the 
car and before any questioning, gave rise to reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking 
and supported an investigative stop. The officer was therefore entitled to question 
the car occupants not only about the equipment violation, but also about possible 
drug activity. 
Finally, Defendant argues that "the detention to await the arrival and search 
by a drug-detection dog exceeded the limits of a detention for a traffic stop." Br. 
Appellant at 37.7 But that assertion has no significance, as the circumstances 
supported not only reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, but also reasonable 
7
 Defendant relies on State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,182 P.3d 935, affd, 2010 
UT 18, 229 P.3d 650, for his claim that he was illegally detained to await the drug 
dog. But Baker addressed the lawfulness of detaining a passenger to await a drug 
dog as part of a traffic stop, not the lawfulness of detaining a driver to await a drug 
dog based on reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. 
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suspicion of drug trafficking. Reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, not 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, justified the officer's detaining Defendant 
for the dog sniff.8 
Defendant's responses to the officer's questions, his wife's responses, his 
demeanor, and what the officer learned from the rental agreement did not dispel the 
officer's suspicions, but rather heightened them, justifying the dog sniff. 
Specifically, the following circumstances increased the officer's suspicions. 
(1) The officer learned that Defendant was driving from Oakland to Chicago 
and flying back. R34:10. The officer was aware from his experience that drug 
traffickers often pick up drugs on the west coast and drive them east—even when 
they fly the east-to-west leg of their trips. R34:10. He also knew that "Interstate 80 
is a known drug trafficking corridor." R34:14. 
(2) When the officer asked Defendant what his travel plans were, Defendant 
gave vague and somewhat contradictory responses. Defendant told the officer that 
he and his wife were "trying to do a mad drive out there," to Chicago. Video at 
8
 Because walking a dog around a car's exterior "generally does not implicate 
legitimate privacy interests," it is not a search. See Cabales, 543 U.S. at 409; see also 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000). But where conducting the dog 
sniff detains an individual, the detention must be constitutionally permissible. 
27 
23:10 (video transcript at 4). But later, when asked why he had chosen to drive 
rather than fly, Defendant stated that he was driving because they wanted "to be 
enjoying the ride," suggesting a more leisurely trip. Video at 23:11 (video transcript 
at 5). Moreover, when asked whether they "plan[ned] on staying anywhere in 
between here and Chicago/7 Defendant stated that they would probably travel 
"another hour or so" and then "pull over." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5). 
But moments later, at a time when they were only about five minutes from the 
border, Defendant said that they would probably stop somewhere in Utah. Video 
at 23:13 (video transcript 6-7). 
When the officer asked where Defendant was headed, he said that he was 
headed to Chicago. Video at 23:08 (video transcript at 1). The officer then asked if 
he was from Chicago, and Defendant said, "[N]o, I'm just visiting family there." Id. 
A minute or two later, the officer asked, "|W]hat family members [are] you visiting 
in Chicago?" Video at 23:09 (video transcript at 3). Defendant hesitated noticeably 
in responding, "I'm actually visiting my, my, uh, my uncle over there." Video at 
23:09 (video transcript at 3). Defendant, in fact, hesitated repeatedly in his 
conversation with the officer. See video at 23:09-23:10 (video transcript at 2-3). 
Defendant also gave very uncertain answers when asked about his return to 
Oakland. When asked whether he planned to "fly back home to Oakland from 
Chicago," Defendant mentioned the possibility of traveling "back down to 
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Memphis" to see "a friend who lives there." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5). 
Defendant said that "we're either going to fly back or go down to Memphis and fly 
back." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 6). The officer then asked, "Don't you 
mean fly down to Memphis?" Id. Defendant responded, "We might drive. I don't 
know." Id. Defendant's wife then added, "We have no really good plan." Id. 
Defendant then volunteered, "We've got our grandkids down in, uh, in 
Birmingham, so we have to go through Memphis." Video at 23:13 (video transcript 
at 6). 
(3) When the officer obtained the rental agreement, he learned that Defendant 
had paid $1200 for the one-way rental from Oakland to Chicago. R34:8-9. This 
drew his attention because "it was a very expensive rental." Id. But when he asked 
Defendant "what made you want to drive from Oakland to . . . Chicago," Defendant 
asserted that it wTas "less expensive." Video at 23:12 (video transcript at 5). 
(4) When the officer asked Defendant about the presence of other luggage in 
the car, Defendant gave contradictory responses. While awaiting Defendant's 
driver's license, the officer asked, "All you[] guy[s'] luggage is just sitting in the 
back seat here?" Video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4). Defendant answered, "No." 
Id. About four minutes later, the officer asked again, "So, ummm, all of your 
luggage is in the back seat here?" Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 7). This time 
Defendant answered, "Pretty much." Id. The officer then asked specifically, 
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"You . . . don't have anything in the trunk or anything?77 Id. Defendant said, "No." 
Video at 23:14 (video transcript at 8). The officer thought it was suspicious that 
Defendant "said that they had other luggage but there was nothing in the trunk." 
R34:14.9 
(5) Defendant was unusually nervous during the questioning. The officer 
testified that Defendant "was very, very nervous in answering questions about his 
trip, his origination and his destination. He was very unsure of his answers." 
R34:10. "[H]e would look up and stall as if he was seeking and making up the 
answer as he was going along. He avoided eye contact when answering those 
simple questions." Id. "It seemed like he had a frog in his throat " R34:ll. 
Inconsistent and evasive responses. All of these circumstances sufficed to 
further the officer's suspicions that had first been aroused by Defendant's wife's 
feigned sleeping, four cell phones, luggage on the back seat, and other matters 
observed upon approaching the car. Defendant's inconsistent and evasive 
9
 A.s explained, at the evidentiary hearing, the officer attributed these two 
contradictory statements to Defendant's wife, the passenger. See R34:14. The video, 
however, indicates that the two statements were both made by Defendant. See 
video at 23:10 (video transcript at 4), 23:14 (video transcript at 7-8). In any case, who 
made the statements is of little significance. What is significant is that the 
occupants' statements about the luggage were contradictory. 
30 
responses suggested that Defendant was not being candid and may have been 
trying to conceal illegal activity. See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,1150 
(10th Cir. 2010) (noting that "vague, inconsistent or evasive answers with respect to 
travel plans support]]... reasonable suspicion"); State v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120,1129 
(10th Cir. 2005) ("Implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion"); 
United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct. 1721 
(2010) ("[This court] ha[s] noted numerous times that implausible travel plans can 
form a basis for reasonable suspicion") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Nervousness and failure to make eye contact Moreover, Defendant's 
extreme nervousness and failure to make eye contact suggested fear that such illegal 
activity might be detected. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 270, 276 (driver's not looking at 
Border Patrol agent supported reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119,124 (2000) ("[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion") (citation omitted); Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1148,1152 (extreme 
nervousness, criminal record, and inconsistent and evasive answers to queries about 
travel plans, provided reasonable suspicion to detain for further questioning and 
canine sniff); United States v. Morneau, Fed. Appx. , 2010 WL 3330505, *1 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (reproduced in Addendum D) (car occupants7 nervousness 
and avoidance of eye contact supported reasonable suspicion); Sutton v. State, 2009 
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WY 148, % 24,220 P.3d 784 (extreme and continued nervousness, acting evasive, or 
breaking eye contact can form basis for reasonable suspicion). 
Thus, the totality of the circumstances increased reasonable suspicion of drug 
activity and justified the continued detention to conduct a dog sniff. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted November •£-?, 2010. 
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Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WILLIAM DUHAIME, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 91500017 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: July 31, 2009 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
BACKGROUND 
An information was filed on January 21, 2009, charging 
defendant with felony possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute (76 pounds of mari3uana), misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance (diazepam), and an equipment 
violation (rear license plate lignt). After being bound over 
after a preliminary hearing on April 28, 2008, defendant filed a 
motion to suppress on May 5, 2009. An evidentiary hearing was 
held Jane 2, 20C9. 
The court heard evidence and received a DVD of the traffic 
stop and took the matter under advisement, and allowed the 
parties to file further memoranda. 
Defenaant filed his memo on July 8, 2009. The State 
responded July 21, 2009. Oral argument was held July 28, 2009. 
The court took the issues further under advisement after oral 
argument. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Niel Ekberg (Ekberg) was on 
patrol in Summit County on Interstate 80 in the night time hours 
of January 14, 2009. His patrol car was equipped with a camera 
and microphone that captured most of the events. He also 
testified at the hearing. No other testimony was received. From 
those sources the court finds as follows. 
2. Some time just before 11:06 pm Ekberg saw this vehicle, a 
Lincoln Town car with Texas plates, traveling east-bound on 1-80 
in Summit County. He called it in at some point to check on the 
license for reasons unknown. Shortly thereafter, for reasons 
unknown, that vehicle again passed Ekberg. 
3. Ekberg observed that the rear license plate illuminating 
light was not working and Ekberg could not see the license plate 
clearly. The video does not clearly show either way, as the 
license is visible but it may be from the reflection of the 
headlights from Ekberg's vehicle. Defendant challenges the 
testimony but the court credits the testimony of Ekberg about the 
equipment violation. Ekberg pulled up behind the vehicle, which 
proved to be driven by defendant, in an effort to see if in fact 
the light was functioning. The camera was activated. 
4. Defendant was in lane number 2, or right hand or slow 
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lane, and he signaled properly and moved into the fast, or number 
one lane. 1-80 has two lanes for both the west and east-bound 
traffic at this point. Ekberg remained in the outside, or slow 
or number 2 lane, for a few moments then pulled into the fast 
lane behind defendant. There was no other traffic on the freeway 
at that time. Upon Ekberg pulling behind defendant, defendant 
again signaled and moved back into the right or slow lane. 
Ekberg evidently turned on his emergency equipment then and 
defendant pulled over to the side of the road. 
5. Ekberg approached from the passenger side and observed 
defendant as the driver and a woman asleep as the front 
passenger. She remained asleep a few moments, though it was cold 
and he had a flash light turned on. Ekberg made several 
observations quickly, which of course are not shown on the video. 
There was luggage in the rear seat. The vehicle had a GPS unit 
and a map was visible. Ekberg could see four (4) cell phones 
evidently connected together according to his testimony, though 
he later admitted they were not all connected to a charger. 
Ekberg saw a coffee cup $nd fast food papers, indicating to him 
the occupants were driving in a hurry and not desiring to stop. 
6. Ekberg asked, at 11:07, how it was going and then asked 
where defendant was going. Defendant said to Chicago. Ekberg 
asked where he had come from, and defendant said Oakland, 
California. Ekberg stated the fast lane is for passing only and 
-3-
the rear license plate was not illuminated. Ekberg then asked 
how long defendant was going to be in Chicago and if he had 
family there. Ekberg asked, at 11:09, for the rental agreement. 
Ekberg testified he saw a Hertz tag on the GPS system, but Ekberg 
made clear later on the video that he had seen and called in this 
vehicle shortly before stopping it and knew it was a rental 
vehicle before he stopped it. Defendant handed a paper to Ekberg 
who examined it and it was not a rental agreement but an 
inspection paper concerning the vehicle. While this was going on 
Ekberg observed that defendant was uncontrollably nervous, 
shaking as he handed the papers to Ekberg. Defendant also 
avoided eye contact. Ekberg then asked when the vehicle was 
rented and how long defendant planned to keep the car. The 
rental showed it was rented in Oakland, at the airport, and was 
to be returned to the Chicago airport on January 16, 2009, and 
cost over $1200 to rent, Ekberg asked what they were going to do 
in Chicago and was told they were visiting family, amd when asked 
who, defendant paused a bit (a few seconds) and stated his uncle, 
and Ekberg asked what his uncle's name was. Defendant 
immediately stated Bob. At that point Ekberg pointed out to 
defendant the paper defendant had given Ekberg was not the rental 
agreement. Ekberg asked who the female was and defendant stated 
it was his wife. Ekberg then asked, at 11:10, for defendant's 
license. Ekberg asked if this was all their luggage and the 
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female stated no, but also stated there was nothing m the trunk. 
Upon receipt of the license, Ekberg noted it was a Hawaii license 
and asked defendant if he lived in Oakland or Hawaii. Defendant 
said he had a restaurant m Oakland. Ekberg asked, at 11:14, 
other questions about travel, such as where the vehicle was 
rented, whether they going to drive back to California, and why 
they did not fly. Defendant stated they wanted to enjoy the 
drive and it was cheaper than flying. Ekberg asked if they had 
plans to stop and stay somewhere. Defendant stated they may go 
on to Memphis, and they had grandkids in Birmingham, but had no 
set plans. Defendant said he was semi-retired and was 60 years 
old. 
7. At 11:14 EKberg went back to his patrol car, and stated 
to someone he was going to need a dog, and called evidently his 
supervisor or sergeant, Loveland, and asked if Cunningham would 
mind coming out. (The court is aware that Summit County Deputy 
Sheriff Bryan Cunningham is the handler for a trained drug 
detection dog.) Ekberg then called for a carine unit. Ekberg 
then called into dispatch and asked for checks on defendant's 
license and criminal history. 
8. Ekbeig was engaged j_n other iadio traffic wxth others d.nd 
was talking about the "crazy" story of defendant, and what 
evidence Ekberg had as to his suspicions. Ekberg characterized 
the story of defendant as "very, very bizarre." Ekberg stated 
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defendant's wife was much, much younger, perhaps in her 20s or 
30s and they claimed were going to see grandkids. In fact the 
evidence later showed according to some comments on the video 
that defendant's wife was age 65. 
9. At 11:22 Ekberg stated he was coming up on 15 minutes and 
would go see if he could get consent. No result was evident from 
the dispatch concerning the license of defendant. 
10. Ekberg went to defendant and asked him to step out and 
they examined the rear license plate light. Defendant asked if 
everything was alright. Ekberg returned the documents, license 
and rental, and issued a verbal warning as to the lane change and 
license plate light. Ekberg then asked if he could ask some more 
questions. Defendant stated he wanted to get going. Ekberg at 
11:23 asked if defendant had anything illegal, and named various 
drugs and defendant stated no to each inquiry. Ekberg asked if 
he could search the vehicle and defendant stated no. Ekberg then 
stated he would detain defendant, who could wait in defendant's 
car, while a canine unit came. Ekberg asked for the car keys for 
safety. Defendant returned to his vehicle and Ekberg to his 
patrol car at 11:25. Ekberg called in to his supervisors 
evidently, and just as the dog arrived the Sargent indicated 
defendant had a very old criminal marijuana conviction (from the 
1960s) and some other old arrests, and a valid license. 
11. The certified dog and its handler arrived at 11:28, and 
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was deployed on the vehicle at 11:31. It indicated aggressively 
and strongly on the trunk area, and based on that Ekberg opened 
the trunk at 11:33. Inside the trunk the troopers found what has 
proven the be over 76 pounds of marijuana, the subject of this 
information and motion. Defendant and his wife were arrested, 
though his wife was not charged. They found $2105 cash on 
defendant. 
DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THE STOP 
1. Ekberg was justified in stopping the vehicle as he 
observed an equipment violation. Ekberg testified the license 
plate light was not functioning and there was no other testimony 
to the contrary other than the arguments about what is and is not 
observable on the video. Again, the court cannot conclude as 
defendant suggests that the light was in fact functioning from an 
observation of the video. The court credits the testimony of 
Ekberg. This is true even if the traffic violation stop is a 
pretext for what otherwise may be a stop due to an improper 
motivation. State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (UT App. 2000). From 
comments on the video there is little doubt Ekberg was intending 
to look for drugs even before the stop. 
2. Defendant argues Ekberg's testimony is not credible in 
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several respects. The court has examined the video carefully and 
compared it to the testimony and defendant's interpretations and 
arguments about those sources of information. The court does not 
believe the statements attributed are any thing more than either 
exaggeration to superiors or a failure to communicate precisely 
or a failure to recall specifics. The explanation for the 
inconsistencies is not, in this court's view, fabrication by 
Ekberg. For example, saying to a superior that defendant took 15 
seconds to name his uncle, when in fact a very few seconds passed 
after Ekberg asked who was being visited, followed quickly by a 
question about his name and defendant giving that name. That 
does not demonstrate Ekberg is lying, only that there are other 
factors at play concerning either Ekberg's recollection or his 
relationship with his superior. The court does not find any 
"lies" by Ekberg, but as will be discussed, does find errors in 
conduct under what this court believes is the law of this state. 
3. The other reason given by Ekberg for the stop is not 
supported by the law. Again, the court does not find or conclude 
Ekberg is lying about the lane change situation, only that he 
misunderstood the law and misapplied it. The court certainly does 
not read UCA 41-6a-704 as allowing only passing in the fast lane, 
or lane number 1, where there are two lanes of travel. The 
v,fast" lane is described in the statute as a general purpose lane 
and it may be used for travel unless it impedes someone behind in 
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that lane. Thus, Ekberg's belief that defendant impeded his, 
Ekberg's travel, is rejected by the court as a valid reason for a 
traffic stop. Driving in the left or fast lane simply, in this 
court's view, is not prohibited unless it impedes traffic. Here, 
defendant was in the slow lane, lane number 2, Ekberg came up 
behind defendant and defendant moved to the fast lane, Ekberg did 
the same, and then concluded defendant was traveling in a lane to 
be used only for passing. An officer must, as defendant argued, 
know the law and what it prohibits. If the officer validly 
believes the conduct is a violation of a traffic law and in fact 
the conduct is NOT a violation of the law, his good-faith 
personal misunderstanding and belief does not justify the stop. 
4. Still, here, the stop is valid because of the observed 
equipment violation, even though the other reason is not a valid 
basis on which to stop a motorist. 
5. Vehicle stops used to be considered in the context of 
what was often called the "pretext" doctrine. That standard is 
no longer the law and a vehicle stop is fully justified and 
lawful EVEN IF the real reason the officer stopped the vehicle 
was other than expressed by the officer. 
6. When speaking of "pretext" we normally ascribe that 
criticism to an action that has a motive which is at odds with 
the action. The "motive" is incompatible with the ordinary 
reason for the action. In a law enforcement action, the issue 
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really is: what is to be done (by the courts who review what 
officers do) when the police do the right thing for the wrong 
reasons, that is, they do a lawful act with an improper motive? 
That question has now, with "nails in the coffin," been answered. 
The answer is that the courts do nothing. 
7. The United States Supreme Court basically has taken the 
focus away from why the police act to ask what actions do the 
police engage in. If a driver is driving in violation of law, the 
police have the right to stop him, regardless of their "true 
motive." 
8. While many, many commentators have bemoaned this trend 
and the status of the law, it clearly is the law of this land. 
The "objective" approach has been many years in coming, but it is 
here and evidently here to stay at least for the foreseeable 
future. It perhaps started in the early 1970s, perhaps altered 
course before 1996, but since then has been solidified and ended 
with a recent case originating in Utah. 
9. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) the Court 
made clear that an officer's subjective motive does not 
invalidate "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment." Further, "subjective intentions play no role m 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." The Fourth 
Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows actions taken, 
whatever the subjective intent. 
-10-
10. In another context, the Court in United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), dealt with a probation search, 
where in the past the intent of the officers and agents had been 
relevant. In this case the Court again held that it had no need 
to examine the "official purpose" or actual motivation of the 
officers who made the search, to determine whether it was 
investigatory or "probationary." 
11. Ending any doubt about whether the objective standard 
applies not only in "pretext" situations but in general search 
and seizure law, the Court in 2006 decided a case from Utah, 
Brigkam City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). In what 
would normally be called an "exigent circumstances" case, the 
Court quickly rejected a request for a subjective analysis, as to 
why the officers "really" entered the residence. The Court said 
"It therefore does not matter . . . whether the officers entered 
the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against 
them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence." The 
Court also said clearly that "An action is 'reasonable-' under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of 
mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
I 4. v. ,, i _. _ +_ _• ~ ~ rr [ tix^ j dULlUfj. 
12. While determining reasonableness of an officer's action, 
the court is to consider whether the totality of the 
circumstances justify the action under an objective standard, 
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regardless of the officer's state of mind. State v. Worwood, 
2007 UT 47. It must be determined (A) whether the "officer's 
action [was] justified at its inception;" and (B) whether the 
"resulting detention [was] reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified" the stop. State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 
1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). 
13. A traffic stop is justified where an officer observes a 
traffic violation or equipment violation within his presence. 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 30. Examples of observed 
violations include improper lane changes, driving without 
insurance, indications the driver is driving under the influence, 
driving with a false registration, and other infractions. See 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 1 26; and Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 30. 
14. From this line of cases, the court concludes that1 
whether Ekberg secretly desired to search this vehicle for drugs, 
upon observing an objectively stated equipment violation, the 
stop was legitimate under the constitution. Ekberg's belief that 
the law was violated as to the lane change does not legitimize 
the stop for the alternate reason of a traffic violation, 
however. 
THE DETENTION. 
15. Once the stop is made, the detention must be temporary 
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop, to give a warning, citation, or receive some 
explanation by the driver. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
In a routine traffic stop, the officer may request a license and 
registration, conduct a compute check and issue a citation. Once 
those items have been produced, the motorist is entitled to 
proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by 
police for additional questioning. Any further temporary 
detention for investigative questioning after the fulfillment of 
the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified only if the 
officer has reasonable suspicion of other serious criminal 
activity. State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (UT App 1990). 
16. Under Utah law, as stated in State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 
115, a seizure occurs if in view of all the circumstances a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. 
The State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the 
officer's actions during an investigative detention. The officer 
may detain the driver to conduct a limited investigation of the 
circumstances that caused the detention. The detention, if it 
exceeds the reason for the original traffic stop detention, must 
be temporary and necessary and must be based on reasoranle 
Suspicion the officer can articulate. The couit looks to the 
totality of the circumstances to determine if there is an 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity and for a 
continued detention. "Investigative acts that are not reasonably 
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related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for 
the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay 
already lav/fully experienced and do not represent any further 
intrusion on the [the detainee's] rights." 
17. The duration of a stop is not to be any "longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. 
Weaver, 2007 UT App 292, f 13. "Once the purpose of the initial 
stop is concluded... the person must be allowed to depart." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 1 31. Any further detention constitutes an 
illegal seizure, "unless an officer has probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion of further illegality." Id. However, the 
officer must have reasonable suspicion BEFORE the detention 
becomes illegal. See Weaver, 2001 UT App 292. 
18. This case highlights that concept and the difficulties 
in reviewing the conduct of officers in the field. Under Utah 
cases, the purpose for the stop may be explored but unless there 
is reasonable suspicion to conduct other investigation which 
lengthens the detention, if the officer delays the motorist, that 
investigation is not permissible. The court examines the length 
of the delay as well as the overall reasonableness. Contrary to 
wnat appears to be popular knowledge, as evidenced by Ekberg's 
comments that he was "coming up n 15 minutes," courts in general 
and the Utah courts have NOT set a "time limit" of any sort. 
Reasonableness is the touchstone. Obviously a long delay is 
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scrutinized more fully than a delay of 2 seconds while the 
officer bends over to pick up his dropped pen. 
19. Thus, in a traffic stop this court believes the law is 
that an officer may and must pursue that investigation which 
caused the stop initially. That involves, in a case such as 
this, an investigation into the equipment violation and even 
though mistaken in his belief as to the legitimacy of the stop 
for improper lane travel, making sure that the driver is alert, 
safe, and not impaired in some way. 
20. This case, as well as many others, highlights the 
difficulty faced by the officers in the field and by this court 
in "reviewing" or "second guessing" what officers do in the 
field. In fact and practice, that is what is involved. An 
officer's conduct is reviewed many miles and months from the 
conduct in the field. As has been said in other contexts, this 
review of what occurs in the heat of the day in "mid-battle" 
takes place in the cool shade of the evening. Nevertheless, our 
law compels such review. 
21. The unlimited and endless possibilities make it 
impossible for the court to adequately explain all possible 
scenarios as each case is so fact dependent that generalities are 
almost useless. However, the court believes that the Utah cases 
require an officer, when a traffic stop is made, to explore first 
that traffic stop. As the cases hold, the officer may ask for 
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license and registration, run a check, and then, absent other 
suspicion, send the motorist on his way. Of course the 
difficulty is determining, in the field and now on review, 
whether that officer has other reasonably objective suspicions 
that justify further and other investigation and thus further and 
delayed detention. 
22. Here, obviously, Ekberg approached the vehicle and began 
a discussion not about missing or broken lights, not about lane 
travel, but about "where have you been and where are you going." 
That discussion clearly detained defendant, three minutes in this 
instance, before Ekberg even asked for a rental agreement or 
driver's license. (Obviously Ekberg knew when he spoke that this 
vehicle was rented, as he had "run" the plate before stopping it 
and no doubt could make observations about the vehicle's interior 
that showed it was rented, a Hertz sticker on the GPS unit). 
23. Thus, contrary to the State's argument, the court 
concludes that such an investigatory questioning is, in this 
context, not permitted absent other facts yielding reasonable 
suspicion. Again, neither this court nor any court can or should 
write a "script" nor envision all possibilities. Generally, 
however, if suspicious circumstances appear to the officer upon 
an approach to a vehicle, those may be explored. 
24. The court rejects the argument of the State that the 
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
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Circuit allow such routine questioning about travel plans upon 
approach to a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. An 
examination of those cases, and the court has read the cases 
cited by the State, reveals that the law in the federal circuit 
appears to be that AFTER asking for license and registration a 
limited conversation about travel plans is justified as part of 
the traffic stop. The cases examined do show that the officer in 
those, upon approach to the vehicle, acted in the way the Utah 
courts require officers to conduct themselves under a 
constitutional analysis. The officer in those cases asked for 
license and registration. DURING that process questions can be 
asked about travel plans, but that questioning MAY NOT 
substantially delay the temporary detention, especially where the 
delay occurs BEFORE the officer even asks for license and 
registration. That is, unless there are other factors that 
justify the questioning. The Tenth Circuit often notes in its 
cases that the questioning about travel plans did not lengthen 
the detention. See, for example, United States v. Williams, 211 
F.3d 1262 (10th Cirr 2001). 
25. The issue, here, is whether Ekberg had such other 
information that justified his questioning at the beginning of 
the stop, before he asked for registration (rental agreement) and 
license. The court rules and concludes that absent such other 
reasonable suspicion, the delay of three minutes BEFORE even 
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seeking license and registration is an unlawful detention. 
26. To state preposterous extreme examples, if an officer 
stops a vehicle for speeding and approaches the vehicle and sees 
a bloody corpse in the rear seat, obviously the officer need not 
simply ask for license and registration. The difficulty comes, 
of course, NOT when there is a bloody corpse, or smoking gun, or 
observable open packages of cocaine for example on the rear seat, 
but the difficulty comes when the officer sees what he has been 
trained to believe are "indicators" of unlawful (usually drug) 
activity that are much more benign than a bloody corpse. 
27. Here, that very case presents itself. Ekberg did not 
ask for license and registration until almost 3 minutes had 
passed. Those three minutes were consumed by Ekberg asking about 
travel plans, destination, stays, names of uncles, and so forth. 
Those questions to this court do not go directly to an 
investigation concerning the reasons for the stop, at least on 
the surface. This court does not believe, however, as defendant 
argues, that an officer MUST only inquire about what it is that 
appears suspicious, though that is certainly possible and often 
logical. The officer must purse an investigation that is designed 
to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicions. The precise nature 
of that investigation is often common and frequent, but it cannot 
be "mapped" by the courts as the facts are so divergent often. 
For example, upon approaching a vehicle and observing what 
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appears to be a blood spot on the carpeted floor, or possibly the 
handle of a gun under the seat, an officer is NOT required to ask 
"why is that blood there" or "whose gun is that." An officer may 
use misdirection, or even subterfuge, and may not want to 
escalate a situation or alert the occupants as to his 
observations until, for example, back up arrives or he has 
further confirmed or dispelled his observations and determined it 
is not a gun handle but a plastic container. Thus, the officer 
may be justified in such a situation as a typical traffic stop in 
asking about travel plans as a "stall" until some other officer 
arrives or until the officer can confirm or dispel his suspicions 
about the observations he has made. As an example in this case, 
having seen 4 cell phones, a conversation about where defendant 
was going may reveal he was a cell phone salesman, thus 
dispelling that suspicion. The conversation about travel may 
confirm or dispel the suspicion about the luggage, as it may be 
revealed defendant was a salesman with his wares in the trunk. 
Thus, there can be no hard and fast rule that an officer must 
only ask directly about what he has seen. There are valid 
reasons for asking about travel plans when the results cf that 
investigative tactic may reveal whether the driver is fully 
alert, or whether he is impaired by fatigue or some substance, or 
simply to in other ways confirm or dispel the suspicion evident 
from the indicators observed. The ability or inability to carry 
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on a sensible conversation may, of course, give an officer 
substantial information about the condition of the driver or his 
right to possess the vehicle as well. The questioning in this 
case does not, on the surface, go to the suspicion observed yet 
it would still be a legitimate detention and investigation based 
on what the officer saw under certain circumstances. Again, 
absent some other indications, however, an officer, in this 
court's view based on Utah case law, may not simply engage in a 
three minute dialogue about travel plans if that is not designed 
to investigate the reasons for the traffic stop or if it is not 
based on reasonable suspicion based on other factors. 
28. Here, however, Ekberg observed factors he said were 
"indicators'" and the court will discuss those further. However, 
the court rejects most of them as being the basis for any 
suspicion, even combined with other factors. The court 
understands that clearly both Utah law and United States Supreme 
Court law (for example, State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 501 (UT 
2005); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) and previous 
case law) require the courts to examine the totality of factors 
and circumstances and to not examine in isolation the factors, to 
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some factor. Nevertheless, there are often advanced 
"indicators" that in this court's view are simply not indicators 
of anything suspicious, no matter what they are combined with. 
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29. Here, the factors the court finds could concern a 
reasonable officer, and give rise to some suspicion, are that 
there were 4 cell phones immediately visible, luggage m the rear 
seat of a large car, and defendant was extremely nervous. 
30. Again, the State asks the court to include the travel 
plans as being suspicious. The court rejects those travel plan 
indicators at this point, and their claimed inconsistency, in 
this analysis because they beg the question. The question is, 
could Ekoerg ASK about those plans based on what he had seen and 
what he knew upon approach to the vehicle. Again, if, for 
example, Ekberg saw what he believed was a marijuana seed, or 
smelled marijuana, he may be able to detain and ask questions, 
even though they were unrelated to that observation. There can 
be no bright line questions that the courts will "approve" but 
the investigation must be logically related to the suspicion the 
officer has and must seek to confirm or dispel the suspicion. 
31. That questioning about travel plans would be 
permissible IF it occurred during the gatnenng of rne Documents 
and during the actual investigation of the traffic violation. The 
State did not demonstrate tnat such questions were asked while 
tl e docur-nts were being aatnered sacn that tre cuesticnmcr o_^ d 
not lengtnen the stop beyond the traffic stop. Clearly, from the 
DVD, m e "investigation" of the equipment violation and perceivea 
(but wrong) lane violation did not get under way for almost three 
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minutes. The court does not suggest there is only one rote 
memorized script law enforcement must apply. Certainly an 
officer can and should be polite, can perhaps ask "where are you 
headed" or something to "pass the time," but an officer is NOT 
free to begin a dialogue, detaining a motorist, on something 
totally unrelated to the reason for the stop unless there are 
circumstances that justify such an investigation. 
32. In this case much of the suspicion stated by Ekberg were 
BECAUSE of the answers given by defendant and Ekberg's 
misinformed and perhaps unreasonable belief in the "craziness" of 
the story. Again, for now the court is discounting those, 
however, discussing first whether those questions could be asked 
based on the objective evidence observed by Ekberg. If the 
questions could be asked, the court may consider those questions 
and answers about travel plans and any suspicion they reveal, in 
the overall equation of whether there was sufficient suspicion to 
justify further detention. If the questioning was impermissible, 
the detention was unlawful and the statements given ought not to 
be considered as a basis for Ekberg's suspicion. 
33. The "indicators" claimed by the State, and stated by 
Ekberg, Include the travel plans. Discounting those, rhe claimed 
factors giving suspicion the fact that the car was on 1-80, ihere 
was luggage in the rear seat, there were 4 celL phones, a map, a 
GPS, a coffee cup, food papers about the vehicle, lack of eye 
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contact, the nervousness of defendant, and the female seemed to 
remain asleep for awhile even with an open window on a cold 
night. After the license and rental agreement were obtained, it 
could be seen by Ekberg this was a one way trip from Oakland to 
Chicago in a big, expensive vehicle ($1200 plus) compared to the 
quicker, possibly cheaper, air travel and the woman stated they 
had more luggage but it was not in the trunk. 
34. Facts that could be construed as indicators of legal 
behavior as well as illegal behavior do not carry much weight. 
See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Facts 
when considered in their totality that give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of further illegality are exemplified by several cases. 
Large amounts of money and drugs visible inside rhe passenger 
compartment of a vehicle justifies reasonable suspicion. See 
State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) . If during 
the traffic stop, an officer smells marijuana, it creates a 
reasonable suspicion to prolong investigatory detention. See 
State v. Parkin, 2007 UT App 193 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
Additionally, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and the smell of 
alcohol gives rise to reasonable suspicion. See Worv/ood, 2007 UT 
47. Facts thai: may not give rise to reasonable suspicion because 
they can be indicators of legal behavior are nervousness, are 
lack of eye contact, and a lack of cold weather gear when the 
driver is headed to cold location, especially when the driver is 
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from an area with a warm climate. See State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431. As to nervousness, the court believes the law is that 
"normal" nervousness is of limited significance, but extreme or 
uncommon or unusual nervousness is given more weight as a factor. 
Of course, this list is not complete, since there may be many, 
many other facts that are indicators of both legal and illegal 
behavior and they must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
35. The claim of the State is that the questioning was 
justified at its inception as simply part of the traffic stop. 
That is rejected. That position being rejected, the State's claim 
must be that the observations about the vehicle and its contents 
and the occupants by themselves amounted to reasonable suspicion 
to believe there was criminal activity. Again, to the court, 
given the above law, those factors have to boil down only to the 
observation of nervousness, the luggage in the back seat of a big 
car, and the 4 cell phones. The other claimed "indicators" are 
so common to all travelers that they cannot possibly, even when 
combined with other "legitimate" factors, be considered 
suspicious. Every major city west of Utah could be considered a 
drug source city, every major city east of Utah could be 
considered a delivery point, every freeway could be considered a 
drug corridor, every coffee drinker who needs a map is 
suspicious, and on and on. Rental cars have GPS units in today's 
world and that cannot add suspicion, even when combined with 
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other factors. Of course it is well known that drug couriers 
often do fly from the east to the west, obtain marijuana, rent a 
vehicle and return east in a rental car with the contraband. 
Still, rental cars are so common, and they have maps and GPS 
devices, such that those factors cannot amount to any suspicion. 
The possible suspicious factors are more unusual, more truly 
indicative of something out of the ordinary. The list is endless, 
but certainly includes of course the actual observation of drugs, 
odor masking agents, visible drug paraphernalia, a driver 
impaired by drug usage, large amounts of cash and other such 
factors. Of course the court must not dismiss the concept that 
officers are also trained to observe things and their experience 
must not and is not discounted and it is not discounted. 
Traveling on Interstate 80 CANNOT be suspicious in any way. What 
would be suspicious is if a person going a long distance, perhaps 
from California or Nevada to a point east, was traveling on small 
roads or through the fields and meadows and country side of a 
rural area. Attaching any significance to travel on a freeway 
is, in this court's view, simply not what the lav/ allows. The 
presence of coffee or energy drinks is not a factor. Driving, 
even a short distance, is often perceived as boring and something 
may be needed for energy. 
36. Again, while nervousness alone is insufficient to 
justify further detention, the nervousness Ekberg saw was not the 
standard factor often mentioned. This was described as hand 
shaking nervousness, stalling in conversation, and after three 
minutes of discussion defendant was still shaking, meaning the 
initial nervousness of a driver being stopped had not subsided. 
The court considers all factors observed by Ekberg and found by 
tne court to determine if, in combination, they were objectively 
reasonable indications of criminal activity other than the 
purpose of the stop. Here, that nervousness is one factor that 
weighs moderately. ''Normal" nervousness is of limited 
significance, but nervousness is not a nullity, and extreme 
nervousness combined with other suspicious activity may amount to 
reasonable suspicion. State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278, 1281 (UT 
App. 2000) 
37. The other factors here that the court believes justify 
the questions by Ekberg, combined with the nervousness, are the 
cell phones (4) and luggage being in the rear seat of a large 
car. Again, avoiding and not considering the travel plans, those 
items were necessarily readily and quickly observed by Ekberg. 
Of course there are innocent explanations for having the luggage 
in the rear seat. A passenger, or driver, may desire to retrieve 
items quickly, including snacks or reading material (for the 
passenger). The paities may have several family members who have 
different cell phone numbers. The fact that there ARE innocent 
explanations does not mean to a trained officer, however, that 
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such officer cannot reasonably articulate those as being 
suspicious. The four cell phones are certainly unusual, 
especially for two people. Whether Ekberg was right or wrong 
about being hooked up to chargers, four cell phones is not normal 
and standard for two people in a rental car. A trained officer 
could readily conclude, objectively, that the reason the luggage 
is in the back seat and not the trunk of a large vehicle with 
presumably a large trunk is because something else is in the 
trunk. 
38. This trained officer no doubt believed the items he saw 
and their configuration were indicative of someone possibly 
possessing and moving drugs, and from an objective standpoint the 
court must agree. 
39. The State urges that during the wait for the canine, 
Ekberg learned defendant had a drug conviction in the 1960s. The 
court rejects that as any basis for reasonable suspicion given 
the age of that conviction and the age of this defendant, age 60. 
A criminal history may or may not be a legitimate factor, at 
another point in time depending on circumstances, but not in this 
instance. Further, it is in this case irrelevant as there was 
reasonable suspicion without such information that justified the 
detention and this information added nothing and came only during 
the wait for the drug detection dog. 
40. Once the questioning began at the initial encounter, 
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the answers' to questions may or may not provide a basis to 
conclude legally that reasonable suspicion exists. The travel 
plans and conversation may or may not "add" to the level of 
suspicion, depending on what is asked and what is answered. In 
this case it is not necessary to fully decide that, because the 
detention was already lawful based on the factors observed and 
discussed (four cell phones, luggage in the rear seat, and 
extreme nervousness). To the extent the court needs to determine 
that issue, this is a close case. Many cases involve travel 
plans that clearly are very suspicious. (I am going to visit a 
friend in Wyoming but I don't know what city he lives, for 
example.) Some are not suspicious from an objective basis. This 
case is not on either end of the spectrum. The court agrees that 
these travel explanations were somewhat suspicious, but 
objectively not as suspicious as Ekberg believed them to be, even 
given his training. Fairly considered, a semi-retired man rented 
a $1200 vehicle to drive to Chicago rather than fly; Ekberg's 
characterization of the "craziness" involving Memphis and 
Birmingham arose, the court believes, simply because Ekberg did 
not fully understand what defendant was saying. The plans are 
not in any sense, to this court, "crazy" but even with the 
presumable wealth that may or may not come with age, there is 
some "unusualness" in renting an expensive car for a short (in 
time) trip. Again, using as a basis that the trip began in 
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California cannot be suspicious, even a city such as Oakland and 
whatever connotations that elicits. Ekberg did not in fact know 
the cost to fly to Chicago, but assumed renting a car for $1200 
was more than flying. Even if it is, people drive rather than 
fly for many valid reasons, despite costs. It is not certain, 
and the court has no idea as to airfares at any given time. 
However, certainly taking 3-4 days to drive to Chicago when 3-4 
hours by air could achieve the same result causes one to wonder 
why a person would do that if the stay in Chicago was only for a 
few days. However, many people perhaps do want to take a "road 
trip" and "see the country" on the way. Still, an officer is not 
unreasonable in believing, even without knowledge, that such a 
plan is a bit unusual. However, that does not make it 
necessarily suspicious but it certainly is a factor to examine in 
determining whether there is overall reasonable suspicion, 
combined with the other three "major" factors. The court does 
not find that the remainder of the facts revealed by the travel 
discussion unusual. As noted, the one way rental may give some 
suspicion, but defendant indicated he was not sure of his plans 
after Chicago, whether he would go to Memphis, Birmingham, or 
drive or fly back to California. Again, some suspicion may arise 
from a knowledge of that fact, but it is not of great 
significance. After obtaining the rental agreement, the woman 
stated they had more luggage but it was not in the trunk. That, 
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of course, is certainly an odd statement, leading an officer to 
wonder just where that other luggage is if not in the car or in 
the trunk. That comment certainly gives some suspicion adding to 
the equation. 
41. Thus, because the court has concluded that Ekberg had 
sufficient reasonable suspicion based on his observations 
(extreme nervousness, 4 cell phones, luggage in rear seat) to ask 
about travel plans and delay the stop, the information learned 
about those travel plans may also be considered in the totality 
of circumstances in determining whether the detention was 
justified by the suspicion the officer had. The court concludes 
it was so justified. Ekberg thus was acting lawfully when he 
asked for consent to search. 
DETENTION WHILE AWAITING CANINE UNIT. 
42. Here, no consent was given but the further detention was 
justified by the factors above described. 
43. Again, in this court's view, there is seemingly some 
belief that there is a time frame during which a motorist may be 
required to await the arrival of a canine. That is not the law. 
The rest is again one of reasonableness. In a rural area, it 
will naturally take longer for a drug detention dog to arrive 
than it will in an urban setting where a vehicle is stopped 3 
blocks from the police station. Recently our court has observed 
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that in this particular realm, of waiting for a drug dog, and 
this court believes the comments apply to all such judicial 
reviews of police conduct, the courts are not to micro-manage the 
second by second conduct of a police officer. That amounts only 
to judicial second guessing. In determining if an officer acted 
reasonably in obtaining a canine to the scene, the overall 
reasonableness is examined, not the second by second conduct of 
the officer. State v. Wilkinson, 2008 Ut App 395. This court, as 
noted, believes those comments apply also to the traffic stop 
itself in that the courts cannot and do not require use of a stop 
watch by an officer nor require a particular script. 
44. Here, Ekberg acted expeditiously. When Ekberg returned 
ro his patrol car, at 11:14 he asked if Cunningham could come to 
the scene. Ekberg asked for consent at 11:24. The dog arrived 
at 11:27. This stop was some 12 miles from the Summit County 
Sheriff' s Office, where presumably Cunningham was. The dog was 
deployed at 11:31. After the alert, which amounted to probable 
cause to search the vehicle {United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 
1523 (10tn Cir. 1993),) defendant was arrested. The court 
concludes that the conduct of Ekberg in detaining defendant for 
purposes of having the canine present was reasonable and 
expeditious, was based on reasonable suspicion, and the detention 
while awaiting the dog was reasonable and based on reasonable 
suspicion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The court believes here the traffic stop, based entirely on 
the objective standard, was justified as the officer saw an 
equipment violation, whatever his true "motive" was. 
Upon approach to the vehicle, the officer is required to and 
may obtain license, registration, and run a computer check. 
Absent some other reasonable suspicion, the officer may not delay 
the stop or detention beyond what is required to complete the 
traffic stop, and the officer may not simply engage in a 
discussion for 3 minutes about travel plans, again absent some 
suspicion to do so. 
Here, the officer had such suspicion based on his 
observations upon approaching the vehicle. Those observations 
consisted of the extreme nervousness of defendant, the presence 
of luggage in the rear seat given the size of the car, and the 
presence of 4 cell phones with two people in the car. The 
officer, upon seeing those, thus had reasonable suspicion to 
justify further and delayed detention and further investigation. 
The courts cannot and do not write a script for officers, and the 
questioning undertaken to explore and confirm or dispel those 
suspicions arising from observations about a vehicle's contents 
is to be related in scope to the suspicion, but the questioning 
need not be directed solely at those suspicions as the motorist 
need not be "tipped" that the officer has such suspicions. Based 
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on the observations, and the information gathered by the 
discussion, the officer here had sufficient suspicion to justify 
detaining the motorist and the passenger. Upon asking for and 
being denied consent to search, a drug detection dog was 
reasonably summoned and alerted, yielding probable cause to 
search the vehicle. 
The motion to suppress is DENIED. 
This matter is set for a status conference for August 17, 
2009, at 8:30 a.m. to determine whether a trial will be scheduled 
or there will be some other disposition. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
i < A i 
DATED this 9 < day of / !j J [, {A' , 2009. 
' /' 
BY THE COURT: „ . -
BRUCE C. LUBECK-
DISTPICT COURT JUDGE 
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Addendum B 
Unofficial partial transcript — viaeo 01 name siop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: Summit 526, 10-60 [23:07] 
Dispatch: 526 
Trooper: 159 East bound. Texas Delta Mike X-ray 116 
Dispatch: 526, 10-60, 159 East bound 1-80, 2307 
Trooper: Good evening. Here, I'll come talk to you, so that I don't wake up these 
guys. 
(inaudible) 
Trooper: How's it going? I'm Niel. [23:08] 
Driver: Fm doing fine. 
Trooper: Okay. I'm Niel Ekberg from the Highway Patrol. Where are you headed 
tonight? 
Driver: We're heading to Chicago. 
Trooper: To Chicago? Where are you guys coming from? 
Driver: California. 
Trooper: Okay, are you from Chicago or? 
Driver: Uh, no, I'm just visiting family there. 
Trooper: You're just visiting family? Are you, so, you are from California? 
Driver: Yes, Sir. 
Trooper: What part of California? 
Driver: Um, uh, Oakland. 
Trooper: Oakland? Ok, um, the reason why I'm stopping you, you, here in the State 
of Utah, the number 1 lane is actually designated for passing only. I was 
just wondering why you were moving back into that number 1 lane 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Driver: Oh, I, I didn't know that. 
Trooper: You didn't know that? Okay. And then also, I know you are out of state 
and this is a rental, but the back, uh, rear plates need to be illuminated here 
in the State of Utah as well. 
Driver: So, my lights aren't working? 
Trooper: No they're, in fact, let's see. Yeah, the lights that are supposed to 
illuminate the, the plate aren't working on this. 
Driver: Okay. 
Trooper: So, you'll probably have to let Hertz, 
Driver: I guess that I'll have to go to a gas station. 
Trooper: Hertz, you'll have to let Hertz know about that.[23:09] 
Driver: Okay. 
Trooper: So, how long do you plan on staying in Chicago? 
Driver: Umm, probably for a few days. 
Trooper: Just for a few days. 
Driver: Yeah. 
Trooper: You said that your, you were visiting family. 
Driver: Yes, I am. 
Trooper: Ok, and just for a few days, huh? Making that big long trip for just a few 
days. 
Driver: Well, my, we've got a, we've got a, yeah, we are. 
Trooper: Okay. Do you have the rental agreement for the car? 
Driver: I do. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: When did you rent the car? 
Driver: Uhh, yesterday. 
Trooper: Just yesterday? Okay, how long have you had the trip planned for? 
Driver: Oh, just ummm, a little while. 
Trooper: Just a little while. 
Driver: Yeah. 
Trooper: Okay. What part of your, who, what family members you visiting in 
Chicago? 
Driver: I'm actually visiting my. my, uh, my uncle over there. 
Trooper: Your uncle, okay. What's your uncle's name? 
Driver: Bob 
Trooper: Bob? Okay. 
Driver: Bob's his name. 
Trooper: All right This is all of the rental agreement you have? [23:10] 
Driver: I think so. 
Trooper: Does it have, this is just, this is a pre-rental inspection form. 
Driver: (inaudible) 
Trooper: Who, who, who, uh, who's with ya? Who, who is this with ya? 
Driver: This is my wife. 
Trooper: Oh, it's your wife? Okay and I woke her up, I apologize. 
Driver: It's okay. 
Trooper: You're missing all the scenery here in Utah. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Driver: Yeah, well, we're trying to get, trying to do a mad drive out there. 
Trooper: Yeah? I bet, umm, you're Gary? 
Driver: Yes, I am. 
Trooper: Okay, do you have a valid driver's license, Gary? 
Driver: I do. 
Trooper: All your guy's luggage is just sitting in the back seat here? 
Driver: No. 
Trooper: What was that? 
Driver: Uh, no. 
Trooper: You got more luggage in the 
Driver: Here you go. 
Trooper: So, you're from Hawaii? 
Driver: Well, I do, I have a residence over there as well. 
Trooper: Oh, wow! So, okay, so how long have you lived in, in Oakland? [23:11] 
Driver: Oh, we just got a home, we actually it is (inaudible) island, it's close 
enough. 
Trooper: What was that? 
Driver: It's close enough, (inaudible) 
Trooper: Oh, the, in Oakland? 
Driver: Yeah. 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: We've got a restaurant there, so. That's what Uncle Bob is doing back. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: Mmhmm, all right. Where, where, did you rent the, the car exactly? 
Driver: In Oakland. 
Trooper: Okay. Just at a local Hertz place? 
Driver: Yes, Sir. 
Trooper: All right, so when you're done going to Chicago are you going to drive 
back? 
Driver: No, we're probably not. 
Trooper: What makes you want to drive out to Chicago, instead of fly out? 
Driver: Well, you now it's actually something that we are going to be enjoying on 
the ride as well. 
Trooper: Okay, do you, do you have any place in mind to stop? 
Driver: Well, when we get tired, we'll stop. [23:12] 
Trooper: But you, you said you wanted to enjoy the ride out there? 
Driver: Yeah, we'll probably, I think we just past Ut, umm, Salt Lake City, so I 
think probably, umm, another hour or so and we'll pull over. 
Trooper: Okay. Uh, so, you're going to fly back home to Oakland from Chicago? 
Driver: (inaudible) back down to Memphis, we have a friend who lives there. 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: So. 
Trooper: Umm, okay. So, what made you want to drive from Oakland to, to 
Chicago? 
Driver: Well, just, umm, just less expensive for it. 
Trooper: Right. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Driver: (inaudible) 
Trooper: Right. Do you, do you want to fly back? 
Driver: Well, we're either going to fly back or go down to Memphis and fly back. 
Trooper: Don't you mean fly down to Memphis? 
Driver: We might drive, I don't know. 
Passenger: We have no really good plan. 
Trooper: Okay. 
Passenger: We just kind of took, uh, 
Driver: We've got our grandkids down in, uh, in Birmingham, so we have to go 
through Memphis. [23:13] 
Trooper: Okay. So did you, were you going to fly from Chicago doAvn to Memphis 
maybe? 
Driver: No. 
Trooper: or drive or rent another car or what? 
Driver: You know we really don't have, uh 
Trooper: . No plans? 
Driver: No plans. 
Trooper: Are you guys retired, working or 
Driver: We're retired pretty much I'm 60 years old. 
Trooper: Okay, it's nice, it would be nice to be able to do that I'd say. Okay, so, 
what, were you guys going plan on staying anywhere in between here and 
Chicago, just 'til you get tired or. 
Driver: No, we'll probably (inaudible) 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: In Utah, you're going to stay? 
Driver: Probably 
Trooper: Okay, you don't have that much more left of Utah 
Driver: Oh really? 
Trooper: You only have about (inaudible) five miles of Utah, then you get into 
Wyoming. 
Driver: Well, I know, Cheyenne is probably the next stop, so. 
Trooper: Well, Cheyenne is pretty far, so. 
Driver: Is it? How far is it? So, 
Trooper: You're looking 
Driver: So, where would be the next city to stop in? 
Trooper: You've got little towns ma, most, the biggest major city you'll, is Evanston, 
it's still not really big, but Cheyenne is obviously, you're looking at 10 
hours away still so. [23:14] 
Driver: To Cheyenne? 
Trooper: Yeah. 
Driver: Oh, man. 
Trooper: Cause Cheyenne, still clear, you got to drive clear across Wyoming to get 
to Cheyenne. 
Driver: Ok. 
Trooper: So, umm, all of your luggage is in the back seat here? 
Driver: Pretty much. 
Trooper: You, you don't have anything in the trunk or anything? Do you, do you 
have your luggage in the trunk? 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Driver: No. 
Trooper: Nothing? Okay. Hang tight, let me go back and make sure everything's 
current and valid, okay. 
Driver: Okay. 
Trooper: Oh, I need a dog. Think Cunningham will mind coming out here? 
Cunningham:No, we'd love to. 
Trooper: Okay, 51, 526. 
51: 
51: 
51: 
Go ahead. [23:15] 
Trooper: Arevou 10-6? 
Negative. 
Trooper: Can you be in route to my location for a sniff? 
Not a problem. 
Trooper: Summit, 526, can I get a 27-29 check out of Hawaii? 
Dispatch: 10-4, 526, go ahead. 
Trooper: by number Hotel 01031771 and if you can do a triple I on that as well. 
Dispatch: 10-4 [23:16] 
598: Summit, 598, IT1 be out with 526. [23:17] 
Dispatch: 598,23-17 
598: Hey, now, we are going to just hang tigh back here until you need our 
assistance. 
Trooper: 10-4 
Cunningham: Have you got to the consent part yet? 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: No, Fm running his license and seeing if he has any triple I, Fm going to 
go talk to him. Eh, crazy story, crazy travel plans, big 'ol rental, Lincoln 
Town car and luggage is in the back seat and he says nothing is in the 
trunk. But, yeah, his story, he's got very, very bizarre travel plans. [23:18] 
Cunningham: I like it. 
Trooper: From Oakland, California by the way. 
Cunningham: Hate the Raiders. 
Trooper: Couldn't tell me his, uh, his uncle's name for about 15 seconds. 
Cunningham: Sounds like another one is getting ready to bite the dust to me. 
[23:19 to 23:20] 
Trooper: This rental cost twelve hundred and twenty-three dollars and, uh, they 
wanted to drive from Oakland to Chicago because it is too expensive to fly 
and they're going to fly back from Chicago to Oakland in two days. 
[23:21] 
Cunningham: (inaudible) He's prob, he's probably unemployed too. 
Trooper: No, he's retired. He's an older guy. 1948. 
(inaudible) 
Trooper: We have two, actually. There's, his, uh, wife who's much, much younger 
in the passenger seat, she was completely asleep laid out. Fm going to go 
see, uh, if he'll grant me consent, right now before Cunningham. Fm 
pushing my 15 minutes on the stop right now. Fm going to go give him his 
warning. [23:22] 
181: Summit, 181 with 526. 
Dispatch: 181,23-22 
Trooper: Hey, Gary, can I have you step out of the car back here, let me talk to you 
out here. 
Trooper: (inaudible) for a couple of days, right? And then you don't know where 
you're going from there? 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Driver: No, we are going to be going down to, as I said, to visit our kids in 
Birmingham, our grandkids. [23:23] 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: So. Is everything ok? 
Trooper: Yeah, ummm. Let me, uh, going to give you a warning for the light, like I 
said, these lights are suppose to be illuminating this plate. 
Driver: Those are the back up lights, sir. 
Trooper: Well, uh, either way, there's that light right there, there is supposed to be a 
light there. 
Unknown: Yeah, that's broken. 
Trooper: That's what that is. 
Driver: We'll get that taken care of. 
Trooper: And in the State of Utah, well, 
(Inaudible) 
Trooper: The State of Utah that number one lane is passing only. 
Driver: Okay. 
Trooper: I'm going to give you a warning for that. 
Driver: Thank you. 
Trooper: Umm, you said that you were retired, you don't have a job right, you don't 
mind if I ask you some more questions do you? 
Driver: Well, I'd like to get going, there's no reason, you know, I own a restaurant 
I'm in commercial property. 
Trooper: I thought you were retired. 
Driver: Well, I'm 60. 
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Trooper: 
Dri\ en So owning the property. \_:• ._-*] 
Trooper: uLiy, so, he: J. here's : ' • " 
in this vehicle do you\ 
Driver: No, Sir. 
•. , ) " : i i.""i ;:!: II i 1 1 laulii lg any kind of drugs1: 
- . j l 
Driver: 
Trooper; 
1 H i \ ',1*1 
Trooper: 
Driver: 
Trooper: 
NO, blT, 
No marijuana? 
No. Sir. 
[\jn | n ' | ' l i l f * 
No, Sir. 
No cocaine? No 
Trooper: No methamphetamines 
Driver: No. Thank you. • 
Trooper: Can I search ujui car""/ 
Driver: ' No 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: 1" J :>. 
Trooper: Let's have you sit tight, you're, you're going to be detained right now. We 
are going to call for a K-9 and have them sniff around the car. Okay. 
Driver: Oh, Okay. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: You don't have to do that. 
Trooper: So, well, I am going to do that. Let me just have you, we can have you just 
detained in the car. The K-9 will be here any moment. 
Driver: Oh, Okay 
Trooper: Okay. 
Driver: Fine 
Trooper: Okay. 
Unknown: Have them take the keys out. 
Trooper: Sir, let me have your keys, if you don't mind. Just for our safety. And you 
can sit back in the car until we get the dog here, okay. [23:25] 
Trooper: What's the 
Unknown: I'm going to sniff that damn trunk, can you (inaudible) before the dog gets 
here. 
Trooper: No, its, no, I got, everything's cool. 
Unknown: huh? 
Trooper: Yeah, dude, he's, he's busted. 
Unknown: Non 
Trooper: It's going to be good. 
Unknown: Non-consent? 
Trooper: Completely, no way and then he told me how 
Unknown: He hasn't had, a really, really old triple I, marijuana years ago, hitchhiking 
years and years ago all back in the 60s and he's got a valid DL. 
unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: Dude, he told me the reason he's driving from Oakland to Chicago is cause 
it is so expensive to fly. That rental is twelve hundred dollars alone. Then 
he said. 
Unknown: That's more than flying one way. 
Trooper: Then I asked him if he, are you going to fly back to Oakland and he's like 
well, maybe, well we might drive down to see our grandkids in Memphis. 
I'm like okay, so you're going to fly or drive down there, oh, maybe drive, 
and I'm like so, you're going to rent another car, well, no, maybe fly down 
there. So, you're going to just fly, it was great. [23:26] 
Unknown: That's awesome. 
Trooper: I talked to him for like, uh, ten minutes about the his trip it was just 
everything was weird, all the indicators are in there, this map, uh, GPS, all 
of his luggage is in the back seat. 
Unknown: And she way is younger than him. 
Trooper: Oh, she is way younger than him. 
Unknown: But they have grandkids? 
Trooper: Yeah. 
Unknown: He's scratching his head. 
Trooper: He's sweating bullets. 
Unknown: Look at him, dude. 
Unknown 2: (inaudible) no, I didn't want him to take off. 
Trooper: No, it's cool. I'm just glad that I, uh 
Unknown 2: Sit back here until the dog gets here. 
Unknown: Want to sniff the trunk? 
(inaudible) 
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Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: Well, there's markings just like the hundred pounds, but yeah, we can. 
[23:27] 
Unknown: Nippy 
Trooper: What was that? 
Unknown: Nippy, outside tonight. 
Trooper: I'm getting my hat on. 
Unknown: I here ya, I'm 
Trooper: I'm all sorts of excitement. 
Unknown: I haven't worn my hat tonight yet or that new coat I haven't worn it yet. 
Trooper: So, the 10-84 was, uh, for the triple I? 
Unknown: Really, really old triple I. 
Trooper: On, on 
Unknown: For misdemeanor stuff, nothing for a long time. 
Trooper. We got our dog here, so its less, less than one half hour. 
Unknown: I'm just going to sit back here and watch it. [23:28] 
Trooper: Except for, I, I don't know if I was mic'd when I was talking to him when I 
asked for consent. 
Trooper: You're going to be (inaudible) 
K-9 Trooper: Yeah. 
Trooper: Okay, uh, older dude twelve hundred dollar rental Lincoln Town car , from 
Oakland, California to Chicago, they're driving to Chicago, cause it is so 
expensive to fly. Twelve hundred bucks, they're going to be in Chicago a 
couple of days. He says he didn't have a job, he's, oh he's retired, he's got 
a really young wife, probably in her 20s, 30s, passenger seat, but yet they 
have grandkids in Memphis, Tennessee. And then when asked they're just 
unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
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going to be in Chicago for a couple of days, story goes on an on and on. He 
said that he was going to fly back to Oakland from Chicago, then they 
weren't sure. Umm, tons of indicators, all the luggage is in the back seat, 
asked them if there is anything in the trunk and then, uh, so, I gave him 
back all of his stuff, gave him a warning for all the stuff I stopped him for, 
then I did, the, the questions and he totally denied me, then straight up no. 
He does have 10-84 or for the you heard the triple I [23:29] 
K-9 Trooper: Adult? 
Trooper: Yep. 
K-9 Trooper: Okay, get them both out 15 feet in front of the car. 
Trooper: Cool. He would like both occupants to be 15 feet in front of the car. 
Trooper: All right, Gary, the dog has arrived, he's asking, you guys need to come out 
of the car and be about 15 feet up here, we'll watch you, if you guys have 
coats or what not you can get those out. [23:30] 
Trooper: Are you just getting a coat, jacket, what are you getting? 
Driver: Woo. 
Trooper: A little nippy, it is. A little colder than California. 
(inaudible) 
Trooper: You guys don't have any knives or weapons on you, nothing? [23:31] 
Passenger: No. 
Trooper: Okay. Yeah, just, you'll be safer over here in the grass over here. 
K-9 Trooper: Have them keep going a little bit further. 
Trooper: Little bit farther. Is that good? 
K-9 Trooper: Yeah. [23:32] 
Trooper: That's good. 
Unofficial partial transcript — video of traffic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: We need to get them separated. Hey, Josh, can you go get them separated? 
Let's keep them separated. [23:33] 
Trooper 1: What do you need? 
Trooper: I'm just having them separate them. 
K-9 Trooper: Oh, yeah, there's pot in there. 
Trooper: All right. Actually, I got the keys. See if we got the automatic trunk, ah, 
here we go. 
Trooper 2: There it is. 
Trooper: You take her I'll take him. Gary, do not move. Do not move from your 
position. Keep your hands out of your pockets. Put your arms behind your 
back, for your safety do not move, do you understand? I'm going to put 
two cuffs to make it more comfortable, okay, (inaudible) [23:34] 
Driver: Yeah, I had my shoulder operated on. 
Trooper: All right, (inaudible) big wide shoulders. Okay, you're under arrest. 
Trooper: Summit, 526, 10-82, a male and a female, 10-35 (inaudible) 
Dispatch: 10-4 (inaudible) 
[23:35 to 23:38] 
Trooper: It's awesome guys, it's like looking for drugs tonight and then, you know 
I'm going, cause he had something at the view area, um, so we're going 
over there and he let them go, see, and I pass this guy in toll gate and 
(inaudible) as soon as I pull up on him, I saw a town car firom Texas and he 
started tapping his breaks and I kind of passed him, I had already ran his 
plate when it came back as a Hertz rental, I slowed up, cause Loveland 22'd 
me and then he, uh, what's weird is I got behind him and I noticed that he 
didn't have, the light's burned out there, so, that was one of the reasons 
why I stopped him. Then he just pulled in the number one lane and not 
passing anybody, so left lane violation. [23:39] 
K-9 Trooper: How much is in there? 
unomciai partial transcript — video ot trattic stop 
Approximate times in brackets 
Trooper: I'm guessing a little over a hundred. 
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-oooOooo-
THE COURT: So we'll call State versus Duhaime. 
Mr. Duhaime is here with Mr. Metos. 
And, Ms. Natale, you said you had two witnesses or 
just one on this? 
MR. METOS: I expect the second witness will be 
fairly short. 
MS. NATALE: It will. He will. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that was Trooper Ekberg, as 
I recall. And who else? 
MS. NATALE: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Your other witness? Let's have them 
come up. Let's get — 
MS. NATALE: Okay. 
THE COURT: - let's go along. Step up, take an 
oath, gentlemen, and... 
(Whereupon, the potential witnesses 
for this case were duly sworn by 
the clerk.) 
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, whoever's not 
testifying first step outside, and don't talk about your 
testimony until you're in the courtroom. And your first 
witness is Trooper Ekberg again. 
Again, tell us your name and spell it, please. 
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COURT: 
Natale? 
called as a 
being first 
and 
NATALE 
: My name is Niel Ekberg, 
Thank you. 
NIEL EKBERG, 
N-i-e-1 
witness by the State of Utah, 
duly sworn, was examined 
testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
E--k-
Q. And you ' re p resen t ly employed as a t rooper with 
the Utah Highway Pa t ro l ; i s tha t correct? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Okay. And how long have you been a trooper, 
again? 
A. Approximately three years. 
Q. Okay. Drawing your attention to January the 14th 
of 2009, do you recall participating in a traffic stop 
involving a black 2008 Lincoln Town Car on that particular 
day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall the location where you first 
observed that car? 
A. Approximately milepost 158 on Interstate 80 in 
Summit County. 
1 Q. Thank you. And do you recall what time you first 
2 I observed that car? 
3 A. It was approximately 2306 at night. 
4 Q. And what drew your attention to it? 
5 A. The vehicle's back rear license plate was very 
6 hard to read and I noticed that it had — it did not have a 
7 working rear plate light. 
8 Q. Okay. As you observed the vehicle, were you -
9 were you stationary or moving when you first saw it? 
10 I A. I was moving. 
11 Q. You were moving. Okay. So upon first noticing 
12 that it was hard to read the plate, did you then try and get 
13 closer to the vehicle to determine whether or not the light 
14 was working? 
15 A. Yes, I did. 
16 Q. Okay. And so you were able to get close enough to 
17 determine that it wasn't illuminated. 
18 | A. Correct. 
19 Q. Okay. Did you observe anything else? 
20 J A. When I got closer in back of the vehicle to see if 
21 I the light wasn't working, the vehicle changed lanes into the 
22 i No. 1 lane. There was no traffic at all on the interstate; 
23 | I thought it was odd that he was going into the passing to 
24 pass no vehicles. So I followed and turned on my lights to 
25 I stop the vehicle. 
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1 Q. So what were the reasons, then, for the traffic 
2 Stop? 
3 A. Failure to illuminate the rear license plate and 
4 the left lane - he was actually traveling below the speed 
5 limit when he moved into the No. 1 lane. There was no 
6 reason for him to be in the No. 1 lane. So I advised him 
7 about the impeding the traffic in that No. 1 lane. 
8 Q. Okay. And there was no reason for him to be in 
9 the No. 1 lane because there was no one else around to pass? 
10 I A. No other traffic around. 
11 Q. All right. I understand. 
12 And you also mentioned that the car appeared to be 
13 traveling below the posted speed limit? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. What is the posted speed limit there? 
16 A. The posted speed limit is 70 miles per hour. 
17 Q. And approximately what speed was this black 
18 Lincoln Town Car traveling? 
19 A. Approximately 60 to 70 miles per hour, 10 miles 
20 I per hour under. 
21 I Q. I'm sorry, what was it? 
22 A. From 60 to 65 miles per hour. 
23 Q. Okay. So five to ten miles an hour under. 
24 A. C o r r e c t . 
2 5 I Q. And how did you determine that? Was that jus t a 
visual 
A. 
with my 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
estimation or did you confirm that with radar? 
I confirmed it with front moving and I paced him 
own speed. 
Okay. Front moving meaning? 
The radar. 
Okay. Did you initiate a traffic stop based on 
what you had observed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. * And what time was the stop made? 
A. At approximately 2306. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Within minutes of when I saw the — the violation. 
Q. Okay. Did the car pull over immediately? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And upon the car pulling over and you pulling up 
behind it, is there anything you do before you exit your — 
your vehicle and go up to the car to make contact with the 
driver? 
A. I exit and walk around my vehicle and approach on 
the passenger side. 
Q. Okay. So what time did you make — does — if your 
report indicates, contact with the driver of that car? 
A. 2308. 
Q. So approximately two minutes or so after you first 
observed the car. 
7 
A. Correct. 
Q. And the driver of that particular vehicle that you 
had stopped, do you see him in the courtroom today? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And is it the defendant, Mr. Duhaime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who's seated at counsel table? 
MR. METOS: We'll stipulate to his identification, 
Judge. 
MS. NATALE: Okay. 
Q. How did you identify Mr. Duhaime? 
A. Mr. Duhaime provided me with a Hawaii driver's 
license. Photo. 
Q. Okay. Did you determine whether or not the 
vehicle belonged to Mr. Duhaime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you determine with respect to that? 
A. Again, I — I observed that it was a — a rental 
vehicle and asked for the rental agreement. 
Q. Did you look at that rental agreement? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what did it indicate? 
A. It was a one-way rental from Oakland, California 
to Chicago, Illinois. And the thing that drew my attention 
to the rental was that it was a very expensive rental. 
8 
1 Q. How expensive? 
2 A. It was approximately $1,200. 
3 Q. Was Mr. Duhaime the only person in the car? 
4 A. No. There was a female passenger sleeping in the 
5 front seat. 
6 Q. Okay. So just the two of them? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. Did the rental agreement indicate who the 
9 renter of the vehicle was? 
10 I A. Yes. It was rented by Mr. Duhaime. 
11 I Q. Okay. Was there anything in particular — just 
12 talking about the rental agreement — that aroused your 
13 suspicions? 
14 A. That it was due back in Chicago and that it was 
15 I very expensive, that it was due at the Chicago Midway 
16 airport, and it was also rented at the Oakland airport. 
17 I Q. Was there anything significant to you about either 
18 I it being rented in Oakland or being returned to Chicago? 
19 A. Correct. It was — it was due back in Chicago in a 
20 couple of days. 
21 I Q. I guess my question, though, was there anything 
22 I that made you suspicious just based on the locations where 
23 it was rented from or being returned to? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 I Q. What? 
A. Just - it was rented at Oakland airport and it was 
due back at the Chicago airport. 
Q. But why are Oakland or Chicago significant to you? 
A. Major cities. From prior experience, drug 
traffickers fly from the east to the west coast, pick up the 
drugs and drive them back east. 
Q. Based on your training and experience, is Oakland 
a major distribution center from which -
A. Yes. 
Q. — drugs leave? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, as you were speaking with the 
defendant, did you notice anything else, any other 
indicators or things that made you suspicious that there 
might be drug activity or criminal activity afoot? 
A. Yes. Mr. Duhaime was very, very nervous in 
answering questions about his trip, his origination and his 
destination. He was very unsure of his answers. Every 
answer that he would answer, he would look up and stall as 
if he was seeking and making up the answer as he was going 
along. He avoided eye contact when answering those simple 
questions. His travel circumstances were very, very 
suspicious. 
Q. Can you elaborate on that? 
A. Yes. He — he provided me different versions of 
10 
1 why he was making this one-way trip from Oakland to Chicago. 
2 ! He first stated that he was going to visit his — a family 
3 member. I asked what family member; he had a hard time 
4 telling me what family member. He told me that he was 
5 visiting his uncle. I asked him what his uncle's name was; 
6 he blurted out "Bob" and said, "Yes, Bob's his name." 
7 He just acted very nervous and unsure of these 
8 simple questions. 
9 Q. Anything else? You mentioned that he appeared to 
10 I be nervous. Other than being unsure or somewhat 
11 inconsistent in his answers, did you notice any other 
12 physical behavior that made you think that he was nervous? 
13 A. Just the way he was talking and answering 
14 questions. It seemed like he had a frog in his throat and 
15 he had a hard time answering those questions. 
16 Q. Did you observe any shaking, sweating, anything 
17 I like that? 
18 A. No. 
19 I Q. Okay. Okay. So the suspicious travel 
20 I circumstances, I think you — 
21 i A. When I asked for the rental agreement, he also had 
22 a hard time finding that rental agreement. And when he 
23 I located what he thought was the rental - he gave me a 
24 vehicle inspection form that wasn't the rental agreement. 
25 And so I actually had to tell him that that wasn't the 
11 
rental agreement. 
Q. Did he have any difficulty producing his license 
or just the rental agreement? 
A. Just the rental agreement. 
Q. Okay. So you mentioned - I think the third 
indicator or so that you mentioned was the suspicious travel 
circumstances? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What, if any, other indicators did you observe? 
A. He told me that he was going to Chicago to visit 
his uncle and then he stated that he was going to Memphis to 
see his grandkids. And then that later changed to 
Birmingham, Alabama to see grandkids. 
Q. So he mentioned three different possible locations 
or destinations where he was going? 
A. Yes. And I knew that the rental vehicle was due 
back in Chicago, so I asked him how he was going to go to 
Memphis or Birmingham, and he did not know. 
Q. Did the rental agreement indicate when the car was 
due back in Chicago? 
A. Yes. I don't have a copy of it wTith me, though. 
Q. Okay. I guess what I'm just wondering was — is 
whether — 
A. The rental agreement was — the vehicle was due 
back in Chicago in two - two days from the time I stopped 
12 
1 him. So -
2 Q. Two days from the time of stop. Okay. 
3 A. - it would be the 16th of January. 
4 Q. So is it fair to say it would have been difficult 
5 for him to drive from Park City to either Memphis or 
6 Birmingham and then make it back to Chicago in time to 
7 return that car in two days? 
8 A. Yes. And Mr. Duhaime also told me that he was -
9 when I asked why he was driving from Oakland to Chicago, 
10 I that it was something that they wanted to enjoy. And so 
11 that came across as that they wanted to spend time seeing 
12 sights on the way, and they weren't going to be able to do 
13 that if the vehicle was due in Chicago and those were all 
14 part of the circumstances. 
15 Q. Okay. Anything else that — any other indicators 
16 that you've observed, just going down your list here? 
17 A. Just the one-way, it was a large luxury rental. 
18 i It's $1,200, like I said before. And, again, I asked — 
19 j because I was perplexed about his plans and these suspicious 
20 | circumstances, and I asked him why he drove instead of 
21 I flying, and he seated that it was less expensive for them to 
i 
22 | drive instead of flying. 
23 Q. Is that consistent with your experience? 
24 I A. No. 
25 | Q. Okay. Was there anything significant to you about 
13 
1 him being on 1-80? 
2 A. Just that Interstate 80 is a known drug 
3 trafficking corridor. 
4 Q. And you're making that conclusion based on your 
5 training and experience or both? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 I Q. Okay. Did you observe anything inside the vehicle 
8 that made you suspicious of — that there might be drug 
9 trafficking or drug activity going on? 
10 I A. Yes. I noticed, when Mr. Duhaime was getting his 
11 J driver's license for me, I noticed the luggagre, all of their 
12 luggage was in the back seat. And while he was getting his 
13 driver's license for me, I asked if this was all of their 
14 luggage that they had. The passenger said, "No, it's not." 
15 And then Mr. Duhaime quickly gave me his driver's license 
16 and said, "Here you go." And then I asked — before I 
17 returned back to my vehicle, because I had the rental 
18 | agreement and the license, I just asked if they had any 
19 i luggage in the trunk, and — or if they had anything in the 
20 | trunk, and the passenger said, "No." So I thought that was 
21 I weird that she said that they had other luggage but there 
22 i was nothing in the trunk. 
23 Q. When you asked about the luggage or whether or not 
24 there was anything in the trunk, did Mr. Duhaime respond? 
25 | A. No. He actually did not; it was the passenger. 
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1 Q. Okay. Anything else you observed again inside the 
2 I car? 
3 A. There was fast food wrappers, appeared that they 
4 were eating on the run. There was four cell phones and 
5 chargers in the center console. With two people, I thought 
6 it was odd to have a large quantity of cell phones. 
7 Q. And you could see those in plain view? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. Were they plugged in? 
10 I A. It appeared that they were all plugged into the 
11 cigarette lighter. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. There was a map in the center console but, yet, 
14 the GPS was on. Coffee cup on the center console, caffeine 
15 late at night, making a — a long trip. The — I thought it 
16 was odd that the passenger stayed asleep on first contact. 
17 As I talked to Mr. Duhaime about his trip, she — she stayed 
18 I asleep for a couple of minutes and then she woke up. I 
i 
19 j thought that was odd. 
20 | Q. Why did you find that odd or unusual? 
21 I A. I approached on the passenger side. It was very 
i 
i 
22 | cold that night, so with the window down and my flashlight 
! 
23 ! in the vehicle, I would think that passengers would not stay 
24 j asleep if — in my experience, passengers have always been 
25 j wide awake even if they were sleeping. They don't stay 
15 
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asleep while I'm talking to them and shining my light with 
the weather coming in and so on. 
Q. And this was in January? 
A. This was in January. 
Q. So it was quite cold. 
A. It was very cold. 
Q. And when you made the stop, had you activated both 
your lights and siren? 
A. No siren, just my — 
Q. No sirens. 
A. — red and blue lights. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And spotlights and wig-wags. 
Q. Okay. Anything that — that we haven't mentioned 
that was an indicator to you that there might be some type 
of drug activity going on? 
A. Just the — again, the totality of the 
circumstances and how it was said and what wais said, what 
19 I I - what I had observed, and my prior experience and 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
training. 
Q. Okay. So based on all of these things that you 
observed and had noticed while you were speaking with 
Mr. Duhaime and the passenger, what did you decide to do 
next? 
A. I returned to my vehicle. I knew Z was going to 
16 
ask for consent to search the vehicle and/or call for a K-9 
drug-sniffing dog. I actually returned to my vehicle and I 
knew that Deputy Cunningham was out on patrol that evening, 
and I called for a K-9 immediately. 
Q. Does your report indicate what time you called for 
the dog? 
A. Yes. I called for the dog - let's see. It was 
shortly after I'd returned to my vehicle, so — let's see. I 
would say approximately five minutes after the 2308. So 
between 2313 and 2315, I'd say. 
Q. Okay. So you — you called for the dog,' then, as 
soon as you got back to your vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that prior to you calling in to dispatch to 
ask for a records check or after you had called in? 
A. That was before. 
Q. Okay. So you called for the dog -
A, Yes. 
Q. - and then - and then is the next thing you do -
A. I run — I ran a — I checked his driver's license 
and ran a criminal history check. 
Q. Okay. And then what happened? 
A. At about twenty - I waited for Brian. At about 
2322, I returned back to the vehicle to speak with 
Mr. Duhaime about the traffic violations. I had Mr. Duhaime 
17 
step out of the car. He came back to check that rear 
registration light, and he thought I was talking about his 
backup lights and I actually had to show him the light above 
the license plate that I was talking about. I had to 
advise — 
Q. And this was at 2322? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you'd already called for the dog at that point. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Go ahead. 
A. So I - I actually handed Mr. Duhaime's driver's 
license back and his rental agreement and advised that he 
was going to need to get that light fixed. I also briefly 
educated him on using that passing lane. And then I — so I 
issued him the verbal warning. 
I was still waiting for the criminal history, 
dispatch was taking an extra long time that evening for the 
records check, the criminal history at Least. 
Sgt. Loveland had arrived on scene and, when I was 
talking to Mr. Duhaime, someone at dispatch came back with 
his criminal history and they asked if I was - if I had 
visitors present, if I was alone or not, to hear the 
information they had for me. But I was talking to 
Mr. Duhaime at the time, so Sgt. Loveland obtained the 
information that Mr. Duhaime did have prior criminal history 
18 
for - for marijuana. 
Okay. And then I asked - after giving him — after 
giving Mr. Duhaime his driver's license and rental 
agreement, I asked if he had anything illegal in the 
vehicle, and he stated no, "No, sir." And I asked if he was 
hauling any kind of drugs, such as marijuana, heroin, 
cocaine or methamphetamine, and he stated, "No, sir." And I 
asked for consent to search the vehicle. He immediately 
stated no, and I advised Mr. Duhaime at that time that he 
was going to be detained a little bit further until the dog 
arrived. 
Q. So you told him at that point that there was a dog 
en route? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know approximately what time that 
conversation occurred? And by "that conversation" I mean 
him denying you consent and you telling him he was going to 
be detained for a little bit longer while you waited for the 
dog. 
A. I logged his further detention — or I told him 
that he was being further detained at approximately 2324, 
just approximately two minutes after I'd returned back to 
the vehicle to issue the warning. 
Q. Okay. And what time did the dog arrive? 
A. Three minutes later, at 2327. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you believe, based on everything you 
2 I had observed, that at that point you were justified or you 
3 had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to keep 
4 Mr. Duhaime there for that extra three minutes while you 
5 waited for the dog? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And what was that based on? 
8 A. All of the indicators that we spoke about, the 
9 totality of the circumstances, what Mr. Duhaime had said to 
10 I me, what I - what I had observed in the vehicle. 
11 Q. Did you believe that the dog would either confirm 
12 or deny those suspicions? 
13 I A. Yes. 
14 I Q. Okay. So the dog arrived at 2327? 
15 | A. Yes. 
16 Q. And that was Deputy Cunningham's police service 
17 dog? 
18 I A. Yes. 
19 | Q. Okay. Were you present while he did the exterior 
20 I sniff of the car? 
! 
21 I A. Yes. 
22 | Q. Did you notice the dog alert or indicate in any 
23 ! manner? 
24 A. Yes. He was very excited and the canine, Caster, 
25 | indicated strongly on the rear - the rear trunk with double 
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1 scratch of the paws. He tried to get up onto the trunk. He 
2 also tried to jump inside the vehicle from the passenger 
3 side. 
4 Q. Okay. And after Caster had sniffed the vehicle, 
5 did you have a discussion with Deputy Cunningham about 
6 exactly what he had observed the dog doing? 
7 A. He just smiled and said, yeah, he indicated very 
8 strongly on the trunk. 
9 f Q. Okay. And did that lead you to believe or, you 
10 I know, confirm or dispel your suspicions one way or another? 
11 I A. Yes. 
12 Q. And which way? 
13 A. That there was something in the trunk. 
14 I Q. Okay. Did you decide to search the trunk at that 
15 point? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 I Q. And is that something that you participated in by 
18 I yourself or did you have assistance? 
I 
19 I A. There were other troopers on scene. I had the — I 
20 I had asked Mr. Duhaime for the keys to the vehicle for safety 
21 I reasons after I detained him further. So I had the keys. 
22 I And I popped the trunk myself and in plain view, a large 
23 quantity of marijuana in the trunk. 
24 Q. Was it just sitting there? 
25 I A. It was sitting there. 
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1 Q. And how was it packaged? 
2 A. The majority of it was packaged in black garbage 
3 bags, opened, and there were several — several vacuum sealed 
4 one-pound packages laying on top of those bags. The trunk 
5 was just packed* full. 
6 Q. Okay. So there were - were they clear plastic 
7 bags, then, that were laying on top of the black garbage 
8 bags? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And then inside the black garbage bags, was there 
n I also marijuana? 
12 A. Were more, yes. 
13 I Q. Okay. And I'm using the term marijuana. Was it a 
14 green leafy substance? 
15 A. A green leafy substance. One of the packages was 
16 cut open at the sally port and I nick tested it, and it 
17 I tested positive for marijuana. 
18 i Q. Okay. 
19 A. There was approximately 7 6 one-pound vacuum sealed 
20 bags. 
21 I Q. So there was a total of 7 6 pounds. 
22 I A. Approximately. 
23 Q. Okay. And did you also find some - some pills as 
24 I w e l l ? 
25 A. Yes . Whi le d o i n g an i n v e n t o r y of t h e v e h i c l e , i n 
22 
Mr. Duhaime's bag, I believe it was — it had an airport 
sticker on the bag identifying it as Mr. Duhaime's bag, as 
well as having male clothing and — clothing for a male. 
There was an unmarked bottle that contained seventeen and a 
half Valium pills. I identified these pills using a pill 
identification book. 
Q. Okay. Based on what you had seized during the 
search, did you place Mr. Duhaime under arrest? 
A. Yes. Mr. Duhaime and his passenger was placed 
under physical custody arrest shortly after the trunk was 
opened. 
Q. What time — what was the time of arrest? 
A. 2335. 
Q. Okay. So less than ten minutes, then, after the 
dog arrived; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. My math is bad. The dog arrived at 2327; is that 
right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And Mr. Duhaime was placed under arrest at 2 335. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Incident to arrest, did you search Mr. Duhaime? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you find anything of significance? 
A. There was a large quantity of cash on Mr. Duhaime, 
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A. It was in a pocket. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall which pocket? 
A. I don't recall. It was in one of his coat 
pockets. 
Q. Okay. Was the — the stop in this tape — in this 
case videotaped? 
A. Yes. 
MS. NATALE: Your Honor, may I approach the 
witness? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
Q. (By Mr. Ms. Natale) I want to hand you what I've 
marked as State's Exhibit No. 1. Do you recognize that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us what it is, please? 
A. That is the traffic stop on video. 
21 i Q. And you personally burned this copy? 
A. Lots of them. Yes. And it works for sure. 
Q. And you've watched it to make sure that it 
coincides with your report as well as your recollection? 
A. Yes. 
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1.1 MS. NATALE: Your Honor, I would move for the 
2 J admission of State's Exhibit No. 1. 
3 MR. METOS: No objection. 
4 THE COURT: Received. 
5 MS. NATALE: And, Your Honor, I don't know if you 
6 want to take the time at this point to watch it, but I was 
7 just going to admit it and then let you peruse it at your 
8 leisure, if that's okay — 
9 MR. METOS: Judge, what I was going to suggest is 
10 J that — I know you're going to request briefs afterwards. As 
11 I part of the briefing, there may be portions of the video 
12 that I would like to direct your attention and - and I think 
13 I I could include those portions in my brief so that, when you 
14 watch it, you can look for the particular times on the video 
15 that — that I would like to have you observe. 
16 THE COURT: Well, I'll watch the whole thing, not 
17 in court today, but I will watch the whole thing and take 
18 | notes and incorporate that into my findings of fact, 
19 I combined with the testimony here today. So in your briefs, 
20 you can certainly request me to pay particular attention to. 
21 J. this or that conversation at this or that time. 
22 I MR. METOS: Okay. 
23 I MS. NATALE: So this is admitted for -
24 THE COURT: Yes. l's received. 
25 | MS. NATALE: Thank you. And my only request would 
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be that, after the Court has ruled on the motion 
allowed to withdraw this because this is my only 
THE COURT: All right. That shouldn't 
problem, Mr. Metos, I assume. 
MR. METOS: No. 
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copy. 
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THE COURT: W e ' l l -
MS. NATALE: And t h o s e a r e a l l t h e q u e s t i o n s I 
h a v e — 
THE COURT: - give it back. 
MS. NATALE: - for this witness, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Metos? 
MR. METOS: The only thing with the video is I 
don't — we've had troubles running it before, and the Court 
may require some instructions on getting the proper — 
MS. NATALE: And I can provide the Court with 
minimal — with just a — a couple instructions on how to play 
it. 
MR. METOS: Yeah. I don't have problems with her 
giving you the memo on how to — 
21 | THE COURT: No. I - I think that I got a program 
installed on the computer now that I can - at least the last 
one I was able to watch, the last one from the Highway 
Patrol. I was able to watch it with no problem. I had the 
folks downtown, IT, put on a program that allowed me to 
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watch it, so. . . 
MR. METOS: Fine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. METOS: 
Mr. 
the 
Q. Okay. Trooper Ekberg, you said 
Duhaime at 2306; is that right? 
A. 
Q. 
videc 
A. 
Q. 
Approximately, yes. 
And that was right — approximate 
> running; is that correct? 
Yes. 
Do you recall telling the office 
that you first saw 
ily when you start 
>rs who came to the 
scene later that you had followed Mr. Duhaime and determined 
that the 
it. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
car was a rental car out of Texas 
Yes. 
And you made that determination 
When I — I ran the plates and it 
? 
before you stopped 
came back as a 
Texas rental 
Q. And you told those officers that, when you found 
it was a Texas rental, you decided to follow the car. 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't tell them that. 
A.- I don't recall that. 
Q. You don't recall telling them that? 
A. I don't recall. 
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Q. Do you recall telling them that, just prior to 
that, that that particular night, you were out looking for 
drugs? 
A. I don't recall that. 
Q. That would be - you don't recall then? But you 
may have said that. 
A. I may have said that. 
Q. And that would be on the video. 
' A. It would be on the video if I said that, yes. 
Q. And during the course of the video, there's a 
number of statements you made about "hundred pounds" and 
"looking for a hundred pounds" or "getting your hundred 
pounds." What did you mean by that? 
A. . I don't recall what I said. If you can elaborate 
on what I said, or no? 
Q. You made statements about a "hundred pounds" and 
looking for a hundred pounds, or getting your hundred 
pounds. You don't recall making — making any of those 
statements? 
A. Well, I don't recall when I said that. 
Q. Okay. But, again, the video reflects what was 
said. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, if you had made those statements, what would 
you have been talking about? 
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A. If the vehicle that I stopped had a large quantity 
of drugs. 
Q. Is there some quota that you're looking for, a 
hundred pounds is some sort of benchmark that you get where 
you get some sort of chit or some sort of reward? 
A. No. 
Q. Nothing like that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Now, you said you've been on the Highway 
Patrol now for three years. 
A. Approximately. 
Q. And a lot of your time with the Highway Patrol is 
spent driving the roads, the freeways; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have a lot of training on driving the 
freeways. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've probably been driving yourself for — 
since you were about 16 years old. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you have a good idea of how people react in 
certain traffic situations; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when- somebody holds up — when you observe one 
car pulling up behind another car, if it's on the freeway 
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1 and the left lane - the No. 1 lane, the car who is moving 
2 slower has a legal obligation to pull over; is that right? 
3 Into the right lane. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And that would be the legal obligation in Utah is 
6 41-6a-704. 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. That is the statute you cited Mr. Duhaime for -
9 you gave him the warning for violating. 
10 ) A. Yes. 
11 J Q. And that section applies only when the driver's in 
12 the left lane; is that right? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 Q. Now, sometimes people are driving in the right 
15 lane and a car will come up behind them; is that right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And if a car gets too close, it can be a little 
18 nerve-wracking. If — well, let me rephrase chat. 
19 I A. Not if you're not there. 
20 I Q. If a car is too close on the freeway, it can 
21 I create a dangerous situation. 
22 | A. If a vehicle is too close, yes. 
23 Q. And, generally, the rule of thumb is about, what, 
24 one car length per ten miles an hour? 
25 I A. Sure. 
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1 Q. And in the previous hearing, you talked about two 
2 I seconds between the distance that cars are traveling; is 
3 that right? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And on the video, you can see you had pulled 
6 fairly close to Mr. Duhaime; is that right? 
7 A. Close enough that I could see that the plate was 
8 not illuminated with a light. 
9 Q. But you were still fairly close on his tail. 
10 A. I was not following too closely. 
11 Q. No. My question is you were — you pulled up close 
12 I behind him. 
13 A. I was behind, not close. 
14 Q. And you approached from behind. 
15 I A. Of course. 
16 Q. And you can see in the video the front of your car 
17 and the rear of Mr. Duhaime1s car; is that right? 
18 I A. Yes. 
19 j Q. And you can also pick out spots on the road and 
20 | count the distance in seconds, as you did in the — the 
21 I previous case that you testified about today. 
22 I A. Yes. 
23 Q. And you said, in that case, a two-second distance 
24 at 60 or 65 miles an hour was too close. 
25 I A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Have you gone back to that tape and looked and 
2 measured and see - to see if you were too close in this 
3 case? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Now, when somebody's approaching from behind, out 
6 of courtesy, quite often a driver will pull over and let 
7 that car pass; is that correct? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. That doesn't happen. 
10 I A. No. 
11 I Q. That's your testimony, that doesn't happen. 
12 A. I'm not saying it doesn't happen. It doesn't 
13 happen regularly, often. But, sure. Yes. 
u Q. It can happen. 
15 A. It can happen. 
16 Q. You follow a car for a certain distance, they're 
17 worried — well, let me back up. 
18 | The danger in following too close Ls that: somebody 
19 I has to make a sudden stop. 
20 I A. Correct. 
21 I Q. And this — on this particular day, just about 
22 11:00 at night - is that correct? 
23 I A. Yes. 
24 Q. It's dark out? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. It's in sort of a rural area? 
2 | A. Yes. 
3 Q. Sometimes there's animals that cross the road. 
4 A. Sometimes. 
5 Q. This is in January? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And sometimes there may be ice or snow on the 
8 road. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And a sudden stop could result in a rear-end 
11 accident. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And so it's probably a good idea, if a car is 
14 fairly close to you, to move over and let him pass, isn't 
15 it? 
16 A. Not if you're in the No. 2 lane. 
17 | Q. Not if you're in the No. 2 lane and the guy's 
18 i right up on your tail? 
19 I A. Are you saying that I was on the — 
20 | Q. No. I'm saying, as a practical matter -
21 ! A. Yes. 
22 ! Q. - that would be a good thing to do. 
23 J A. If I was - yes. If the vehicle was up on 
24 someone's tail, then it would be an unsafe situation. 
25 Q. And you said Mr. Duhaime was traveling about 65 
miles an hour at this time? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. And then he pulled over to the left-hand lane; is 
that right? 
A. Into the No. 1 passing lane, yes. 
Q. And at that time, there were no other cars in that 
lane? 
A. No other cars. 
Q. But you cited him for impeding traffic. 
A. I didn't cite him, I gave him -
Q. Or you warned him about impeding traffic. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at the time that he moved over there, you were 
in the No. 2 lane, the right lane. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So there was no traffic he was impeding at that 
time that he moved, was there? 
A. As soon as I moved into the No. 1 lane, I was 
traveling — 
Q. You're smiling as you say that because you caused 
that violation by moving there, didn't you? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't? 
A. I'd already made the decision to stop the vehicle 
for the rear registration light. I thought it was odd that 
34 
he was moving into the No. 1 lane with no traffic -
Q. So you'd made the decision, but you hadn't 
signaled him to pull over, though. 
A. I was waiting for a safe — safe spot for me to 
make a safe traffic stop on the car. At that time, we were 
nearing guardrails and other safe - unsafe bends in the 
road. I was waiting for a safe spot that I could conduct a 
safe traffic stop. 
Q. So how much farther did you think you had to 
travel before you reached that safe spot? 
A. To 158. 
Q. So he pulls over, you pull behind him; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He impedes you because you're behind him. Is your 
testimony. 
A. That he was impeding the traffic flow in the No. 1 
lane, yes. 
Q. Which would be you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. The only car that was in that traffic lane; is 
that right? 
A. As I recall, yes. 
Q. It wasn't there when he moved there. 
A. Correct. 
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Q. And he was in that traffic lane less than five 
seconds before you turn on your overheads. 
A. Correct. Because we had gotten to the safe spot 
for me to stop the car. 
Q. Now, you talked about the license plate lighting; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And on the video, you can see the rear of 
Mr. Duhaime's car. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You pulled within maybe two to four car lengths 
behind him. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And at that point, you can see the light — or you' 
can see the license plate; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you can look at the video and — and see that — 
you can see what's on the plate, you can see the writing; is 
that right? 
A. That's because my camera was zoomed up on the 
vehicle. 
Q. . And you can also - it was zoomed up, but if the -
A. The camera was — 
Q. -if the plate was dark, you wouldn't be able to 
see the plate. 
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A. From driving — driving behind the vehicle, the 
plate was not — you could not read the plate from a hundred 
feet. 
Q. Okay. But, still, the video, you can look at the 
video and see some illumination on the plate; is that right? 
A. That's because my headlights were reflecting off 
the license plate. 
Q. And this car had a metallic bumper; is that 
correct? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. And you could look at the video and see if there's 
any reflection on the bumper from any lights that were on 
the - the license plate, could you not? 
A. I have spotlight and my headlights on, so any 
reflection, of course, it's going to reflect. 
Q. Okay. And so when the car changes position, that 
reflection would also change, would it not? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Okay. 
A. It's reflecting my headlights. 
Q. Getting back to - to the move into the No. 2 lane, 
when he moved, he signaled properly; is that right? 
A. As I recall. 
Q. So there's no violation in the way he changed 
lanes. 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Now, on a drug stop, you look for — you previously 
3 I testified you look for some indicators; is that right? 
4 A. On a drug stop? I don't -
5 Q. Okay. Any — 
6 I A. I don't classify my stops. 
7 Q. Pardon me? 
8 A. I don't classify my stops as a drug stop as a — 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. I mean, if I have indicators, of course, it's 
11 criminal activity, but, yes. 
12 Q. All right. So if you're — one of the things 
13 you're doing is looking for drugs as part of your job. 
14 A. One, yes. 
15 Q. And one of the indicators that you seem to rely on 
16 is unusual travel plans. 
17 I A. Yes. 
18 i Q. And when you make a traffic step, you're 
19 | entitled — you're aware that you're entitled to get the 
I 
20 I registration or rental agreement, the driver's license and 
21 j check that stuff out; is that correct? 
22 ! A. Yes. 
23 ! Q. And as you do that, if other information develops, 
24 | that becomes your reasonable suspicion. 
25 I A. Yes. 
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1 Q. In this case, when you walked up to the window, 
2 I you approached the passenger side; is that right? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. I assume you did that for your own safety. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And your initial question was: Where are you 
7 going? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. You didn't ask for his license. 
10 A. Not at that time. 
11 Q. You didn't ask for the — you didn't ask for the 
12 rental agreement. 
13 A. Not at that time. 
14 Q. You didn't ask for the registration. 
15 I A. Not at that time. 
16 Q. You didn't tell him why you were pulling over at 
17 that time. Initially. 
18 i A. Not — not initially. 
19 Q. And that initial questioning had nothing to do 
20 | with the reason for the stop, did it? 
21 | A. Not at — the very first question, I just asked 
i 
22 I where he was going. 
23 I Q. Yeah. That had nothing to do with the reason you 
24 | stopped him. 
25 i A. No. 
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1 Q. Had nothing to do with his driver's license. 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Whether he properly had the vehicle. 
4 A. No. Can I explain? 
5 Q. I'll ask the questions. But that's the kind of 
6 question that can help you develop some reasonable suspicion 
7 or some indicators for drug activity, can it not? 
8 A. Or other activity, yes. 
9 I Q. Other illegal activity. 
10 A. Yes. 
n Q. Okay. When you talked to him about the reason for 
12 this stop, you asked him why he changed lanes; is that 
13 I right? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 I Q. You told him that it was illegal to change lanes 
16 like that, didn't you? 
17 A. I'd advised of — him of the — the No. 1 lane, 
18 I passing — 
19 Q. You told him it was illegal to change lanes like 
20 | that. 
21 | A. If I can refer to my report, I'll know exactly 
22 | what I said, so I can be sure. 
23 I I just explained that the left lane is really 
24 J designated for passing only and that he changed lanes into 
25 I the No. 1 lane with no traffic. 
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Q. But that's not correct. The left lane isn't for 
passing only, is it? 
A. In a two — two-lane highway, it usually is 
designated for passing only. 
Q. In seventy - under 41-6a-704, that's not what the 
statute says, is it? 
A. Not that statute. 
Q. Is there some other statute that says that? 
A. There's — there's another statute that states that 
the — on a two-lane highway, all vehicles shall drive on the 
right side of the road unless passing or overtaking another 
vehicle. 
Q. But this is a four-lane highway. 
A. No. This is a two-lane highway. One way, two-
lane. 
Q. But you didn't cite him for that or warn him for 
that. 
A. No. 
. Q. Okay. 
A. There were other violations that he — he had 
violated. 
Q. Then you talked about the plate illumination; is 
that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Then you went back to talking about his travel 
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1 itinerary, where he was going; is that right? 
2 I A. Yes. 
3 Q. Why he was going there? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And asked him how long he would be staying. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. None of those had anything to do with the license 
8 plate light; is that right? 
9 A. No. 
10 | Q. None of those had anything to do with him impeding 
11 traffic. 
12 I A. No. 
13 Q. None of those had anything to do with his right to 
14 I operate that vehicle. 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. And at that point, you'd not even requested his 
17 driver's license; is that right? 
18 | A. Not at that time. 
19 Q. And at that point, you'd not requested any other 
20 I form of identification. 
21 I A. No. 
22 I Q. You did finally receive the rental agreement. 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. You requested it shortly after there was more 
25 I questions about his travel itinerary. 
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1 A. That's because he'd provided me with a vehicle 
2 J inspection form not the rental agreement. 
3 Q. No. I said you requested it after those 
4 questions. Then he provided — 
5 A. The -
6 Q. - the rental inspection form; is that right? 
7 A. I asked a few questions and asked for the rental 
8 agreement, which he didn't provide, then asked a few more 
9 questions and then he finally found the rental agreement, 
10 provided me with that; asked a few more questions, got the 
11 i driver's license. 
12 Q. All right. And that would all be reflected on the 
13 ] video. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. And the — and you're relying on your 
16 memory; is that right? 
17 I A. Yes. 
18 i Q. And that may be inconsistent with - with what's on 
19 i the video. 
20 j A. Sure. 
21 | Q. Okay. You did receive the rental agreement; is 
22 j that right? 
23 j A. I obtained a rental agreement, yes. 
24 Q. Then, after you received that, you began 
25 | requesting details about his trip; is that correct? 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. As I looked over the rental agreement. 
He said he was going to Chicago; is that right? 
Yes. 
You asked who he was visiting; is that correct? 
Yes. 
And he said he was going to visit his uncle. 
No. He stated - he actually said, "I'm actually 
visiting my — my — my uncle over there." 
Q. And then on the - you asked what's his uncle's 
name. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you testified today that he immediately said 
"Bob." 
A. Yes. 
Q. But when you called in dispatch on the radio, you 
stated that he waited about 15 seconds before he came up 
with a name, didn't you? 
A. I didn't tell dispatch the name of the uncle. 
Q. No. When you said you talked about some of the 
indicators you had, you indicated to the guy on the other 
end, dispatch, that this guy had waited about 15 seconds 
after you requested the uncle's name. Do you recall saying 
that? 
A. I did not tell dispatch the name of the uncle. I 
was — 
Q. 
A. 
That's not 
- I think -
to dispatch. I 
uncle's 
Q. 
name. 
Okay. 
about him having 
didn 
And 
my question. 
- okay. You're 
' t tell dispatch 
you didn't say 
to wait and come up 
referring 
anything 
to that I said 
about the 
anything to dispatch 
with an uncle's name. 
A. Not to dispatch, no. 
Q. Okay. To any of the other people on - that you 
were talking to on the radio? 
A. To my sergeant, who was right next to me, yes. 
Q. Okay. So you told him that you - that Mr. Duhaime 
had to wait about 15 seconds to come up with the uncle's 
name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that wasn't true, was it? 
A. It wasn't 15 seconds. But I was - it was the 
totality of what Mr. Duhaime was telling me. 
Q. No. My question is: You told the sergeant, 
whoever, Duhaime waited about 15 seconds before coming up 
with a name. 
A. If that's in the video, then, yes. 
Q. Okay. And that was not true. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Now, getting back to the discussion you 
were having with Mr. Duhaime about where he was going, about 
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1 
five minutes into this, you request his license; is that 
correct? 
A. 
minutes < 
Q. 
I don't recall it being that long, but within 
Df my approach. 
But, again, the timer on the video would show when 
that happened. 
A. 
Q-
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
driving; 
A. 
Q. 
Sure. 
And you discussed the Hawaii license; is that 
Yes. 
And you asked more questions about why he's 
is that correct? 
Why he's driving? 
He was driving rather than some other form of | 
transportation. 1 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 1 
He said that he — he wanted to enjoy the ride. 
One of the reasons uhat he provided, yes. 
And then you asked him again, several times, why 1 
he was driving, and he said something about it being less 
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21 | expens ive . 
22 I A. Yes . 
23 | Q. And he also discussed he was going to Chicago; is 
24 | that right? 
25 I A. Yes. 
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Q. Then he talked about - you asked where he was 
going from there; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that's when he started talking about going to 
Memphis, then they're going to Birmingham to see their kids, 
their grandkids. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And they also indicated that they really didn't 
have any set plans. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, you go back to the parole — patrol 
car, and the first thing you do is request a dog. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then one of the reasons that you request a dog is 
the nature of the rental agreement; is that right? 
A. No. One — the rental agreement was one of the 
reasons why I requested a dog. 
Q. Okay. They're renting the car to go from Oakland 
to Chicago; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you said it had Texas plates. 
A. It was a Texas rental. 
Q. But that's not uncommon for rental cars to have a 
plate from a third state from where you're at. 
A. No. 
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Q. Everything in the rental agreement was proper; is 
that right? 
A. As in valid? 
Q. As in valid. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it listed Mr. Duhaime as the driver? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He was the driver. 
A. Yes. 
Q. His name was on the agreement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You also indicated as an indicator that you 
observed some working GPS? 
A. That was one of the indicators, yes. 
Q. Okay. People use GPS devices to keep from getting 
lost; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, was this a GPS device that was installed in 
the car or was it a separate one? 
A. I believe it was — it was in — I don't recall. It 
was just in the - in the vehicle. 
Q. Okay. And some higher end vehicles have them 
actually installed in the vehicle. 
A. Some higher end vehicles do have them installed, 
yes. 
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Q. Okay. You said there was a road atlas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Road atlases are handy in case the GPS is out of 
range or goes down for whatever reason; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Especially if you're driving cross-country. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Whether you're transporting drugs or just going 
for pleasure, it's a good idea to keep a map, isn't it? 
A. Sure. 
Q. You probably have a map in your car, don't you? 
A. I do. 
Q. You said there was also a cup of coffee. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's about 11:00 p.m. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? And so — and there was some other 
wrappers or food wrappers in the car; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All of those would be consistent with people 
traveling interstate; is that right? 
A. Innocent motoring public, yes. 
Q. And 1-15 — or, excuse me, 1-80 is where you were 
on; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. You said it's — that's a major drug thoroughfare; 
2 I is that right? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. There's also a lot of long-haul trucking; is that 
5 right? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. There's also a lot of people just traveling for 
8 their own recreation? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 I Q. Traveling for business? 
11 A. Yes. . 
12 I . Q. In fact, probably the vast majority of travel on 
13 that road is not drug related. 
14 A. I don't know the percentages. 
15 I Q. Would you say that the majority of cars that you 
16 stop on 1-80 contain drugs? 
17 A. It's hard to say. Maybe, maybe not. 
18 | Q. Maybe not? You indicated that there are four cell 
19 I phones in the car; is that right? 
20 I A. I observed four. 
21 Q. And you said there were four chargers. 
22 A. Yes. 
23 . Q. And you told Ms. Natale that every one of them was 
24 plugged into the charger. 
25 A. I saw one into the cigarette lighter. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
connected 
So that was an overstatement on your part. 
Sure. 
Okay. 
Can I explain the cell phone? They were all 
to a charger, so I had no idea if they were all 
plugged in or not. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
So each one was connected to a charger. 
Yes. 
So when activity — so if you're traveling 
interstate, it's a good - it's a good idea to keep a cell 
1 phone; is 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
•Q, 
phone. 
A. 
that right? 
One, yes. 
Some people have more than one cell phone. 
Some people. 
Some people have a business phone and a personal 
Two, yes. 
Q. And in this case, there were two people in the 
car. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you said that the trip didn't make sense 
because of the cost of the rental car; is that right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you call and get any information on cost of 
airline travel during that particular time frame? 
1 A. Not at that time. 
2 Q. Did you check - so you didn't check what the cost 
3 would be to go from the California Bay Area to Chicago for 
4 two people by plane? 
5 A. I recall, from an earlier stop, that a one-way 
6 ticket from California to Chicago was approximately $2 50. 
7 Q. But that depends on when you buy it in relation to 
8 when the trip is; is that right? 
9 I A. Sure. 
10 J Q. If you buy an airline ticket close to the time 
11 you're leaving, the price tends to go up. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 I Q. If you buy a first class ticket, it's higher in 
14 cost; is that right? 
15 A. I don't know. I'm not familiar with airline 
16 I tickets. 
17 Q. You're not familiar with airline tickets. 
18 I A. Their prices. Just from - I know from California 
19 I to Chicago that day, it was two hundred and fifty bucks one 
20 | way. 
21 I Q. But did you - you didn't go back and check it for 
22 this particular date, did you? 
23 A. I actually did. I - it's not in my report, but I 
24 was curious as to what a one-way trip from Oakland to 
25 Chicago would be, and it was approximately $250. 
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Q. Now, did you check it for a next-day travel or 
same-week travel or did you just get the lowest price 
available? 
A. I just got on to Priceline.com and — 
Q. So you got the lowest price available. 
A. I don't know if it was the lowest price. 
Q. Then did you check the — the cost for airline 
tickets to go to Memphis then on to Birmingham? 
A. I didn't check that. 
Q. And you didn't include any of that in your report, 
did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you just testified a few minutes ago that: you 
weren't familiar with airline ticket costs, didn't you? 
A. I know that $1,200 for a rental car is a lot more 
expensive than flying two people from California to Chicago. 
Q. And did you factor in flying, then, to Memphis 
then on co Birmingham? 
A. To fly or drive? 
20 | Q. Fly. 
! 
21 I A. I would assume uhat if you're going to fly from ' 
I 
22 i Chicago - from California to Chicago that you'd fly 
! 
23 I everywhere and not just fly out somewhere, drive somewhere 
24 i and then fly. 
25 | Q. That's going to run up the cost of travel, isn't 
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1 it? 
2 J A. Yes. 
3 I Q. Okay. And this car was due in Chicago about two 
4 or three days later, after — 
5 A. Two days. 
6 Q. Two days. 
7 A. Two days. 
8 Q. Now, have you ever rented a car before? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 I Q. And you're aware that, when you rent a car, rental 
11 I companies are generally more than happy to let you just call 
12 in and keep the rental as long as you're paying more. 
13 j A. I'm not aware, but, yes. 
14 J Q. That happens, though. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. And what this indicated is that he'd prepaid about 
17 I $1,200. 
18 I A. Okay. 
19 I Q. So when he gets to Chicago, it would have been a 
20 | big deal to keep the car longer as long as he notified the 
21 | rental company. Is that right? 
22 A. Sure. 
23 I Q. Now, you talked about, on direct, a drug 
24 j conviction; is that right? 
25 I A. Yes. 
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Q. 
occurred 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
You failed to mention that that was - that that 
in the '60s. 
I said he had a prior history with marijuana. 
But that was in the '60s. 
Prior — 
Q. 1960s. 
A. Pr ior h i s to ry . 
Q. Okay. But you neglected to mention tha t i t was 40 
years ago. 
A. I have — i t j u s t — i t wasn' t ac tua l ly an i s sue 
because I knew I — 
Q. Right. 
A. — was going to ask for consent, I new the dog was 
already on its way. 
Q. Okay. Now, you also said that he appeared to be 
somewhat nervous? 
A. Yes. Very nervous. 
Q. And you'd never met Mr. Duhaime before? 
A. You don't know how he acted — how he would act 
normally? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know how he would react to questioning 
or — or how he spoke normally? 
A. No. 
Q. So you generally don't know what his demeanor is. 
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A. 
Q. 
the car, 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
And when you were talking to him at 
you had your flashlight with you; is 
Yes. 
And you're shining it in the car in 
the side of 
that right? 
his face? 
A. Not in h i s face. 
Q. Towards him? 
A. In the vehicle. Mainly hands. 
Q. Now, when you - after you call for the dog and you 
go back to Mr. Duhaime, you get him out of the car; is that 
right? 
A. After when? 
Q. After you call in on the license plate, you go 
back to get Mr. Duhaime out of the car. To talk to him. 
After you're at your patrol car — 
A. Okay. I run a records check — 
Q. Right. 
A. Yes. I brought Mr. Duhaime out to issue him a 
warning. 
Q. And you had a discussion about the license plate 
lights. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? And you were the one that pointed 
at the two lights that weren't shining, were you not? 
A. I pointed towards the plate. 
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1 Q. And he was - he said those are the backup lights. 
2 A. He thought I was talking about the backup lights. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. And I wasn't going to get on the ground and show 
5 him that the light was broken. 
6 Q. And again the — again, the video would show what 
7 you were pointing at — 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. — as you made that statement. 
10 Now, you - at that point, you give him back his 
11 documents; is that right? 
12 A. Rental agreement and driver's license, yes. 
13 Q. And you didn't tell him he was free to go at that 
14 point. 
15 A. No. 
16 I Q. And he wasn't in fact free to go at that point. 
17 A. He was free to go in his — because he had his 
18 | documents, his driver's license, rental agreement. I was 
19 I making sure that he understood his rights, that he — that he 
20 j had the right to know that he was free to go. But, no, I 
21 j did not want him to go. 
22 | Q. You didn't want him to go, but you're saying now 
23 I he was free to go? 
24 A. No. I'm not saying he was free to go. I handed 
25 I him his driver's license and rental agreement to let him 
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1 know that I was done with the - the traffic violations that 
2 I stopped him for. 
3 Q. Okay. And at that point, after you hand him the 
4 documents, you started asking him questions about drugs. 
5 A. Not immediately about drugs, no. 
6 Q. You didn't ask him about whether he was carrying 
7 drugs at that point? 
8 A. Let's see. I asked him if he had anything illegal 
9 in the vehicle. 
10 J Q. Okay. And then you went specifically — 
11 A. And then — then — 
12 J Q. — into drugs. 
13 A. — specifically into drugs, yes. 
14 Q. You then - he then - you then asked to search; is 
15 that right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 I Q. And he says-, "1 — I'd like to get on my way"? 
18 A. No. He said no to asking — 
19 Q. But what he said specifically, again, is on the 
20 video. 
21 I A. Yes. I think what you're recalling is I asked 
22 I him — after giving him his driver's license and the rental 
23 agreement, I asked if I could ask a few more questions, and 
24 he thought that it wasn't really necessary for me to. Is 
25 J that what you're referring to? 
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Q. 
questions 
A. 
questions 
Yeah. 
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He fe 
and I 
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It that 
thought 
was has: 
it wasn 
it was 
Lcally tired 
't necessary 
necesj 
of you 
for me 
asking 
to ask 
him 
sary for me to ask more 
questions. 
Q. And then you detained him and waited for the drug 
dog. 
A. Yes. For three minutes. 
Q. Oh, one of the factors I didn't ask you about, I'm 
sorry, is: On the tape, when you're calling either your 
sergeant or the dispatcher, you made some — you — you seem 
to indicate there is an inconsistency because he said he had 
grandchildren and his wife looked like she was in her 
twenties or thirties; is that right? 
A. I hadn't — I never identified the passenger until 
after the arrest was made. From the dark, from what I had 
observed, she — she had a hat on she pulled over. She was 
sleeping at first, so I didn't actually get a really good 
look at her. But she did appear to be very young. 
Q. But she turned out to be 65. 
A. I don't recall her age, actually. 
Q. So — but - so when you tell your sergeant that she 
appears to be really young, in her twenties or thirties, 
you're just speculating. 
A. During — yeah. 
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1 Q. Okay, 
2 A. If I was going to - I didn't ever identify her, 
3 but from what I saw, yes, I would think that she was in her 
4 twenties or thirties. 
5 Q. All right. 
6 A. But as a whole, that didn't make my decision on 
7 searching the vehicle or calling for a dog. It was 
8 something I said to my sergeant. 
9 Q. But it was part of what you keep describing as the 
10 totality of the circumstances. 
11 A. One of them. But not one of the major ones, so... 
12 Q. All right. 
13 A. It's not even in my report, so... 
14 MR. METOS: That's all I have. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. 
16 Ms. Natale, any redirect? 
17 | MS. NATALE: No, Your Honor. 
18 I THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may step 
19 down. 
20 I Ms. Natale, you said you had another witness? 
21 I MS. NATALE: Yes, Your Honor. I'll try and be 
22 j brief. 
23 THE COURT: Is he or she here? 
24 MS. NATALE: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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MS. NATALE: He's outside. 
THE COURT: Step up, take an oath and take the 
witness stand, please. 
Tell us your name. 
THE WITNESS: Brian Cunningham. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Natale. 
BRIAN CUNNINGHAM, 
called as a witness by the State of Utah, 
being first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. NATALE: 
Q. And where are you presently employed? 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
And how long have you been with the sheriff's 
A 
Q 
office? 
A 
Q 
Five years. 
Do you have any particular specialized training 
with the sheriff's office — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — dealing with — go ahead. 
A. I'm currently assigned to the K-9 unit. 
Q. Okay. And as a K-9 handler, then, do you — have 
you received particular training in how to handle a police 
service dog? 
A* Yes, lots of it. 
Q. And what has that training mainly consisted of? 
A. I'm — I'm required yearly or annually to 
recertify. I had to go through over 200 hours to certify 
with the dog in the first place. Then I'm required by our 
policy to train monthly. 
Q. Okay. And is that training — do you have to do 
that training with the dog or is it individual training that 
you do? 
A. It's with the dog. Some can be without the dog, 
with just — in handlers training, but most of the time it's 
with the dog. 
Q. Okay. And is there a particular agency that 
certifies you and/or the dog in order to conduct these types 
of operations? 
A. Yes. The State of Utah Police Officers Standard 
and Training certifies my dog. 
Q. Okay. And are you certified as well, or just the 
dog? 
A. Both the dog and myself. 
Q. Okay. 
A. As a handler and as a narcotics detecting dog. 
Q. Were those certifications for both you as well as 
your dog current on January 14th of this year, 2009? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 J Q. Okay. And what is your dog's name? 
3 A. Caster. 
4 Q. Can you describe basically what it is that Caster 
5 does when you deploy him on an exterior sniff of a vehicle? 
6 A. .Yes. There's two types of alerts for a dog. 
7 One's passive alerting and the other one is aggressive. My 
8 dog's an aggressive alert indicator, which means that, when 
9 he alerts, he goes into a behavioral change. And once that 
10 I behavioral change and he — he finds the source where the 
11 odor's coming from, he can — he indicates in different ways. 
12 I One, scratching, biting, barking. Sometimes due to the fact 
13 of where the narcotics are hidden, if you — if it's the 
14 temperature or the wind, it all — it all depends on — on 
15 | what's present as an element. But just an alert can be his 
16 final response. 
17 j Q. Okay. So as I understand you, then, an alert is 
18 I more of a behavioral change? 
19 I A. Yes. 
20 | Q. And an indicator would be what then? 
21 I A. Actually, going to source, the strongest point of 
22 j the odor. 
23 Q. Okay. And then when he finds that particular 
24 I odor, is there something that he does in response? 
25 I A. Yes. He'll either scratch, he'll - he'll bite, 
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he 
or 
11 bark or : 
Q. 
can 
A. 
Okay. 
they be 
They 
iust stick on odor and not leave. 
Does an alert usually precede an indication 
independent of each other? 
can be independent. An alert can happen 
without an indication due to the fact it's a large odor of 
marijuana or methamphetamines or just narcotic in general. 
Q. Does it take a stronger odor, usually, to trigger 
an indication than an alert? 
A. No. It's usually an alert is the first: and then 
it's an indication on a point source. It's a final — final 
response. 
Q. Okay. And are there particular drugs that Caster 
is trained to detect? 
A. Yes. He's certified on four odors: 
methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin and marijuana. 
Q. Okay. And has he been deployed by you to conduct 
exterior sniffs of many vehicles? 
A. Many. 
Q. Approximately how many; do you know? 
A. I don't know. It could be 50, 60. I don'z - I've 
done so many. 
Q. How long has he been doing it? 
A. He had a previous handler before me, but, with me, 
two years. 
Q. Okay. Were you called to assist Trooper Ekberg on 
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1 a traffic stop on 1-80 on January the 14th of this year, 
2 2009? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And what were you informed about that particular 
5 stop? 
6 A. I was informed over the radio that he was 
7 requesting a K-9 for a exterior vehicle sniff. As I arrived 
8 on scene, I was met by Trooper Ekberg, and he advised that 
9 | he had reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals 
10 in the vehicle were trafficking illegal narcotics. 
11 Q. Okay. And do you recall approximately what time 
12 you arrived at the scene? 
13 I A. I don't recall. I can look to my report and see. 
14 Q. Okay. Do you have that with you? 
15 A. Yes, I do. 
16 j Q. Okay. And would it help you to refer to it to 
17 J refresh your memory on that? 
18 I A. Yes, iu would. 
19 j I actually went at about 2321, which was 11:21. 
20 Q. Okay. So you arrived at uhe scene. What's the 
21 j first thing you do? 
22 I A. First thing I do is I want to make sure that the 
23 [ scene is secure before I get my dog out. I want to get the 
24 ! information from the trooper, I want to make sure that, you 
25 I know, it's going to be a - something that's - that's legit 
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1 for my dog to be run on. A lot of times, people will find 
2 I the drugs in the car on a consent search and then they'll 
3 want me to run my dog after the fact, which is not necessary 
4 unless it's - they believe a hidden compartment's on the 
5 vehicle. 
6 So I wanted to make sure that - that I knew the 
7 circumstances of why I'm getting my dog out of the vehicle 
8 and that everybody was secure and safe, so... 
9 Q. Okay. So do you have the occupants in the car, 
10 then, exit — 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. — before you start the search? 
13 A. We can either leave them in the vehicle or we can 
14 I have them step out of the vehicle. My preference is to get 
15 out of the vehicle. I don't want a 2,000-pound weapon in 
16 their — in their hands while I'm in front of the vehicle 
17 i with my dog. 
18 | Q. Okay. And then when you start to run your dog, is 
19 there a particular protocol or steps that you follow when 
20 I you — when you start conducting a sniff of a vehicle? 
21 A. Yes. I have the occupants stand at least 15 feet, 
22 if not more, in front of the vehicle; one, so I can keep an 
23 I eye on — if I'm by myself, if I don't have any other 
24 officers on the scene. Two is that's a good distance away 
25 from — from me and my dog so my dog doesn't perceive them as 
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1 I a threat and try to - to bite them. He's on lead, which 
2 I means he's on a leash, but, still, it's three to four feet 
3 on a lead that he can - he can do a good snap at you. So 15 
4 feet -
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. — at least in front of the vehicle. 
7 Q. Okay. So you have them get out. And then is 
8 there a particular spot at the vehicle you always start at 
9 or — 
10 J A. I always start at the rear of the vehicle. 
11 Sometimes, depending on the wind current, just the elements, 
12 if they're too close to the roadway or the fog line, you 
13 know, it depends on which side of the vehicle I'll actually 
14 I go to. If I go clockwise or counter-clockwise on a vehicle. 
15 Q. Okay. So you don't always go the same direction 
16 or -
17 A. No. 
18 I Q. Okay. Do you take into account things like — you 
19 I mentioned the wind — the elements, the weather conditions, 
20 | things like that? 
21 I A. Yes. 
i 
22 I Q. Okay. And did you do that in this particular 
23 case? 
24 A. I did. It was — it was at night, not a lot of 
25 | traffic. It was pretty - I recall pretty secure on the side 
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1 of the — the right shoulder. And so, no, I just - I just 
2 deployed my dog and I let him go -
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. — where he wanted to go. 
5 Q. So describe what you observed Caster do during 
6 this particular sniff. 
7 A. I observed multiple alerts. Like I said, it was 
8 behavioral change, head checks. I did receive some 
9 indications after those alerts on the areas where the alert 
10 was — was perceived. 
11 Q. And what did the indications consist of? 
12 A. Scratching. 
13 Q-. Okay. With one paw, two paws? 
14 A. Two paws. 
15 I Q. And was it just a light scratch or was it a very 
16 J aggressive scratch? 
17 A. It's — it's aggressive. Depends on — on, like I 
18 j said, just the elements and how high the height is. 
19 I Sometimes he can't get to a scratch, so it's just going to 
20 j be an alert if it's too high. 
21 | Q. Okay. So tell me the areas where he alerted and 
22 I then the areas where he indicated. 
23 A. I believe in a wheel well and — the rear wheel 
24 well on the right side, I believe, and the trunk, trunk 
25 | lid -
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Q. Okay. 
A. — and the rear bumper. 
Q. So on the trunk, was there an alert and an 
indication or just one or the other? 
A. Both. 
Q. Both. Okay. Did you convey those observations to 
Trooper Ekberg? 
A. Yes, I did. And I actually advised Trooper 
Ekberg, before my dog was out of the vehicle, not to 
interview or speak about the traffic stop while my dog was 
out of the vehicle. 
Q. And is there a reason for that? 
A. Yes. There's some — there's case law on coercion 
with the dog out of the vehicle. So I wanted to make sure 
that no interviews or any questions of any sort were advised 
to them while my dog was out of the vehicle. 
Q. Okay. Anything else that you recall about this 
particular incident that you can talk about? 
A. Just that, after I secured my patrol dog in my -
in the car, the trunk was popped and a large quantity of 
marijuana was located in the trunk. 
Q. Okay. So were you present when the trunk was 
opened? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And did you also observe the - the substances you 
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1 believe to be marijuana in the trunk? 
2 A. Yes. There was multiple packages of marijuana. 
3 J Q. Okay. 
4 A. Or a green leafy substance, but, with my training 
5 and experience, I knew it was marijuana. 
6 Q. Okay. And, again, just to reiterate, those 
7 indications and alerts that you observed your dog doing 
8 during this particular occasion suggested to you that there 
9 was — there were controlled substances present. 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 Mr. Metos? 
14 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. METOS: 
16 Q. Have you got copies that you can provide to 
17 counsel? 
18 I A. Yes. I believe she — she's in possession of those 
19 | copies. 
20 I MS. NATALE: Uh-huh. 
21 I MR. METOS: Judge, just I would request that we 
22 I could make those part of the record. I have no problem with 
23 j Ms. Natale's needing those exhibits later, as long as copies 
24 are provided to me, since I haven't seen those yet. 
25 THE COURT: Do you want to offer them? I mean -
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1 MS. NATALE: I don't know that they're necessary 
2 for purposes of this hearing, but I'd certainly be happy to 
3 get them to Mr. Metos. 
4 MR. METOS: I think it goes to the dog's 
5 qualifications. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I - I mean, I don't think 
7 they're necessary. He's testified they're certified. If 
8 you were asking that they be admitted, I certainly don't 
9 have a problem with admitting them either. But I don't 
10 think it' s -
11 MR. METOS: All right. 
12 Q. When you got the — when you got there, did you 
13 I talk to Ekberg about what he'd seen in the car and what his 
14 I observations were? 
15 A. No. He just advised he had reasonable suspicion 
16 to believe there was some drug trafficking. 
17 i Q. And so you basically just walked your dog around 
18 | the car and looked for alerts. 
19 | A. Looked for, yes, behavioral changes and then the 
20 I final response. 
21 ! Q. And the areas that this dog alerted were the rear 
I 
22 i end of the car and the — 
23 j A. The trunk and the bumper, yes. 
24 | MR. METOS: All right. That's all I have. 
25 J MS. NATALE: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you, deputy. You may step down. 
May he be excused? 
MS. NATALE: No. 
THE COURT: No? He's got the next case or 
something? 
MS. NATALE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. Any further testimony, 
Ms. Natale? 
MS. NATALE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Metos? 
MR. METOS: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Metos, when - when can 
you reasonably get a brief in, you think? I mean, what you 
think you want and let's talk about whether I think that's 
reasonable. 
MR. METOS: I've got a Tenth Circuit brief coming 
up in the next couple weeks. My preference would be to get 
a — a transcript of this, and I don't know how long — I know 
it only takes a matter of days to get the video. 
THE COURT: Well, you can get - you can gee the 
CD 
MR. METOS: I mean the CD, yeah. 
THE COURT: - in a day - in a day. 
MR. METOS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: But you have to physically come get 
72 
1 it, but — and I don't know your schedule, but as far as you 
2 just have a form and we can get it back to you in a day. 
3 But I don't know how long it's going to take you to get a 
4 transcript. I don't — I don't want to wait a month and a 
5 half for a brief to get that. I mean, I'm going to leave 
6 here and, sometime in the next two days, watch this video. 
7 So I don't need a transcript. You may for your purposes, 
8 but I won't need one. 
9 I MR. METOS: Could we - what about July - we've got 
10 the July 4th holiday. What about submitting my brief July 
11 I 6th? 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Natale, if he did that, when could 
13 you have yours? 
14 MS. NATALE: July 6th. Two weeks after that 
15 should be fine, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: So then we could put argument the next 
17 day or do you want argument on the 2 8th? 
18 i MR. METOS: I would prefer a little time to review 
19 j it for a response so that I could — 
20 i THE COURT: Okay. Let's set, Mr. Metos, then, you 
21 | file your brief by July 6th; Ms. Natale, respond by July 21. 
22 I I'll give you an extra day. And we'll hear argument on this 
23 I at 9:00 on July 28th, Mr. Metos and - and I will have viewed 
24 the DVD in the next two days, so... 
25 j All right. We'll follow that schedule. Bail may 
73 
1 remain. Mr. Duhaime, stay in touch with your attorney, 
2 Thank you. 
3 MR. METOS: Thank you. 
4 (Whereupon, the hearing was 
5 I concluded at 11:03 a.m.) 
6 -oooOooo-
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
74 
C E R T I F l C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ] 
] ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ] 
I, JERI KEARBEY, Certified Court Transcriber in and for 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing electronically-
recorded proceedings were transcribed by me from an audio/video CD 
furnished by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah; 
That pages 3 through 74, both inclusive, represent a 
full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings held on June 2, 2009, 
and that said transcript contains all of the evidence, objections of counsel 
and rulings of the Court and all matters to which the same relate. 
DATED this 22nd day of June 2009. 
tRIKESRBEY, CC1 
I hereby affirm that the foregoing transcript was 
prepared under my supervision and direction. 
Carolyn Eiickson, CSR 
75 
$1,2QC 9 2 13:18 53:15 54:17 
$2,10C 24:1 
$2,105 24:1 
$250 52:6,25 
60s 55:2,4 
1 5:22 6:5,6,7,9 24:17 25:2 30:1 
34:5,18 35:1,17 40:17,25 
1's 25:24 
10 6:19 
11:00 32:22 49:15 
11:03 74:6 
11:2165:19 
14th 4:17 62:25 65:1 
15 44:16,21 45:12,16,19 66:21 67: 
3 
158 4:24 35:11 
16 29:19 
16th 13:3 
1960s 55:6 
(2 3:1 33:16,1734:14 37:21 
2,000-pound 66:15 
I200 62:5 
2008 4:19 
J2009 3:1 4:18 62:25 65:2 
21 73:22 
23:06 5:3 7:10 27:6 
23:08 7:23 17:9 
(23:13 17:10 
123:15 17:10 
23:2165:19 
!23:22 17:24 18:6 
23:24 19:21 
23:27 19:25 20:14 23:17 
123:35 23:13,20 
28th 73:18,24 
40 55:8 
41-6a-704 30:6 41:5 
4th 73:11 
50 64:20 
60 6:19,22 31:24 64:20 
65 6:22 31:24 33:25 59:20 
6th 73:12,15.22 
70 6:16,19 
76 22:19,21 
8 
80 4:24 14:2 
9:00 73:24 
9:42 3:1 
A.M3:l 74:6 
able 5:16 13:12 26:23,24 36:24 
above 18:3 
accident 33:11 
account 67:19 
across 13:11 
act 55:19 
acted 11:755:19 
activated 16:7 
activity 10:15,15 14:9 16:16 20:3 
38:11 40:7,8,9 51:9 
actually 6:4 11:25 14:25 17:2 18: 
3,11 44:7,7 48:23 52:23 55:10 59: 
18,2163:21 65:19 67:13 69:9 
admission 25:2 
admit 25:7 
admitted 25:23 71:9 
admitting 71:10 
advised 6:6 18:12 19:9 40:17 65:8 
69:9,16 71:16 
afoot 10:15 
afterwards 25:10 
age 59:21 
agency 62:14 
aggressive 63:7,8 68:17,18 
ago 53:13 55:9 
agreement 8:19,20 9:8,1211:21, 
22.24 12:1,3,4,19,24 14:18 18:12 
19:4 38:20 39:12 42:22 43:2,8,9, 
21,23 44:1 47:15,16 48:1,10 57:12, 
18.25 58:23 
ahead 18:10 61:22 
airline 51:25 52:10,15,17 53:7,14 
airport 9:16,16 10:1,223:1 
Alabama 12:13 
alert 20:22 63:8,15,17 64:2,4,8,9 
68:10,21 69:4 
alerted 68:22 71:22 
alerting 63:7 
alerts 63:6,9 68:8,10 70:8 71:19 
allowed 26:2,25 
alone 18:22 
already 18:8 34:24 55:14 
and/or 17:1 62:15 
animals 33:3 
annually 62:4 
another 21:10 29:25 41:9,11 60: 
20 
answer 10:19,19,20 
answering 10:17,21 11:13,15 
answers 10:18 11:11 
appear 59:19 
appeared 6:12 11:9 15:3,10 55:15 
appears 59:23 
applies 30:11 
approach 7:19 24:13 46:4 
approached 15:21 31:14 39:2 
approaching 32:5 
Approximately 4:16,24 5:3 6:17, 
19 7:10,24 9:2 17:9 19:15,21,22 
22:19,22 24:1 27:7,8 29:11 34:2 
52:6,25 64:19 65:11 
area 33:1 52:3 
areas 68:10,22,23 71:22 
argument 73:17,18,23 
around 6:9,10 7:19 71:18 
aroused 9:12 
arrest 23:8,10,12,20,22 59:16 
arrive 19:24 
arrived 18:19 19:11 20:14 23:15, 
17 65:7,12,20 
asleep 15:16,18,24 16:1 
assigned 61:23 
assist 64:25 
assistance 21:18 
assume 26:4 39:4 53:21 
atlas 49:1 
atlases 49:3 
attention 4:17 5:4 8:24 25:12,20 
attorney 74:2 
available 53:3,5 
avoided 10:21 
awake 15:25 
aware 38:19 54:10,13 
away 66:24 
B 
b-e-r-g 4:2 
back 5:5,20 9:14,19 10:2,6 12:17, 
20,25 13:6 14:12,17 17:12,24 18:1, 
12,20 19:22 26:9 27:17 32:1,17 
37:21 41:25 45:24 47:11 52:21 56: 
10,14 57:10 73:3 
backup 18:3 57:1,2 
bad 23:17 
bag 23:1,2,2 
bags 22:3,4,7,8,10,20 
Bail 74:1 
bark 64:1 
barking 63:12 
based 7:6 9:22 10:7 14:4 16:21 
20:1,7 23:7 
basically 59:1 63:4 71:18 
Bay 52:3 
becomes 38:24 
began 43:24 
behavior 11:12 
behavioral 63:9,10,18 68:9 71:20 
behind 7:16 29:25 30:15 31:12,13, 
14 32:5 35:12,15 36:12 37:1 
u^r,«v,aorvi 11 91-Q23:1 48:20 
65:9 66:4 68:24,25 70:2,19 71:17 
belonged 8:15 
below 6:4,13 
benchmark 29:4 
bends 35:6 
between 17:1031:2 
big 54:20 
bills 24:2 
Birmingham 12:13,18 13:6 47:5 
53:8,18 
bit 19:10,18 
bite 63:25 67:1 
biting 63:12 
black 4:19 6:17 22:2,7,10 
blue 16:11 
blurted 11.6 
Bob 11:6 44:13 
Bob's 11:6 
book 23:6 
both 14:5 16:7 62:21,24 69:6,7 
bottle 23:4 
Brian 17:23 61:5,8 
brief 25:13 60:22 72:14,17 73:6, 
11,22 
briefing 25:11 
briefly 18:13 
briefs 25:10,19 
broken 57:5 
brought 56:18 
bucks 52:19 
bumper 37:8,12 69:3 71:24 
burned 24:21 
business 50:10 51:15 
buy 52:7,10,13 
caffeine 15:14 
California 8:23 52:3,6,18 53:16,22 
called 4:6 17:4,5,7,11,15,17 18:8 
44:15 61:9 64:25 
calling 17:14 59:10 60:7 
came 13:11 18:1,20 27:11,1744: 
16 
camera 36:20,23 
canine 20:24 
Car 4:19,23 5:2 6:12,18 7:13,15, 
17,22,25 9:3 12:19 13:7 15:2 18:1 
20:20 27:13,13,20 29:25,25 30:1, 
15,17,20,24 31:16,17 32:7,16 33: 
13 35:5,2136:4,9,11 37:8,16 47: 
12,18 48:19 49:11,18 50:19 51:19, 
22 53:15 54:3,8,10,20 56:3,5,10, 
14,15 66:2,9 69:21 71:14,19,23 
carrying 58:6 
cars 31:2 34:6,8 47:23 50:15 
case 3:19 24:11 31:21,23 32:3 39: 
1 49:3 51:18 67:24 69:14 72:5 
cash 23:25 
Caster 20:24 21:4 63:3,4 64:12 
68:6 
caused 34:20 
CD 72:22,23 
cell 15:4,6 50:18 51:4,10,13 
center 10:8 15:5,13,14 
certain 29:22 32:16 
certainly 25:20 71:3,9 
certifications 62:24 
certified 62:19 64:14 71:8 
certifies 62:15,18 
certify 62:5 
change 37:17 40:15,19 63:9,10,18 
68:9 
changed 5:21 12:12 37:24 40:12, 
24 
changes 37:16 71:20 
charger 50:24 51:5,7 
chargers 15:5 50:21 
checlc 17:15,21 18:1,18 38:2152: 
2,2,21 53:1,7,9 56:16 
checked 17:20 
checks 68:9 
Chicago 8:24 9:14,15,18,19 10:2, 
3 11:1 12:10,17,20,25 13:6,9,13 
44:2 46:23 47:19 52:3,6,19,25 53: 
16,22,22 54:3,19 
chit 29:5 
cigarette 15:11 50:25 
Circuit 72:17 
circumstances 10:22 11:20 12:7 
13:14,20 16:18 20:9 60:10 66:7 
cite 34:10 41:16 
cited 30:8 34:9 
cities 10:4 
class 52:13 
classify 38:6,8 
clear 22:6 
clerk 3:20 
clockwise 67:14 
close 5:16 30:17,20,22 31:6,7,9, 
11,13,24 32:2,18 33:14 52:10 67: 
12 
closely 31:10 
closer 5:13,20 
clothing 23:3,3 
coast 10:5 
coat 24:8 
cocaine 19:7 64:15 
coercion 69:14 
Coffee 15:1449:13 
coincides 24:24 
cold 15:22 16:5,6 
combined 25:19 
come 3:14 30:15 45:6,12 73:1 
coming 16:245:1963:1172:17 
companies 54:11 
company 54:21 
compartment's 66:4 
computer 26:22 
concluded 74:6 
conclusion 14:4 
conditions 67:20 
conduct 35:7 62:15 54:16 
conducting 66:20 
confirm 7:1 20:11 21:10 
confirmed 7:2 
connected 51:5,7 
consent 17:1 19:8,17 55:13 66:2 
consist 68:12 
consisted 62:3 
consistent 13:23 49:20 
nsole 15:5,13,14 
contact 7:17,22 10:21 15:16 
contain 50:16 
contained 23:4 
controlled 70:10 
conversation 19:16,16 25:21 
convey 69:7 
conviction 54:24 
copies 70:17,20,24 
copy 12:21 24:21 26:2 
correct 4:125:18 6:24 8:19:19 
23:15,16,19 27:9 28:23 29:13,22 
30:7,13 32:7,20,22 35:25 36:3 37: 
9 38:21 41:1,24 43:25 44:4 46:2,9, 
12,16 47:3,7,10,20 48:17 51:23 
corridor 14:3 
cost 51:22,24 52:2,14 53:7,25 
costs 53:14 
counsel 8:7 70:18 
count 31:20 
counter-clockwise 67:14 
County 4:25 61:15 
couple 9:20 15:1826:1772:18 
course 28:10 31:15 37:15 38:10 
courtesy 32:6 
courtroom 3:23 8:3 
create 30:21 
criminal 10:15 17:21 18:16,18,21, 
25 20:3 38:11 
cross 33:3 
cross-country 49:6 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 27:3 70: 
15 
Cunningham 17:3 21:5 61:5,8 
Cunninabam's 20:16 
cup 15:14 49:13 
curious 52:24 
current 62:25 67:11 
currently 61:23 
custody 23:10 
cut 22:16 
D 
danger 32:18 
dangerous 30:21 
dark 32:24 36:24 59:16 
|date 52:22 
day 4:20 32:21 52:19 72:24,24 73: 
o i c 23 
days 9:20 12:25 13:2,7 54:4,5,6,7 |72:20 73:7,25 
deal 54:20 
dealing 61:22 
.decide 16:23 21:14 
[decided 27:20 
decision 34:24 35:2 60:6 
defendant 8:5 10:13 
demeanor 55:25 
denominations 24:2 
deny 20:12 
denying 19:17 
depending 67:11 
depends 52:7 63:14 67:13 68:18 
deploy 63:5 
deployed 64:16 68:3 
Deputy 17:3 20:16 21:5 72:2 
describe 63:4 68:6 
idescribing 60:9 
designated 40:24 41:4 
destination 10:18 
destinations 12:15 
details 43:25 
detained 19:10,18,21 21:21 59:6 
detect 64:13 
detecting 62:23 
detention 19:20 
determination 27:15 
determine 5:13,17 6:25 8:14,17 
determined 27:12 
develop 40:6 
develops 38:23 
device 46:18 
devices 48:15 
different 10:25 12:14 24:1 63:11 
difficult 13:4 
difficulty 12:2 
DIRECT 4:9 25:12 54:23 61:12 
direction 67:16 
discussed 46:8,23 
discussion 21:5 45:24 56:20 
dispatch 17:14 18:17,20 44:15,18, 
21,24 45:3,3,5,7 
dispatcher 59:11 
dispei 21:10 
distance 31:2,20,23 32:16 66:24 
distribution 10:8 
documents 57:11,18 58:4 
dog 17:2,6,7,11,17 18:8 19:10,12, 
19,24 20:5,11,14,17,22 21:6 23:15, 
17 47:12,14,17 55:13 56:9 59:7 
60:7 62:1,6,9,11,11,13,15,18,20, 
21,23,25 63:6 65:23 66:1,3,7,17, 
18,25,25 68:3 69:10,11,15,17,20 
70:8 71:18,22 
dog's 63:2,8 71:5 
done 58:1 64:21 
double 20:25 
down 13:16 15:22 49:4 60:19 72:2 
downtown 26:25 
Drawing 4:17 
drew 5:4 8:24 
drive 10:6 13:5,22 41:10 53:19,23 
driver 7:18,22 8:2 32:6 48:6,8 
driver's 8:12 14:11,13,15 17:20 
18:11 19:3 30:11 38:20 40:1 42:17 
43:11 57:12,18,25 58:22 
driving 13:929:13,15,1830:14 
37:1,1 46:12,13,14,20 49:6 
drove 13:20 
drug 10:4,15 14:2,8,9 16:16 38:2, 
4,8 40:7 50:1,13 54:23 59:6 71:17 
drug-sniffing 17:2 
drugs 10:6,10 19:6 28:3 29:2 38: 
13 49:8 50:16 58:4,5,7,12,13 64:12 
66:2 
due 9:14,15,19 10:2 12:16,20,24 
13:13 54:3 63:12 64:5 
Duhaime 3:3,4 8:5,11,12,15 9:3, 
10 10:16 13:8 14:10,15,24 15:17 
16:23 17:25,25 18:20,24,25 19:3,9 
20:4,9 21:20 23:8,9,20,22,25 27:6, 
12 30:8 31:6 33:25 45:11,17,19,25 
48:6 55:18 56:10,14,18 74:2 
Duhaime's 18:11 23:1,2 31:17 36: 
9 
duly 3:19 4:7 61:10 
during 23:7 28:10 51:25 59:25 68: 
6 70:9 
DVD 73:25 
E-k4:1 
each 51:7 64:3 
earlier 52:5 
east 10:5,6 
eating 15:4 
educated 18:14 
either 9:17 13:5 20:11 59:10 63: 
25 66:13 71:10 
Ekberg 3:10,24 4:1,5 27:5 64:25 
65:8 69:8,10 71:14 
elaborate 10:24 28:14 
element 63:15 
elements 67:11,20 68:19 
employed 4:11 61:14 
en 19:13 
end 44:21 48:22,24 71:23 
enjoy 13:10 46:17 
enough 5:16 31:7 
entitled 38:19,19 
Especially 49:6 
estimation 7:1 
even 15:25 42:16 60:13 
evening 17:3 18:17 
everybody 66:8 
everything 20:1 48:1 
everywhere 53:23 
exactly 21:6 40:21 
EXAMINATION 4:9 61:12 
examined 4:7 61:10 
excited 20:24 
excuse 49:23 
excused 72:3 
Exhibit 24:1725:2 
exhibits 70:24 
exit 7:16,19 66:10 
expect 3:7 
expensive 8:25 9:1,15 13:21 46: 
21 53:16 
experience 10:4,7 13:23 14:5 15: 
24 16:19 70:6 
explain 40:4 51:4 
explained 40:23 
exterior 20:19 63:5 64:17 65:7 
extra 18:17 20:4 73:23 
eye 10:21 66:23 
ifrog 11:14 
front 7:2,4 9:5 31:16 66:16,22 67: 
6 
full 22:5 
further 19:10,20,21 21:21 72:1,8 
face 56:5,6 
fact 25:16 50:12 57:16 63:12 64:5 
66:3 
factor 53:17 
factors 59:9 
failed 55:1 
Failure 6:3 
fair 13:4 
fairly 3:8 31:6,9 33:14 
familiar 52:15,17 53:14 
family 11:2,3,4 
far 73:2 
farther 35:9 
fast 15:3 
feet 37:3 66:21 67:2,4 
felt 59:3 
female 9:4 
few 43:7,8,10 53:13 58:23 
fifties 24:3 
fifty 52:19 
file 73:22 
final 63:16 64:10,10 71:21 
finally 42:22 43:9 
find 15:20 22:23 23:24 66:1 
finding 11:22 
findings 25:18 
finds 63:10,23 
Fine 27:2 73:16 
first 3:22,23 4:7,22 5:1,9,11 7:24 
11:2 15:16 27:5 39:21 47:12 52:13 
59:18 61:10 62:6 64:9 65:21,22 
five 6:23 17:9 36:1 46:1 61:18 
fixed 18:13 
flashlight 15:22 56:3 
flow 35:17 
fly 10:5 53:19,20,21,22,23,24 
flying 13:21,22 53:16,17 
fog 67:12 
folks 26:25 
follow 27:20 32:16 66:19 74:1 
followed 5:24 27:12 
following 31:10 32:18 
follows 4:8 61:11 
food 15:3 49:18 
form 11:24 42:20 43:2,6 46:14 73: 
3 
found 27:19 43:9 
four 15:4 36:11 50:18,20,21 64:14 
67:2 
four-lane 41.13 
frame 51:25 
free 57:13,16,17,20,23,24 
freeway 29:25 30:20 
freewavs 29:13 16 
igarbage 22:2,7,10 
gave 11:23 14:15 30:9 34:10 
general 64:6 
generally 30:23 54:11 55:25 
gentlemen 3:17,21 
gets 30:17 54:19 
getting 14:10,1226:1528:12,17 
,37:21 45:24 48:15 66:7 
give 26:9 57:10 73:23 
giving 19:2,3 26:20 58:22 
got 5:20 17:12 26:21 43:10 53:4,5 
170:17 71:13,13 72:5,17 73:10 
gotten 36:3 
GPS 15:14 48:13,15,18 49:3 
grandchildren 59:13 
grandkids 12:12,13 47:6 
green 22:14,15 70:5 
ground 57:4 
guardrails 35:6 |guess 9:21 12:22 
guy 44:20,21 
guy's 33:17 
H 
half 23:5 73:6 
hand 24:16 58:3 
handed 18:11 57:24 
handle 61:25 
handler 61:24 62:23 64:23 
handlers 62:12 
hands 56:8 66:16 . 
handy 49:3 
happen 32:9,11,12,13,14,15 64:4 
happened 17:22 46:6 
happens 54:14 
happy 54:11 71:3 
hard 5:6,12 11:3,15,22 50:17 
hat 59:17 
hauling 19:6 
Hawaii 8:12 46:8 
He'll 63:25,25,25 64:1 
head 68:9 
headlights 37:6,14,20 
hear 18:22 73:23 
hearing 31:1 71:3 74:5 
height 68:19 
help 40:6 65:16 
heroin 19:6 64:15 
hidden 63:13 66:4 
high 68:19,21 
higher 48:22,24 52:13 
Highway 4:12 26:23 29:9,12 41:3, 
10,13,14 
history 17:21 18:16,18.21,25 55:3, 
7 
holds 29:24 
holiday 73:11 
hour 6:16,19,20,22,23 30:24 31:24 
34:1 
hours 62:5 
hundred 28:11,12,12,16,17,17 29: 
4 37:2 52:19 
hundreds 24:2 
1-15 49:23 
1-80 14:1 49:23 50:15 65:1 
ice 33:7 
idea 29:21 33:13 49:9 51:5,10 
identification 8:8 23:6 42:20 
identified 23:5 59:15 
identify 8:11 60:2 
identifying 23:2 
illegal 19:4 40:9,15,19 58:8 65:10 
Illinois 8:24 
illuminate 6:3 
illuminated 5:17 31:8 
illumination 37:5 41:22 
immediately 7:13 17:4 19:8 44:12 
58:5 
impedes 35:15 
impeding 6:7 34:9,11,16 35:17 
42:10 
Incident 23:22 69:19 
include 25*13 53-m 
inconsistency 59:12 
inconsistent 11:11 43:18 
incorporate 25:18 
independent 64:3,4 
indicate 8:22 9:8 12:19 17:5 20:22 
59:12 
indicated 20:25 21:7 44:20 47:8 
48:12 50:18 54:16 68:23 
indicates 7:22 63:11 
indication 64:2,5,8,10 69:5 
indications 68:10,12 70:8 
indicator 12:6 16:15 48:12 63:8, 
20 
indicators 10:14 12:9 13:15 20:8 
38:3,10,15 40:7 44:20 48:14 
individual 62:9 
individuals 65:9 
information 18:23,25 38:23 51:24 
65:24 
informed 65:4,6 
initial 39:6,19 
Initially 39:17,18 
initiate 7:6 
Innocent 49:22 
inside 14:7 15:1 21:2 22:10 
inspection 11:24 43:2,6 
installed 26:22 48:18,23,24 
instead 13:20,22 
instructions 26:15,17 
Interstate 4:24 5:22 14:2 49:21 
51:10 
interview 69:11 
interviews 69:15 
inventory 22:25 
involving 4:19 
isn't 33:14 41:1 49:9 53:25 
issue 19:23 55:10 56:18 
itinerary 42:1,25 
January 4:17 13:3 16:3,4 33:5 62: 
25 65:1 
job 38:13 
July 73:10,11,11,15,22,22,24 
jump 21:2 
JUNE 3:1 
justified 20:2 
K 
K-9 17:1,4 61:23,24 65:7 
keep 20:3 48:15 49:9 51:10 54:12, 
20 60:9 66:22 
keys 21:20,21 
kids 47:5 
kind 19:6 40:5 
known 14:2 
lane 5:22 6:4,5,6,7,9 18:14 30:1,1, 
3,12,15 33:16,17 34:3,5,7,14,14,18 
35:1,18,21 36:1 37:21 40:17,23,25 
41:1,15 
lanes 5:21 37:25 40:12,15,19,24 
large 13:17 15:6 21:22 23:25 29:1 
64:5 69:21 
last 26:22,23 
late 15:15 
law 69:14 
laying 22:4,7 
lead 21:9 67:1,3 
leafy 22:14,15 70:5 
leash 67:2 
least 18:18 26:22 65:21 67:6 
leave 10:1064:1 66:1373:6 
leaving 52:11 
left 6:4 30:1,12 40:23 41:1 
left-hand 34:3 
gal 30:2,5 
legit 65:25 
leisure 25:8 
length 30:24 
lengths 36:11 
less 13:21 23:14 36:1 46:20 
license 5:5 6:3 8:13 12:2 14:11, 
13,15,18 17:20 18:4,12 19:3 36:5, 
15 37:7,13 38:20 39:9 40:1 42:7, 
17 43:11 46:1,8 56:13,20 57:12,18, 
25 58:22 
lid 69:1 
light 5:7,13,21 16:1 18:2,3,13 31:8 
lighter 15:11 50:25 
lighting 36:5 
lights 5:24 16:8,11 18:3 37:12 56: 
21,24 57:1,2 
limit 6:5,13,15,16 
Lincoln 4:19 6:18 
line 67:12 
list 13:16 
listed 48:6 
little 19:10,18 30:17 73:19 
located 11:23 69:22 
location 4:22 
locations 9:22 12:14 
logged 19:20 
long 4:14 15:15 18:17 42:5 46:3 
54:12,20 61:16 64:22 70:24 72:19 
73:4 
long-haul 50:4 
longer 19:18 54:20 
look 8:20 10:19 25:14 36:17 37:4, 
11 38:2,3 59:19 65:13 
looked 32:1 44:1 59:13 71:19,20 
looking 28:2,12,17 29:3 38:13 
lost 48:16 
lot 29:12,15 50:4,7 53:15 66:1 67: 
25 
Lots 24:22 62:2 
Loveiand 18:19,24 
lowest 53:2,5,6 
luggage 14:11,12,14,19,21,23 
luxury 13:17 
M 
made 7:9 9:22 10:14 11:12 14:8 
16:7 27:15 28:11,16,24 34:24 35:2 
57:9 59:11,16 
Mainlv 56:8 62:3 
MaioM0:4.8 50:1 60:11 
maority 22:2 24:2 50:12,15 
male 23:3,3 
manner 20:23 
many 64:17,18,19,21 
map 15:13 49:9,11 
marijuana 19:1,6 21:23 22:11,13, 
17 55:3 64:6,15 69:22 70:2,3,6 
marked 24:17 
math 23:17 
matter 33:20 72:20 
mean 19:16 28:13 38:10 71:1,7 
72:14,23 73:6 
meaning 7:4 
means 63:8 67:2 
measured 32:2 
member 11:3,3,4 
memo 26:20 
memory 43:16 65:17 
Memphis 12:11,18 13:5 47:5 53:8, 
17 
mention 55:1,8 
mentioned 6:12 11:9 12:5,6,14 
16:14 67:20 
met 55:18 65:8 
metallic 37:8 
methamphetamine 19:7 64:15 
methamphetamines 64:6 
Midway 9:15 
might 10:15 14:8 16:15 
milepost 4:24 
miles 6:16,19,19,22,23 30:24 31: 
24 34:1 
minimal 26:17 
minutes 7:12,24 15:18 17:9 19:22, 
25 20:4 23:14 46:1,4 53:13 59:8 
month 73:5 
monthly 62:7 
most 62:12 
motion 26:1 
motoring 49:22 
move 25:1 33:14 37:21 
moved 6:5 34:13,17,18 35:24 37: 
22 
moving 5:9,10,11 7:2,4 30:1 34:21 
35:1 
Ms 3:5,9,12,15 4:4,10 8:10 24:13, 
16 25:1,5,23,25 26:7,10,16 50:23 
60:16,17,20,21,24 61:1,7,13 70:21, 
24 71:2 72:1,4,7,9,10 73:13,15,22 
much 35:9 
multiple 68:8 70:3 
myself 21:22 62:21 56:23 
N 
N-i-e-14.1 
name 3:25 4:1 11:5,6 44:10,17,18, 
22,24 45:4,6,13,20 48:10 61:4 63:2 
narcotic 64:6 
narcotics 62:23 63:13 65:10 
Natale's 70:24 
nature 47:15 
nearing 35:6 
necessary 58:24 59:3,4 66:3 71:2, 
8 
need 18:13 73:8,9 
needing 70:24 
neglected 55:8 
nerve-wracking 30:18 
nervous 10:16 11:7,10,12 55:16, 
17 
never 55:18 59:15 
new 55:13 
next 16:24 17:19 45:10 72:5,18 
73:7,17,25 
next-day 53:1 
nick 22:16 
Niel 4:1,5 
night 5:3 15:15,22 28:2 32:22 67: 
25 
None 42:7,10,13 
normally 55:20,23 
notes 25:18 
nothing 14:22 29:7 39:19,23 40:1 
72:1 
notice 10:13 11:11 20:22 
noticed 5:6 14:10,11 16:22 
noticing 5:11 
notified 54:20 
number 28:11 
Oakland 8:23 9:16,18 10:1,3,7 11: 
1 13:9 47:18 52:24 
oath 3:17 4:8 61:2,11 
objection 25:3 
obligation 30:2,5 
observations 69:7 71:15 
observe 5:19 11:16 12:9 14:7 25: 
15 29:24 70:1 
observed 4:23 5:2,8 7:7,25 8:18 
13:16 15:1 16:19,22 20:2,10 21:6 
48:13 50:20 59:17 68:6,8 70:8 
obtained 18:24 43:23 
occasion 70:9 
occupants 66:9,21 
occurred 19:16 55:2 
odd 5:23 15:6,16,19,20 34:25 
odor 63:22,24 64:1,5,7 
odor's 63:11 
odors 64:14 
offer 71:1 
Office 61:15,17,20 
officers 27:11,19 62:17 66:24 
often 32:6,13 
old 29:19 
once 63:9 
one 3:6 6:9 21:10 22:15 24:8 26: 
23,23 29:24 30:24 38:12,14,15 41: 
14 46:18 47:14,16,16 48:14,19 50: 
23,25 51:7,12,13 52:19 56:23 59:9 
60:11,11 63:7,12 66:22 68:14 69:5 
73:9 
One's 63:7 
one-pound 22:4,19 
one-way 8:23 11:1 13:17 52:5,24 
ones 60:11 
only 9:3 25:25 26:2,13 30:11 35: 
21 40:24 41:2,4 72:20 
oooOooo 3:2 74:7 
open 22:16 
opened 22:3 23:11 69:24 
operate 42:14 
operations 62:16 
order 62:15 
origination 10:17 
other 3:13 6:10 10:13 11:10,11 
12:9 13:15 14:21 21:19 34:6,8 35: 
6 38:23 40:8,9 41:8,20 42:19 44: 
20 45:8 46:14 49:17 63:7 64:3 66: 
23 69:5 
out 11:6 17:3 18:1 27:13 28:2 31: 
19 32:5,24 38:21 49:3 53:23 56: 
10,14,18 59:20 65:23 66:7,14,15 
67:7 69:10,12,15,17 
outside 3:22 61:1 
over 7:13,15 30:2 32:6 33:14 34:3, 
13 35:3,12 39:16 44:1,8 59:17 62: 
5 65:6 
overheads 36:2 
overstatement 51:1 
overtaking 41:11 
own 7:3 39:4 50:8 
p.m 49:15 
paced 7:2 
packaged 22:1,2 
packages 22:4,15 70:3 
packed 22:5 
Pardon 38:7 
PARK 3:113:5 
parole 47:11 
part 13:14 25:11 38:13 51:1 60:9 
70:23 
participated 21:17 
participating 4:18 
particular 4:19 8:2 9:11 25:14,20 
28:2 32:21 51:25 52:22 61:19,25 
62:14 63:23 64:12 65:4 66:19 67: 
8,23 68:7 69:19 70:9 
pass 5:24 6:9 32:7 33:14 
passenger 7:20 9:4 14:14,20,25 
15:16,21 16:23 21:2 23:9 39:2 59: 
15 
passengers 15:23,24 
passing 5:23 18:14 34:5 40:18,24 
41:2,4,11 
passive 63:7 
Patrol 4:12 17:3 26:24 29:10,12 
47:11 56:15 69:20 
paw 68:14 
paws 21:1 68:14,15 
pay 25:20 
paying 54:12 
people 15:5 29:21 30:14 45:8 48: 
15 49:20 50:7 51:13,14,15,18 52:4 
53:16 66:1 
per 6:16,19,20,22 30:24 
perceive 66:25 
perceived 68:11 
percentages 50:14 
perplexed 13:19 
person 9:3 
personal 51:15 
personally 24:21 
peruse 25:7 
phone 51:4,11,13,15,16 
phones 15:4,6 50:19 
Photo 8:13 
physical 11:12 23:10 
physically 73:1 
pick 10:5 31:19 
pill 23:5 
pills 22:23 23:5,5 
place 23:8 62:6 
placed 23:9,20 
plain 15:7 21:22 
plane 52:4 
plans 13:19 38:16 47:9 
plastic 22:6 
plate 5:5,7,12 6:3 18:4 31:7 36:5, 
15,18,24,25 37:2,2,5,7,13 41:22 
42:8 47:24 56:13,20,25 
plates 27:17 47:21 
play 26:17 
please 3:25 24:19 61:3 
pleasure 49:9 
plugged 15:9,10 50:24 51:6 
pocket 24:4,6,7 
pockets 24:9 
point 18:8 19:12 20:2 21:15 25:6 
36:14 42:16,19 57:10,14,16 58:3,7 
63:21 64:10 
pointed 56:23,25 
pointing 57:7 
police 20:16 61:25 62:17 
policy 62:7 
popped 21:22 69:21 
port 22:16 
portions 25:11,13 
position 37:16 
positive 22:17 
possession 70:19 
possible 12:14 
posted 6:13,15,16 
potential 3:18 
pounds 22:21 28:11,12,13,16,17, 
qualifications 71:6 
quantity 15:6 21:23 23:25 29:1 
169:21 
question 9:21 31:11 39:6,21 40:6 
45:1,18 
questioning 39:19 55:22 
.questions 10:17,22 11:8,14,15 
26:7 40:5 42:25 43:4,7,9,10 46:11 
58:4,23 59:2,4,5 69:16 
quickly 14:15 
quite 16:5 32:6 
Iquota 29:3 
,18 29:4 
practical 33:20 
[precede 64:2 
[prefer 73:19 
[preference 66:14 72:18 
i prepaid 54:16 
present 18:22 20:19 63:15 69:23 
70:10 
I presently 4:11 61:14 
[pretty 68:1,1 
previous 31:1,21 64:23 
previously 38:2 
price 52:11 53:2,5,6 
Priceline.com 53:4 
prices 52:18 
prior 10:4 16:19 17:14 18:25 28:1 
[55:3,5,7 
[probably 29:18 33:13 49:11 50:12 
.problem 26:4,24 70:23 71:10 
problems 26:19 
producing 12:2 
[program 26:21,25 
(proper 26:15 48:1 
(properly 37:22 40:3 
protocol 66:19 
(provide 26:16 43:8 70:17 
provided 8:12 10:25 43:1,4,10 46: 
18 70:25 
public 49:22 
pull 7:13 30:2 32:6 35:3,12 
[pulled 31:5,11 34:3 36:1159:17 | pulling 7:15,15 29:25 39:16 
,pulis 35:12 
purposes 71:3 73:8 
'put 26:25 73:17 
Q 
radar 7:1,5 
radio 44:15 45:9 65:6 
ran 17:20,21 27:17 
range 49:4 
rather 46:14 
reached 35:10 
react 29:21 55:22 
read 5:6,12 37:2 
really 40:23 47:8 58:24 59:18,23 
rear 5:5,7 6:3 18:1 20:25,25 31:17 
34:25 36:8 67:10 68:24 69:3 71:22 
rear-end 33:10 
reason 6:6,8 39:20,23 40:11 49:4 
69:13 
reasonable 20:3 38:24 40:6 65:9 
1:1672:16 
reasonably 72:14 
reasons 6:1 21:21 45:18 47:14,17 
recall 3:11 4:18,22 5:124:4,7,8 
27:11,23,24,25 28:1,4,5,14,18.20 
35:23 37:10,23 44:22 46:3 48:20 
52:5 59:21 65:11,13 68:169:18 
recalling 58:21 
receive 42:22 43:21 68:9 
Received 25:4,24 43:24 61:25 
recertify 62:5 
recognize 24:17 
recollection 24:24 
record 70:23 
records 17:15 18:18 56:16 
recreation 50:8 
red 16:11 
redirect 60:16 
refer 40:21 65:16 
referring 45:2 58:25 
reflect 37:15 
reflected 43:12 
reflecting 37:6,20 
reflection 37:12,15,17 
reflects 28:21 
refresh 65:17 
registration 18:2 34:25 38:20 39: 
14 
regularly 32:13 
reiterate 70:7 
related 50:13 
relation 52:7 
rely 38:15 
relying 43:15 
remain 74:2 
rent 54:10 
rental 8:18,19,20,23,25,25 9:8,12 
11:21.22.23,24 12:1,3.4,16.19.24 
13:17 14:17 18:12 19:3 27:13,18, 
20 38:20 39:12 42:22 43:2,6,7,9, 
21,23 44:1 47:15,16,22,23 48:1 51: 
22 53:15 54:10,12,21 57:12,18,25 
58:22 
rented 9:10,16,18,23 10:1 54:8 
renter 9:9 
renting 47:18 
rephrase 30:18 
report 7:22 17:5 24:24 40:21 52: 
23 53:10 60:13 65:13 
request 25:10,20,25 46:1 47:12, 
14 70:22 
requested 42:16,19,24 43:3 44:22 
47:17 
requesting 43:25 65:7 
require 26:15 
required 62:4,6 
respect 8:17 
respond 14:24 73:22 
response 63:16,24 64:11 71:21 
73:20 
result 33:10 
return 13:7 
returned 9:18,23 14:17 16:25 17: 
2 8 24 19:22 
review 73:19 
reward 29:5 
ride 46:17 
rights 57:19 
road 31:19 33:3,8 35:7 41:11 49: 
1,3 50:13 
roads 29:13 
roadway 67:12 
route 19:13 
rule 30:23 
ruled 26:1 
run 15:4 17:20 53:25 56:16 66:1,3, 
18 
running 26:14 27:9 
rural 33:1 
safe 35:4,4,5,6,7,8,10 36:3 66:8 
safety 21:20 39:4 
sally 22:16 
Salt 61:15 
same 67:16 
same-week 53:2 
saw 5:9 7:12 27:5 50:25 60:3 
saying 32:12 33:19,20 44:22 57: 
22,24 
says 41:6,8 58:17 
scene 18:19 21:19 27:12 65:8,12, 
20,23 66:24 
schedule 73:2 74:1 
scratch 21:1 63:25 68:16,17,20 
scratching 63:12 68:13 
sealed 22:3,19 
search 17:1 19:8 21:14 23:8,22 
58:14 66:2,12 
searching 60:7 
seat 9:5 14:12 
seated 8:7 
second 3:7 
seconds 31:2,20 36:2 44:16,21 
45:12,16,19 
section 30:11 
secure 65:23 65:8 68:1 
secured 69:20 
see 5:20 8:3 12:12,13 15:7 17:7,8 
31:5,7,16 32:2,2 36:8,14,15,17,18, 
18,25 37:5,11 47:5 58:8 65:13 
seeing 13:11 
seeking 10:20 
seem 38:15 59:11 
seemed 11:14 
seen 70:25 71:14 
seized 23:7 
sense 51:21 
separate 48:19 _____ 
sergeant 45:10,18 59:11,22 60:8 
service 20:16 62:1 
set 47:9 73:21 
seventeen 23:4 
seventy 41:5 
several 22:3,3 46:19 
Sgt 18:19,24 
shaking 11:16 
shall 41:10 
she's 70:19 
Sheriff's 61:15,16,20 
shining 16:1 56:5,24 
shortly 17:8 23:10 42:24 
shoulder 68:2 
shouldn't 26:3 
show 18:3 46:5 57:4,6 
side 7:20 15:21 21:3 39:2 41:11 
56:2 67:13 68:1,25 
sights 13:12 
signaled 35:3 37:22 
significance 23:24 
significant 9:17 10:3 13:25 
simple 10:21 11:8 
since 29:19 70:25 
sir 19:5,7 
siren 16:8,9 
sirens 16:10 
sitting 21:24,25 
situation 30:21 33:24 
situations 29:22 
sleeping 9:4 15:25 59:18 
slower 30:2 
smiled 21:7 
smiling 34:20 
snap 67:3 
sniff 20:20 63:5 65:7 66:20 68:7 
sniffed 21:4 
,;*<«. evi--<"7 
somebody 29:24 32:18 
somebody's 32:5 
someone 18:20 
someone's 33:24 
sometime 73:7 
sometimes 30:14 33:3,4,7 63:12 
67:1168:20 
somewhat 11:10 55:16 
somewhere 53:23,23 
soon 17:1234:18 
sorry 3:12 6:21 59:10 
sort 29:4,5,5 33:1 69:16 
source 63:10,21 64:10 
speaking 10:12 16:22 
specialized 61:19 
specifically 58:10,13,19 
speculating 59:24 
speed 6:4,13,15,16,17 7:3 
spell 3:25 
spend 13:11 
spent 29:13 
spoke 20:8 55:23 
spot 35:4,7,10 36:3 67:8 
spotlight 37:14 
spotlights 16:13 
spots 31:19 
stall 10:19 
stand 61:3 55:21 
Standard 62:17 
start 27:8 66:12,18,20 67:8,10 
started 47:4 58:4 
State 3:3 4:6 47:24 61:9 62:17 
State's 24:17 25:2 
stated 11:2 12:11 13:21 19:5,7,9 
44:7,16 
statement 57:9 
statements 28:11,16,19,24 
states 41:9 
stationary 5:9 
statute 30:8 41:6,7,8,9 
stay 15:23,25 74:2 
stayed 15:16,17 
staying 42:5 
Step 3:16,22 18:1 60:18 61:2 66: 
14 72:2 
steps 66:19 
stick 64:1 
sticker 23:2 
still 18:16 31:9 37:4 67:2 
stipulate 6:8 
stop 4:18 5:25 6:2 7:6,9 13:2 16:7 
24:10,20 32:19 33:10 34:24 35:5,8 
36:4 38:2,4,8,18 39:20 40:12 50: 
16 52:5 65:1,5 69:11 
stopped 8:3 12:25 27:15 29:1 39: 
24 58:2 
stops 38:6,8 
stronger 64:7 
strongest 63:21 
strongly 20:25 21:8 
stuff 38:21 
submitting 73:11 
substance 22:14,15 70:5 
substances 70:1,10 
sudden 32:19 33:10 
suggest 25:9 
suggested 70:9 
Summit 4:25 
suspicion 20:3 38:24 40:6 65:9 
71:16 
suspicions 9:13 20:12 21:10 
suspicious 9:22 10:14,23 11:19 
12:6 13:19 14:8 
sweating 11:16 
sworn 3:19 4:7 61:10 
table 8:7 
tail 31:9 33:18,24 
talked 15:1731:1 36:540:1141: 
22 44:19 47:1 54:23 
tape 24:10 32:1 59:10 
temperature 63:14 
ten 6:23 23:14 30:24 
tends 52:11 
Tenth 72:17 
term 22:13 
tested 22:16,17 
testified 4:8 31:21 38:3 44:12 53: 
1361:11 71:8 
testifying 3:22 
testimony 3:23 25:19 32:11 35:16 
72:8 
Texas 27:13,18,20 47:21,22 
they'll 66:2 
third 12:5 47:24 
thirties 59:14,23 60:4 
thoroughfare 50:1 
though 9:21 12:21 35:3 54:14 
threat 67:1 
three 4:16 12:14 19:25 20:4 29:10 
54:4 59:8 67:2 
throat 11:14 
thumb 30:23 
ticket 52:6,10,13 53:14 
tickets 52:16,17 53:8 
timer 46:5 
tired 59:1 
today 8:3 25:17,19 31:21 44:12 
top 22:4,7 
total 22:21 
totality 16:17 20:9 45:17 60:10 
touch 74:2 
Towards 56:7,25 
Town 4:19 6:18 
traffic 4:18 5:22 6:1,7.10 7:6 17: 
25 24:20 29:22 34:9,11,16 35:1,5, 
8,17,21 36:1 38:18 40:25 42:11 
58:1 65:1 68:1 69:11 
traffickers 10:5 
trafficking 14:3,9 65:10 71:17 
train 62:7 
trained 64:13 
training 10:7 14:5 16:20 29:15 61: 
19,25 62:3,8,9,9,12,18 70:5 
transcript 72:19 73:5,8 
transportation 46:15 
transporting 49:8 
travel 10:22 11:19 12:6 35:10 38: 
16 41:25 42:25 50:12 51:25 53:1, 
2,25 
traveling 6:4,13,18 31:2 33:25 34: 
19 49:21 50:7,10 51:9 
tried 21:1,2 
trigger 64:7 
trip 10:17 11:1 15:15,17 43:25 51: 
21 52:8,24 
Trooper 3:10,24 4:11,14 27:5 64: 
25 65:8,24 69:8,9 
troopers 21:19 
troubles 26:14 
trucking 50:4 
true 45:15,22 
trunk 14:19,20,22,24 20:25 21:1,8, 
13,14,22.23 22:4 23:10 68:25,25 
69:4,21,22,23 70:2 71:24 
try 5:12 60:21 67:1 
TUESDAY 3:1 
turn 36:2 
turned 5:24 59:20 
twenties 59:14,23 60:4 
twenty 17:23 
two 3:5 7:24 9:6 12:25,25 13:2,7 
15:5 19:22 31:1 36:1141:3,14 51: 
17,18 52:4,19 53:16 54:3,5,6,7 56: 
24 63:6 64:24 66:24 68:14,15 73: 
7,15,25 
two-lane 41:3,10,14 
two-second 31:23 
type 16:15 
types 62:15 63:6 
U 
uncle 11:5 12:1144:6,8,18,24 
uncle's 11:5 44:9,22 45:4,6,12 
uncommon 47:23 
under 6:20,23 23:8,10,20 41:5 
understand 6:11 63:17 
understood 57:19 
unit 61:23 
unless 41:11 66:4 
unmarked 23:4 
unsafe 33:24 35:6 
unsure 10:18 11:7,10 
until 3:23 19:10 59:15 
unusual 15:20 38:16 
using 18:14 22:13 23:5 
UTAH 3:1 4:6,12 30:5 61:9 62:17 
V 
vacuum 22:3,19 
valid 48:3,4 
Valium 23:5 
vast 50:12 
chicle 5'8 13 20 21 25 7" 17 19 8" 
2^5.19 9:9 'l 1?24'l2:16,24 13:13 ' 
14:7,17 15:23 16:25 17:1,2,8,12,24 
19:5,8,23 20:10 21:2,4,20 22:25 
29:1 30:22 33:23 34:24 36:21 37:1 
40:3 41:12 42:14 43:148:21,23 
56:8 58:9 60:7 63:5 65:7,10 66:5, 
7,13,14,15,16,20.22 67:6.8,10,13, 
1469:10,12,15,17 
vehicle's 5:5 
vehicles 5:24 41:10 48:22,24 64: 
17 
verbal! 8:15 
versions 10:25 
versus 3*3 
video 24:20 25:11,14 26:13 27:9 
28:8,9,10,21 31:5,16 36:8,17 37:4, 
5,11 43:13,1945:21 46:5 57:6 58: 
20 72:20 73:7 
videotaped 24:11 
view 15:7 21:22 
viewed 73:24 
violated 41:21 
violating 30:9 
violation 7:12 34:21 37:24 
violations 17:25 41:20 58:1 
visit 11:2 12:10 44:6 
visiting 11:5 44:4,8 
j/F&tors 18:22 
Visual 7:1 
W 
Lwafc*45:6,12 73:5 
waited 17:23 19:18 20:5 44:16,21 
45:19 59:6 
waiting 18:16 35:4,7 
walk 7:19 
walked 39:1 71:18 
wallet 24:5 
wanted 13:10,11 46:1766:668:5 
69:15 
warn 41:16 
warned 34:11 
warning 18:15 19:2330:956:19 
watch 25:6,14,16,17 26:23,24 27: 
1 73:7 
watched 24:23 
way 11:13 13:1221:10,1237:24 
41:14 52:20 55:14 58:17 
ways 63:11 
weapon 66:15 
weather 16:2 67:20 
weeks 72:18 73:15 
weird 14:21 
west 10:5 
whatever 49:4 
[wheel 68:24,24 
Whereupon 3:18 74:5 
whether 5:13 8:14 12:23 14:23 
40:3 49:8 58:6 72:15 
Who's 8.7 
whoever 45:19 
whoever's 3:21 
whole 25:16,17 60:6 
wide 15:25 
wife 59:13 
wig-wags 16:13 
wind 63:14 67:11.20 
window 15:22 39:1 
withdraw 26:2 
Within 7:12 36:11 46:3 
without 62:11 64:5 
witness 3:7,13,24 4:1,6 24:14 26: 
10 60:20 61:3,5,9 
witnesses 3:5,18 
woke 15:18 
wondering 12:22 
working 5:7,14,21 48:13 
works 24:22 
worried 32:17 
wrappers 15:3 49:18,18 
I writing 36:18 
Y 
year 62:25 65:1 
yearly 62 4 
years 4:16 29:10,19 55:9 61:18 
64:24 
young 59:19,23 
yourself 21:18 29:18 
Z 
zoomeu JO.^U,*:^ 
Addendum D 
Page 1 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.)) 
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.))) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.This 
case was not selected for publication in the Federal 
Reporter. 
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter See 
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally gov-
erning citation of judicial decisions issued on or after 
Jan. 1, 2007. See also Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. (Find 
CTA9 Rule 36-3) 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Timothy M. MORNEAU, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 09-30192. 
Argued and submitted July 29, 2010. 
Filed Aug. 25,2010. 
Background: After his motion to suppress was de-
nied, defendant was convicted in the United States 
District Court for the District of Montana. Richard F. 
CebuU, Chief Judge, of possession with intent to dis-
tribute ecstasy and conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute ecstasy. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) questioning that occurred during records check, 
following traffic stop of vehicle, was permissible, and 
(2) officer had reasonable suspicion justifying con-
tinued questioning of vehicle's occupants after com-
pletion of records check. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Automobiles 48A N - ^ ^ ^ ^ 349(18) 
48AVU Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349fl8) k. Inquiry; License, 
Registration, or Warrant Checks. Most Cited Cases 
Officer's questioning of vehicle's occupants, follow-
ing traffic stop, during 16-minute time period re-
quired to complete records check was permissible, 
and did not have to be justified by reasonable suspi-
cion, since questioning did not extend duration of 
stop. U.SC.A Const.Amend. 4. 
€=^> [21 Automobiles 48A " w " 349(18) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
48A Automobiles 
Deposit 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(18) k. Inquiry; License, 
Registration, or Warrant Checks. Most Cited Cases 
Officer conducting traffic stop of vehicle had reason-
able suspicion that justified continued questioning of 
vehicle's occupants after completion of records 
check, given occupants' nervousness and avoidance 
of eye contact, defendant's continued, or feigned, 
deep sleep despite cold air from open window, con-
tradictory stories by other occupants as to whether 
defendant was hitchhiker or knew one of them, con-
tradictory stories about identity of person occupants 
planned to visit, contradictions about when and 
where defendant was picked up, defendant's knowl-
edge of name of person to be visited, which was un-
known to other occupants even though they said they 
were visiting other's friend, and defendant's implau-
sible claim that he legally crossed into United States 
from Canada on snowmobile and thereafter had his 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.)) 
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont.))) 
identification stolen. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
131 Automobiles 48A ^ - ^ 349(17) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
Length and Character Thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Continued delay of traffic stop after officer obtained 
consent to search car was reasonable in light of cir-
cumstances of case, including need to move vehicle 
to highway patrol office to ensure safety and comfort 
Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., James Edmund 
Seykora, Esquire, Assistant U.S., USBI-Office of The 
U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
David Allen Duke, Esquire, Law Office of David A. 
Duke, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana, Richard F. Cebull Chief District 
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. l:08-cr-00043-RFC-l. 
Before O'CONNOR, Associate Justice.— and 
THOMAS and W FLETCHER. Circuit Judges. 
MEMORANDUM — 
*1 Defendant Timothy M. Morneau was convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute ecstasy and con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute ecstacy in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He now 
appeals the pretrial denial of his suppression motion. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 12Q1 and 
nttm INI 
atrirm.— 
[11 The district court denied Morneau's motion to 
suppress, holding the initial traffic stop justified 
based on a broken headlight and the continuation of 
the stop supported by reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity. Morneau here alleges only that the stop 
was unreasonably prolonged. We review de novo the 
district court's ruling on a motion to suppress and 
Page 2 
review for clear error the underlying findings of fact. 
United States v. Tunin. 517 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th 
Cir.2008). 
After de novo consideration, we agree with the dis-
trict court that the stop was not unreasonably pro-
longed. A motorist's general expectations in a traffic 
stop include a records check, United States v. 
Mendez, 416 F.3d 1077. 1080 (9th Clr.2007) (citing 
Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420. 437. 104 S.Ct 
3138. 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). which Officer Quin-
nell conducted in this case. Relying on Supreme 
Court precedent, this Court has explained, " '[M]ere 
police questioning does not constitute a seizure' 
unless it prolongs the detention of the individual, and, 
thus, no reasonable suspicion is required to justify the 
questioning that does not prolong the stop." Mendez, 
476F.3dat 1080 (quoting Muehlerv. Mena, 544 U.S. 
93. 101. 125 S.Ct. 1465. 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005)). 
Questioning may include inquiries unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop. See Tunin, 517 F.3d at 1100. 
Therefore, questioning that does not extend beyond 
the completion of a records check does not prolong a 
stop and need not be supported by reasonable suspi-
cion. Here, the records check for Morneau and the 
other occupants of the car ended around minute 16 of 
the stop, which means that all questioning until that 
time was permissible because it did not extend the 
duration of the stop. 
[2] The issue that remains, therefore, is whether the 
extension of the stop was justified from minute 16 to 
minute 34, when the car's owner (a passenger in the 
car) gave consent for Officer Quinnell to search the 
car. 
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances at minute 
16, id. at 1101 (determining reasonableness of pro-
longation of a stop based on a totality of the circum-
stances analysis), we conclude that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to continue questioning the car's 
occupants. By minute 16, factors that, taken together, 
amounted to reasonable suspicion included: 1) occu-
pants' nervousness and avoidance of eye contact; 2) 
Morneau's continued deep sleep (or feigning of sleep) 
despite cold February Montana air due to an open car 
window; 3) contradictory stories by the car's other 
occupants about whether Morneau was a hitchhiker 
or knew one of them; 4) contradictory stories about 
the identity of the person they planned to visit in Bill-
ings; 5) contradictions about when and where they 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. VS Gov. Works. 
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picked up Morneau; 6) the fact that Morneau-the al-
leged hitchhiker-knew the name of the person they 
were to visit in Billings, though neither of the other 
occupants did, despite the fact that the other occu-
pants each said they were visiting the other's friend; 
and 7) Morneau's implausible claim that he legally 
crossed into the United States from Canada on a 
snowmobile and subsequently had his ID stolen. 
*2 [3] In light of these factors, it was reasonable for 
the officer to prolong the stop from minute 16 to 
around minute 34 when he obtained consent to search 
the car. Continued delay after minute 34 and before 
Morneau's arrest was reasonable in light of the cir-
cumstances of this case, including the need to move 
to the Highway Patrol Office to ensure safety and 
comfort during the search of the car. 
Viewing the "totality of the circumstances" surround-
ing the stop, the officer's conduct was reasonable, and 
we therefore affirm the district court's denial of Mor-
neau's motion to suppress. 
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. 
FN* The Honorable Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Associate Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a). 
FN** This disposition is not appropriate for 
publication and is not precedent except as 
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 
FN1. Because the parties are familiar with 
the factual and procedural background, we 
recite it here only insofar as it is necessary 
to understand the disposition. 
C.A.9 (Mont.),2010. 
U.S. v. Morneau 
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 3330505 (C.A.9 (Mont)) 
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334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah)) 
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) 
(Cite as: 334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah))) 
HThis case was not selected for publication in the 
Federal Reporter. 
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter. See 
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally gov-
erning citation of judicial decisions issued on or after 
Jan. 1, 2007. See also Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. (Find 
CTA10 Rule 32.1) 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Jose Alfredo LOPEZ-GUTIERPvEZ, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 08-4143. 
June 8, 2009. 
Background: Defendant was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine after the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
2006 WL 3373909, denied his motion to suppress 
evidence, and he appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Michael R. Murphy, 
Circuit Judge, held that a police officer had reason-
able suspicion to prolong a traffic stop. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Automobiles 48A €^=> 349(17) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(]4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases 
Police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong 
traffic stop of car defendant was driving in order to 
have a drug-sniffing dog sweep the car; officer saw 
multiple signs of hidden compartments in the interior 
of the car, and there was an air freshener and a rose in 
the car, which the officer suspected were devices to 
mask the scent of drugs, there were more cell phones 
in the car than passengers, and when defendant exited 
the car at the officer's request, he assumed a position 
to be frisked fui weapons without being asked to do 
so. U.S C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
*881 Stephen Sorenson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
Veda M. Travis, Office of the United States Attorney, 
Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
Julie George, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant-
Appellant. 
Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, 
Circuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT1^ 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent except under the doctrines of law 
of the case, res judicata, and collateral es-
toppel. It may be cited, however, for its per-
suasive value consistent with Fed. R App P. 
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 
MICHAEL R MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, 
this panel has determined unanimously that oral ar-
gument would not materially assist in the determina-
tion of this appeal. See Fed R.App P 34(a)(2); 10th 
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submit-
ted without oral argument. 
I. Introduction 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Defendant-Appellant Jose Alfredo Lopez Gutierrez 
appeals his conviction for Possession of Metham-
phetamme With Intent to Distribute in violation of 21 
U S C ^ 841(a)(1) On appeal he argues the district 
court failed to suppress evidence seized during a 
search of the car he was driving Exercising jurisdic-
tion pursuant to 18 U S C fr 3742(a) and 28 U S C & 
1291, we affirm the distnet court's denial of the sup-
pression motion because the police had reasonable 
suspicion to temporanly detain Lopez while a dog 
sniff was conducted, and had probable cause to 
search the vehicle when the dog alerted to drugs 
II. Background 
Lopez was pulled over in Cedar City, Utah, for tail-
gating, making an improper lane change, and pos-
sessing tinted windows darker than allowable under 
state law A female passenger was riding in the vehi-
cle When the officer approached and looked inside 
the vehicle, he immediate!) noticed scarring on the 
seat belt bolts and a reattached airbag compartment m 
the dashboard Based on his training, the officer con-
sidered both of these alterations to the vehicle's inte-
rior to be indicative of hiding places for contraband 
The officer also observed one picture of Tesus Mal-
verde affixed to the dashboaid and another*882 
hanging from Lopez's necklace The officer recog-
nized the images of Jesus Malverde, who is consid-
ered a patron saint by some drug traffickers The of-
ficer observed an air freshener, which he thought 
might be used to mask the smell of drugs, as well as a 
rose on the dashboard which he characterized as a 
4
 distraction " Finally, the officer observed three cell 
phones in the vehicle's center console He believed, 
based on his training and experience, that individuals 
engaged in criminal activity often carried extra cell 
phones to have multiple lines of communication 
available Lopez told the officer he and the passenger 
were returning to Kansas after spending "about a 
week" m Las Vegas on vacation The officer ob-
served only one small suitcase m the vehicle, how-
ever, which m his view was less luggage than would 
be expected for a trip of that duration 
The officer asked Lopez to return with him to the 
patrol vehicle to leceive a written warning When 
Lopez got out of his car, instead of following the 
officer to the patrol vehicle, he assumed a position to 
be frisked for weapons The officer told him a frisk 
w as not necessary and motioned him to sit in the pa-
(Utah))) 
trol car Once in the patrol car, while the officer was 
writing out the warning, he asked additional ques-
tions about Lopez s travels Lopez changed nis ac-
count about the duration of the tnp, new saying it had 
been three or four days Lopez also, without prompt-
ing, told the officer a friend had taken the vehicle 
overnight while Lopez was m Las Vegas The officer 
testified this spontaneous statement was suspicious 
and interpreted it as an attempt by Lopez to distance 
himself from any contraband that might be found m 
the vehicle 
**2 Pnor to giving Lopez the written warning he had 
been preparing, the officer asked Lopez if there was 
anything illegal m the vehicle Lopez said no The 
officer then asked if he could search the vehicle, and 
Lopez said yes The officer then returned to Lopez's 
vehicle and briefly questioned the female passenger 
She said the two had been staying m a motel, which 
contradicted Lopez's account of them staying with a 
friend The officer then deployed his certified drug 
sniffing dog, Gino, for a sweep around the exterior of 
the vehicle Gmo alerted to the rear of the vehicle, so 
the officer opened the rear cargo door and deployed 
Gmo inside the vehicle The dog then indicated at the 
area between the second and third rows of seats The 
officer searched that area by hand and discovered 
6 73 pounds of methamphetamine hidden inside one 
of the rear seats 
At trial, Lopez attempted to suppress the metham-
phetamine, arguing the search was conducted without 
probable cause or valid consent The district court 
rejected the suppression request, ruling Lopez did not 
have a legitimate possessory interest in the vehicle to 
assert a Fourth Amendment violation,f— and even if 
he did, the officer had both probable cause to search 
the \ehicle and valid consent Lopez pleaded guilty, 
and now appeals 
FN1 The vehicle's expned registration was 
in the name of a third party, and Lopez was 
unable to provide the officer vuth the 
ownei's full name or telephone number 
There was, however, an expired insurance 
card indicating the vehicle had been insured 
by Lopez 
III. Discussion 
A district court's decision on a motion to suppress 
©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Oris US Gov Works 
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evidence is reviewed de novo United States v 
Contreras. 506 F 3d 1031 1035 (10th Cir 2007) The 
factual findings underlying its decision, however, are 
reviewed for clear en or A/_ 
**883 Lopez does not contend his initial traffic stop 
was invalid Rather, he argues the government unlaw-
fully prolonged the traffic stop and searched the inte-
rior of his vehicle without valid consent The polite 
may search the mteiior c i a ^ chide if theie is prob-
able cause that there is contraband inside the vehicle 
See United States v Vazquez 555 T 3d 923 929 
(10th Cir 2009) An alert by a certified drug-sniffing 
dog during a sweep of the exterior of the vehicle can 
give probable cause to search the interior Id at 929-
30, United States v Claikson, 551 F 3d 1196 1203 
(10th Cir 2009) 
Here, Gino's alert along with the other information 
known to the officer at the time, created probable 
cause to search the interior of the vehicle The only 
issue is wheiher Lopez was being lawfully detained 
when the sweep with Gmo commenced A traffic stop 
may be extended if the officer has reasonable articu-
lable suspicion of criminal activin Vazquez, ^ 5 
F 3d at Q29 Reasonable suspicion is a4 particularized 
and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped 
of cnmmal activity' United States \ Alcaiaz-
Aiellano 441 F 3d 1252 12>9 (10th Cir 2006) (quo-
tation omitted) "It represents a minimum level of 
objective justification which is considerably less than 
proof of wrongdoing by a pi eponderance of the evi-
dence " Id at 1260 (quotations omitted) This court 
"accords appropriate deference to the ability of a 
trained law enforcement officer to distinguish be-
tween innocent and suspicious actions " Cknkson, 
551 F 3d at 1201 (quotation omitted) Reasonable 
suspicion is determined based on the totality of the 
circumstances present Id_ 
**3 The iecord indicates the traffic stop became pio-
longed, at the earliest when the officer began asking 
additional questions while sitting in the patrol car 
with Lopez — At that point, the officer had ample 
reason to be suspicious of possible drug trafficking 
There were multiple signs of hidden compartments in 
the interior of the \ehicle There was an air freshener 
and a rose in the car, which the officer suspected 
w ere de\ ices to mask the scent of drugs There w ere 
more cell phones m the car than passengers There 
w ere multiple images of Jesus Malverde, considered 
by some to be a patron saint of drug traffickers Lo-
pez and his companion had less luggage than would 
be expected for a v\eel -long \ acanon Finally, Lopez 
automatically assumed a position to be frisked for 
weapons w ithout being asked to do so These factors 
taken together particular!} the evidence of the hid-
den compartments, gave rise to a reasonable suspi-
cion that Lopez may have been engaged in drug tiaf-
fickmg The police officer was therefore justified m 
prolonging the lenith of the traffic stop 
FN2 The recoid is uncleai as to whtn the 
officer CDmpleted filling out the warning 
while he was questioning Lopez in the patrol 
vehicle Once the written warning was com-
pleted, the officer's refusal to give Lopez the 
warning meant Lopez was not free to termi-
nate the encounter and thus was still being 
detained beyond the original purpose of the 
traffic stop, which required reasonable sus-
picion of some criminal activ lty It is unnec-
essary to determine the precipe point during 
the questioning when the stop became pro-
longed, however, because the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to piolong the step be-
fore the questioning began 
The police officers questioning pnor to the deploy-
ment of the drug-sniffing dog onlv served to heighten 
his suspicions and further justify the detention Lopez 
gave an inconsistent statement about the length of his 
stay in Las Vegas and spontaneously *884 told the 
officer that the vehicle had been m his friend's pos-
session overnight The passenger in the car told the 
officer they had stayed m a motel, not m a friend's 
house as Lopez had indicated These inconsistencies 
gave the officer justification to prolong the traffic 
stop further and deploy Gmo Therefore the deten-
tion was lawful at the time Gmo alerted tc drugs in-
side the vehicle —i 
F~NR The government amends ana tne uis 
tnct court ruled that Lopez did not demon-
strate a possessory interest m the vehicle 
sufficient to permit him to assert a Fourth 
Amendment violation It is unnecessary to 
reach this issue on account of the officer 
havmg probable cause to search the vehicle 
Likewise it is unnecessary to address the 
government's other contention that Lopez 
gave valid consent to search the vehicle, be-
C - in l h mson I utus N i I inn to */n^ I «> ^o\ \ c rl s 
334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah)) 
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) 
(Cite as: 334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO (Utah))) 
cause the search was lawful even in the ab-
sence of consent. 
IV. Conclusion 
The district court correctly denied Lopez's motion to 
suppress because the police had probable cause to 
conduct the search following a lawful detention. 
Therefore, the district court's decision is affirmed. 
C.A.IO (Utah).2009. 
U.S. v. Lopez-Gutierrez 
334 Fed.Appx. 880, 2009 WL 1579798 (C.A.IO 
(Utah)) 
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H i his case was not selected foi publication m tiie 
Federal Reporter. West Headnotes 
Not for Publication in W est's Federal Reporter. See 
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally go\-
erning citation of judicial decisions issued on or after 
Jan. 1, 2007. See also Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. (Find 
CTA10 Rule 32.1) 
Dotted States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Jesus Manuel DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 09-2090. 
Dec. 11,2009. 
As Amended on Rehearing in Part Jan. 28, 2010. 
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan 28, 
2< HO 
Background: Defendant was convicted, in the 
United States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico, of possession with intent to distribute 1000 
kilograms or muie of marijuana. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals. Marv Beck 
Briscoe, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) motor carrier inspection officer had piobuble 
cause to conduct further search of defendant's tractor-
trailer after his regulatory inspection of the vehicle; 
(2) evidence was sufficient to support conviction; 
(3) permissive inference jury instruction was war-
ranted; 
(4) admission of officers' testimony regarding the 
trucking industry and common drug trafficking prac-
tices was not plain error; and 
(5) denial of motion to allow handwriting expert to 
examine original consent to seaich form did not 
prejudice defendant. 
! 1! Automobiles 48A €^2 349.5(4) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349.5 Search oi Seizure ' on sequin I 
to Arrest, Stop oi Inquiry 
48Ak349.5(4) k. Probable or reasonable 
cause in general. Most Cited Cases 
\ ii to mobiles 48 A € ^ xi o > n 
^8 A, Automobiles 
48AVI1 Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak3^9,5 Search or Seizure Consequent 
to Arrest, Stop or Inquiry 
48Ak349,5(5) Object. Pn-ihil s o[» 
and Conduct of Search or Inspection 
48Ak349.5D k. Drugs and naaot-
ics. Mo t^ Cited Cases 
Motor carrier inspection officer had probable cause to 
conduct further search of tractor-trailer defendant 
wras driving after conducting regulatory inspection; 
inconsistent weights suggested defendant was carry-
ing more load than was listed on bill of lading, log 
book showed considerable down time away from 
home, defendant offered inconsistent stories, ap-
peared increasingly nervous, and possessed four cel-
lular phones, but not a CB radio, lock and seal on 
trailer was unusual given weight and nature of load, 
and large amount of dust on boxes m trailer and 
strong odor of air freshener was consistent with drug 
shipment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Affirmed. 
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[21 Controlled Substances 96H " V - / " " " 81 
96H Controlled Substances 
96HIII Prosecutions 
96Hk70 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
96Hk81 k. Possession for sale or distribu-
tion. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's con-
structive possession of marijuana found in tractor-
trailer, as required to support conviction for posses-
sion with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more 
of marijuana; defendant was the sole occupant and 
driver of the vehicle, he had a receipt for shrinkwrap 
used to package the marijuana, and the large quantity 
and value of the drugs made it unlikely that they 
would be shipped without the driver's knowledge. 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Art of 1Q70 S 4f)irhVlVA,l 91 I K f A 8 
841fb)(l¥A). 
131 Controlled Substances 96H x - r — 97 
96H Controlled Substances 
96HIII Prosecutions 
96Hk95 Instructions 
96Hk97 k. Possessory offenses. Most Cited 
Cases 
Permissive inference instruction telling jury it could, 
but was not required to, draw an inference about 
driver's knowledge of the marijuana based on his 
operation of the tractor-trailer in which the marijuana 
was found was warranted, in prosecution for posses-
sion with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more 
of marijuana, where defendant was sole operator of 
the vehicle, a drugs had a high value, and defendant 
had receipt for shrinkwrap used to package the mari-
juana. 
HI Criminal Law 110 €^ , 036.6 
110 Criminal Law 
11QXXIV Review 
11OXXTVYE) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl036 Evidence 
110kl036.6 k. Opinion evidence. 
Most Cited Cases 
Admission of law enforcement officers' testimony 
regarding the trucking industry and common drug 
trafficking practices was not plain error, in prosecu-
tion for possession with intent to distribute 1000 
kilograms or more of marijuana; to the extent that the 
testimony was expert in nature, the testimony's reli-
ability could be inferred from the breadth of the offi-
cers' training and experience. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
702, 28 U.S.C.A. 
[51 Criminal Law 110 €^> 627.6(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
11 OXX(A) Preliminary Proceedings 
110k627.5 Discovery Prior to and Incident 
IU 1 1 1U1 
110k627.6 Information or Things, Dis-
closure of 
110k627.6(3) k. Particular docu-
ments or tangible objects. Most Cited Cases 
Denial of motion to allow handwriting expert to ex-
amine original consent to search form did not preju-
dice defendant, in prosecution for possession with 
intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of mari-
juana, where prosecution had allowed defendant to 
inspect and copy the original form. Fed.Rules 
Cr.Proc.Rule 16fa)(T¥E). 18 U.S.C.A. 
[61 Witnesses 410 €=? 228 
410 Witnesses 
41 PHI Examination 
410111(A) Taking Testimony in General 
41Qk228 k. Mode of testifying in general. 
Most Cited Cases 
Trial court lacked discretion to permit telephonic 
testimony, and thus properly excluded telephonic 
testimony of defendant's former employer's regarding 
the common practices of the trucking industry in 
prosecution for possession with intent to distribute 
1000 or more kilograms of marijuana. Fed.Rules 
Cr.Proc.Rule 26. 18 U.S.C.A. 
J71 Criminal Law 110 c^ 338(7) 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Page 3 
356 FedAppx. 117, 2009 WL 4730422 (L .A. 10 (N.M.)) 
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) 
(Cite as: 356 FedAppx. 117, 200Q WL 4730422 (CA.l 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
11 OXVII(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance 
11 Qk3 3 8 Relevancy in General 
110k338(7) k. Evidence calculated to 
create prejudice against or sympathy for accused. 
Most Cited Cases 
Probative value of testimony of defendant's worker's 
compensation attorney as to defendant's possible 
worker's compensation recovery was outweighed by 
danger of jury confusion, in prosecution for posses-
sion with intent to distribute marijuana; even if the 
testimony was relevant to show absence of defen-
dant's motive to engage in drug trafficking, it could 
confuse the jury into thinking that the criminal prose-
cution involved a civil case. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
403.28U.S.CA. 
*119 Laura Fashing, Office of the United States At-
torney, Albuquerque. NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee 
Brian Anthony Pori, Esq., Inocente, PC, Albuquer-
que. NM. for Defendant-Appellant. 
Before BRISCOE. BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit 
Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT— 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law 
of the case, res judicata, and collateral es-
toppel It may be cited, however, for its per-
suasive value consistent with Fed. RApp. P. 
32.1 andlOthCir. R. 32.1. 
MARY BECK BRISCOE. Circuit Judge. 
*•! Defendant-Appellant Jesus Manuel Diaz was 
convicted by a jury of possession with intent to dis-
tribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). On appeal Diaz 
challenges his conviction on five grounds alleging 
that: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress evidence of the marijuana; (2) the evi-
dence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his 
conviction; (3) the district court improperly in-
structed the jury; (4) the district court improperly 
admitted the testimony of two law enforcement offi-
cers; and (5) the district court committed three other 
evidentiary errors which cumulatively denied him the 
ability' to present a defense. We have jurisdiction pur-
© 2010 Thomson Reuteis. '^ Jo i 
(N.M.))) 
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM Diaz's con-
viction. 
I. 
Jesus Manuel Diaz is the owner-operator of a one ng 
trucking company known as JD Easyline On Marih 
IP. 2007, Diaz drove his tractor-trailer eastbound 
through the Gallup, New Mexico, Port of Entry lo-
cated on Interstate 40 near the Arizona border. The 
drive-up credentials booth was closed that morning 
so Diaz got out of his truck and entered the lobb) at 
9:40 a.m. in pursuit of the permits necessary to dn\ e 
his tractor-trailer across Neu Mexico. 
Once inside. Diaz encountered James Snnd. a Motor 
Transportation Division officer with the New Mexico 
Department of Public Safety. Diaz provided Officer 
Smid with his commercial drher's license and the 
various other items necessary to complete the permit 
paperwork. According to the bill of lading and weight 
scale ticket Diaz presented to Officer Smid, Diaz's 
load consisted of 9,762 pounds of Dollar Store mer-
chandise and the gross weight of his tractor-trailer 
was 56,760 pounds. 
*120 These weights concerned Officer Smid. Based 
on his experience, both as a commercial truck driver 
and as public safety officer, Smid knew that an empty 
tractor-trailer with fuel weighs between 32,000 and 
33,000 pounds. Thus, he believed that if Diaz's load 
were in fact 9,762 pounds, the gross weight of Diaz's 
tractor-trailer would be approximately 42.000 
pounds. This left approximately 14,000 pounds unac-
counted for by Diaz's paperwork. Smid was also con-
fused by the fact that Diaz had chosen to "scale out" 
when he was well below the applicable weight limit. 
At 9:45 a.m., with his interest piqued, Officer Smid 
informed Diaz that he was going to perform a Le\ el 
Two Regulatory Inspection of his tractor-trailer. A 
Level Two Inspection is a process authorized by 
N.M. Stat. Ann. S 65-5-1 which allows a safety offi-
cer to ensure that a tractor-trailer is in compliance 
with all applicable laws and regulations by examining 
the vehicle and performing a more in-depth review of 
the driver's relexant paperwork. 
Officer Smid began his Level Two Inspection of 
Diaz's tractor-trailer by reviewing Diaz's logbook. It 
showed that Diaz had not driven for the first several 
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weeks of March and that Diaz had in fact been in 
California since January 19, 2007. Officer Smid felt 
that such a long stretch of downtime was strange for 
a sole proprietor trucker, particularly because al-
though Diaz listed Baxley, Georgia as his home, he 
had spent the downtime in California. Smid asked 
Diaz about this and Diaz claimed that he had been 
sick with the flu in California for the entire two 
months. 
**2 Officer Smid then began to question Diaz about 
the weight discrepancies indicated by his paperwork. 
Diaz attempted to explain the unaccounted weight by 
telling Officer Smid that sometimes shippers put 
more on to a trailer than is indicated in the bill of 
lading. Officer Smid found this explanation odd 
given that in his experience legitimate shippers only 
ship what is listed in the bill of lading. 
During his review of Diaz's paperwork, Officer Smid 
also noticed a marked change in Dial's demeanor. 
Diaz began lowering his head, rubbing his lips with 
his hand, and scratching his neck. This was of note to 
Smid because Diaz had not exhibited any of this be-
havior during the initial permitting process. At this 
time Diaz also offered a second story regarding his 
downtime in California, this time informing Smid 
that he had spent some of the time in Mexico visiting 
family and friends. 
With the document review portion of the Level Two 
Inspection complete, Officer Smid instructed Diaz to 
pull his tractor-trailer into an inspection bay so that 
he could inspect the vehicle itself. As Officer Smid 
inspected the outside of the vehicle he first noted a 
lock and seal on the trailer's doors. Officer Smid felt 
that this was unusual because based on his experi-
ence, a relatively small load of Dollar Store mer-
chandise would not be locked and sealed. 
Officer Smid then began to inspect the cab of the 
tractor-a routine part of a Level Two Inspection. 
While inside Smid noticed that Diaz did not have a 
citizen's band or CB radio, which he felt was unusual 
for a commercial trucker. Smid asked Diaz why he 
did not have a CB radio and Diaz told Smid he had 
sold it because he needed money. Officer Smid also 
discovered four cell phones in Diaz's cab. Smid 
thought this was significant because in the over 2,500 
inspections he had conducted, he had discovered 
multiple cell phones in only about thirty instances, 
(N.M.))) 
nearly all of which eventually resulted in the discov-
ery of contraband as well. Officer Smid also felt that 
Diaz's paying for four cell phones was not consistent 
with his statement that he sold his CB radio because 
he needed the money. 
*121 Officer Smid then moved on to check the load 
in Diaz's trailer. Diaz had informed Smid that the 
shipper had sealed and locked the load. Again, Smid 
felt that it was unusual that a load of this nature 
would have been sealed and locked. Upon further 
examination Smid was also concerned by the fact that 
the seal on the trailer's door was a commercially 
available seal, not unique to the shipper. In Smid's 
experience this was not a typical practice. 
When the doors of the trailer swung open, Officer 
Smid detected a strong odor of air freshener. Smid 
thought this was strange because the bill of lading did 
not indicate that Diaz was transporting any air fresh-
eners. Further, in Officer Smid's experience, drug 
traffickers had used air fresheners in an attempt to 
conceal the contraband they were transporting. 
Officer Smid then viewed the contents of the trailer. 
It was packed very tightly with pallets of boxes lining 
its entire length. In the middle were large bundles of 
clear plastic shrinkwrap. Officer Smid noticed that 
the boxes toward the nose of the trailer had a large 
amount of dust on them while the boxes toward the 
rear of the trailer, or near its doors, did not. In Officer 
Smid's experience this was consistent with the use of 
a "cover load," or a group of boxes that remain in a 
trailer over the course of multiple drug runs, each 
time aiding in the driver's attempt to appear legiti-
mate. During this time Officer Smid also looked back 
at Diaz on at least one occasion, but Diaz would not 
look at Officer Smid. 
**3 Confident now in his belief that Diaz's trailer 
contained contraband, Officer Smid terminated his 
Level Two Inspection at 10:17 a.m. and asked an-
other officer to call Officer Hermillo Lucero, a K-9 
officer. Although it is unclear wrhether Smid returned 
Diaz's paperwork to him at this time, Smid did ask 
Diaz if he could ask him a few more questions, and 
Diaz agreed. Officer Smid asked Diaz if there was 
any cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine in his truck 
and Diaz promptly answered "no" to each of these 
questions. When Smid asked Diaz if there was any 
marijuana in his trailer, however, Diaz hesitated, 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Oris. US Gov. Works. 
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turned away from Smid, and laughed nervously be-
fore saying "no" again. 
Officer Smid then asked Diaz if he could perform a 
more thorough search of the tractor-trailer and Diaz 
verbally agreed. Smid then produced a consent form-
in Spanish because Diaz indicated he was more fluent 
in that language-which was read to Diaz. Diaz signed 
this consent form at 10:30 a.m. and Officer Smid 
began his subsequent search at 10:35 a.m. 
At this point Officer Dave Halona arrived and stayed 
with Diaz while Smid began searching the cab of the 
tractor. As he entered the cab, Diaz informed Smid 
that there was $1,500 in cash in a bag in the cab. Diaz 
said that he had received the cash as an advance for 
costs from the broker who got him the job. Based on 
his experience, Officer Smid felt that this was an un-
usual practice. Further, he felt that it was odd that the 
cash was is small denominations. Officer Smid's 
search of the cab ended at approximately 10:55 a.m. 
Officer Smid then moved back to the trailer. The 
smell of air freshener became stronger as he moved 
toward the middle of the trailer. He proceeded to 
open one of the boxes and discovered a seat cushion 
in a state of disrepair that indicated to Smid that it 
was not legitimate merchandise. He continued to 
diligently move and search the boxes by himself for 
approximately an hour. Then, at 11:55 a.m., Smid 
called Officer Lucero to see how long it would be 
before he arrived with the canine unit. Officer Lucero 
said he would be there shortly. 
*122 Smid continued to search the trailer without 
taking a break until Officer Lucero arrived at 12:15 
p.m. Shortly after he arrived, Officer Lucero ran his 
dog around the outside of Diaz's trailer and it alerted 
on the front left corner. The dog did not, however, 
alert inside the trailer. Nonetheless, Officers Smid 
and Lucero decided to conduct a further hand search 
of the trailer. 
As they moved several more of the boxes in the 
trailer the officers discovered a plywood tunnel that 
had been built into the trailer. Officer Smid crawled 
into the tunnel and discovered a large plastic bag. He 
cut the package open and discovered marijuana. The 
officers then arrested Diaz at 12:45 p.m. before fin-
ishing their search which eventually produced 230 
bundles of marijuana weighing more than 3,300 
(N.M.))) 
pounds. 
At Diaz's trial, the following additional facts were 
adduced. First, a laptop computer and printer were 
discovered in the cab of Diaz's tractor and a computer 
forensics expert testified that a program used to cre-
ate bills of lading had been deleted from the com-
puter the day before Diaz was arrested. Also, it was 
discovered that Diaz already had a bill of lading for a 
return trip from Georgia which was identical in every 
way to the one he presented to Officer Smid in 
Gallup except that the cargo was listed in a different 
order. And a Dollar Store manager from California, 
Homer Gonong, testified that the Dollar Store does 
not ship in bulk, a single company services the com-
pany's southern California trucking needs, the contact 
listed on Diaz's bill of lading does not work for the 
Dollar Store, and the type of bill of lading that Diaz 
presented was not one that the Dollar Store used. 
**4 Further, a receipt for shrinkwrap was discovered 
in Diaz's cab, the seal on the trailer's door was found 
to be within the sequence of seals found in Diaz's 
cab, and it was determined that all four of the cell 
phones found in Diaz's cab were "throw away" 
phones, only one of which had any connection to 
Diaz or his company. Finally, Drug Enforcement 
Agency Agent Kevin Garver testified that many of 
Diaz's practices were consistent with drug trafficking 
operations that he had previously investigated. 
On March 20, 2007, a criminal complaint was filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of 
New Mexico charging Diaz with the possession of 
over 1,000 kilograms of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(A). After 
a jury trial, Diaz was convicted and this timely appeal 
followed. 
II. 
A Motion to Suppress 
Prior to trial, Diaz filed a Motion to Suppress Evi-
dence in which he requested that the district court 
suppress the evidence of the marijuana seized from 
his tractor-trailer. After holding an evidentiary hear-
ing, the district court denied Diaz's motion. The dis-
trict court concluded that Officer Smid's initial Level 
Two Inspection of Diaz's tractor-trailer was constitu-
tional under the regulatory search exception to the 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, see United 
Siates v. Gwathnev, 465 F.3d 1133. 1138-40 (10th 
Cir.2006) (holding that New Mexico's inspection 
system is constitutional under the regulatory search 
exception insofar as it allows an officer to enter a 
trailer to inspect its cargo). The district court also 
concluded that the subsequent search performed by 
Officers Smid and Lucero was constitutional, offer-
ing three independent bases for this holding: (1) that 
during the course of his Level Two Inspection Offi-
cer Smid developed *123 probable cause to believe 
that Diaz's tractor-trailer contained contraband; (2) 
that during the course of his Level Two Inspection 
Officer Smid developed reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that Diaz's tractor-trailer contained contraband; 
and (3) that Diaz voluntarily consented to the subse-
quent search. 
On appeal, Diaz does not challenge the district court's 
conclusion regarding the constitutionality of Officer 
Smid's Level Two Inspection, but does argue that the 
district court erred in upholding the subsequent 
search of the cab and trailer. We are free to affirm the 
district court's decision on any grounds, see United 
States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203. 1209 n. 1 (10th 
Cir.2005), and begin our review with the district 
court's conclusion that Officer Smid had probable 
cause to conduct the challenged search. 
Probable cause under the automobile exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement exists if, 
given the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair 
probability that the vehicle contains contraband or 
evidence. United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 
1207. 1212 (10th Cir.200n. We review the district 
court's probable cause ruling de novo, United States 
v Rosborouzh. 366 F.3d 1145. 1152 (10th Cir.2004). 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government and accepting the factual findings cf 
the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, 
see United States v Grimmctt, 439 F.3d 1263. 1268 
qOthCir.2006). 
**5 HJ The district court relied on the following fif-
teen factual findings in concluding that Officer Smid 
had probable cause to conduct a further search after 
he had completed his regulatory inspection: 
(1) the inconsistent weights suggested Diaz was 
carrying more load than was listed on the bill of 
lading; (2) Diaz's log book showed considerable 
(N.M.))) 
down time away from home which was odd for an 
independent trucker; (3) Diaz offered inconsistent 
stories regarding his illness and/or trip to Mexico; 
(4) Diaz was increasingly nervous from the initial 
permit process through the inspection; (5) Diaz's 
explanation for why he scaled out was inconsistent 
with the use of legitimate shippers; (6) Diaz's pos-
session of four cell phones; (7) Diaz's lack of a CB 
radio was suspicious; (8) Diaz's claim that he sold 
the CB radio because he needed money was incon-
sistent with the fact that he had four cell phones to 
pay for; (9) the use of a lock and seal on the trailer 
was unusual given the weight and nature of the 
load; (10) the seal on the trailer was not unique to 
the shipper, even though Diaz claimed the shipper 
sealed the trailer; (11) the large amount of dust on 
the boxes was consistent with the use of a cover 
load; (12) the strong odor of air freshener was con-
sistent with an attempt to mask the odor of drugs; 
(13) Diaz's hesitation and nervous laughter when 
asked if he had marijuana in the truck indicated 
criminal activity; (14) Diaz told Smid he had 
$1,500 in cash in a bag in the tractor; and (15) the 
packages in the trailer contained seat cushions in 
terrible condition, indicating they were part of a 
cover load. 
ApltApp. at 297-98, 302. 
Diaz contends that several of these factual findings 
are clearly erroneous because they "were based on 
nothing more than Officer Smid's bare assertions 
which lacked any factual basis." Aplt Op. Br. at 24. 
Specifically, Diaz argues that there was no evidence 
to confirm any alleged weight discrepancy Smid 
found between the bill of lading and the tractor-trailer 
itself, that his logbook demonstrated that his state-
ments regarding his downtime were not inconsistent, 
that there was no *124 documented evidence of dust 
on boxes or air fresheners in the trailer, and that Offi-
cer Halona's testimony indicated that Diaz was calm, 
not nervous, throughout the encounter. Diaz further 
argues that it was improper for the district court to 
rely solely on Officer Smid's testimony to conclude 
that the details of his method of operation-his four 
cell phones, the use of a commercially available seal, 
his lack of a CB radio, etc.-were consistent with the 
practices of a drug trafficker. 
Diaz's arguments are not compelling. First, as we 
have previously noted, "[t]he credibility of witnesses, 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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able inferences drawn from the evidence fall within 
the province of the district court," Rosborouzh, 366 
F.3dat 1148 (quoting United States v. Lonz. 176 F.3d 
1304. 3307 (10th Cir.1999)), and Diaz provided no 
evidence or direct testimony to contradict Officer 
Smid at the suppression hearing. Moreover, we have 
cautioned that "a court should accord deference to an 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions." United States v. Gandara-
Salinas. 327 F.3d 1127. 1130 (10th Cir.2003). There-
fore, we cannot conclude that the district court's fac-
tual findings were clearly erroneous, even if they 
were based solely on the testimony of Officer Smid. 
**6 Thus, although our review of the record causes 
us to conclude that the events which relate to the dis-
trict court's final two factual findings occurred after 
Officer Smid's Level Two Inspection, we accept, and 
in turn rely upon the remaining findings to conclude 
that by the end of his Level Two Inspection, Officer 
Smid had probable cause to believe that Diaz's trac-
tor-trailer contained contraband. See Gwathney, 465 
F.3d at 1137-40 (holding that a trucker's suspicious 
travel schedule, the presence of non-conforming 
packages in his trailer, a receipt indicating he had 
paid almost $14,000 in cash for repairs, and foot-
prints on boxes indicating that the non-conforming 
packages had been placed in the trailer last, all con-
tributed to a finding of probable cause); United States 
v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059. 1066 (10th Cir.1997) 
(holding that conflicting versions of travel itinerary, 
the presence of a communication device consistent 
with drug trafficking and the scent of air freshener all 
contributed to a finding of probable cause). In light of 
this conclusion we need not address the district 
court's alternative findings and conclusions which 
support its conclusion that reasonable suspicion and 
consent would also serve as bases for upholding the 
challenged search. We conclude that the district court 
was correct in denying Diaz's motion to suppress. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[21 Diaz next argues that the evidence presented at 
his trial was insufficient to support his conviction. 
We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a criminal conviction de novo. United States v. Tri-
ana, All F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir.2007). In so do-
ing, we "ask only whether, taking the evidence-both 
direct and circumstantial, together with the reason-
Page 7 
.M.))) 
able inferences to be drawn therefrom-in the light 
most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id_ (citation and alteration omitted). 
To support Diaz's conviction for possession with in-
tent to distribute, the government must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt: (1) that Diaz knowingly pos-
sessed the marijuana; and (2) that Diaz possessed the 
marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it. Id^ 
Possession may, however, be constructive. That is, 
possession may be found if the defendant knowingly 
had ownership, dominion, or control over *125 the 
contraband and the premises where it was found. 
United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th 
Cir.1996). However, "when the contraband may be 
attributed to more than one individual, constructive 
possession requires some nexus, link, or other con-
nection between the defendant and the contraband." 
Id 
According to Diaz, the marijuana in his trailer could 
reasonably be attributed either to him or to the Dollar 
Store and because there was no nexus or link which 
connected him to the contraband, the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction based on con-
structive possession. Even we assume, arguendo, that 
the marijuana found in the trailer could reasonably be 
attributed to the Dollar Store, Diaz's argument is un-
availing because the evidence adduced at trial did 
establish a nexus or link between Diaz and the con-
traband. 
**7 Specifically, Diaz was the sole occupant of the 
truck, his mode of operation and his downtime in 
California supported an inference of drug trafficking, 
his computer was shown to be capable of creating 
bills of lading identical to the one he presented to 
Officer Smid, he had a receipt for shrinkwrap which 
was used to package the marijuana, and the value of 
the drugs made it unlikely that they would be shipped 
without the driver's knowledge. In sum, the evidence 
was sufficient to support's Diaz's conviction based on 
a theory of constructive possession. 
C. Jwy Instruction 
[31 Diaz next argues that the district court erred in 
giving the jury the following instruction: 
With respect to the question of whether or not a de-
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present, you may, but are not required to, infer that 
the driver and sole occupant of a tractor trailer rig 
has knowledge of the controlled substance within 
it. This inference does not relieve the government 
of its obligation to prove all the elements of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Aplt.App. at 674. Diaz alleges that this permissive 
inference instruction was not warranted by the evi-
dence and as such it relieved the government of its 
burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. We review the trial court's decision 
to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of 
discretion, but "consider the instructions as a whole 
de novo to determine whether they accurately in-
formed the jury as to the governing law." Gwathnev, 
465F.3dat l l42. 
The instruction that Diaz challenges is the same in-
struction the defendant challenged in Gwathnev. See 
id. at 1138. In rejecting Gwathney's challenge to the 
instruction, we noted that "[a] permissive inference 
instruction does not violate a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights provided there is a rational con-
nection between the facts proved by the prosecution 
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inferred fact 
is more likely than not to flow from the proven 
facts." Id. at 1143. We went on to hold that the dis-
trict court had not abused its discretion in giving the 
permissible inference instruction because the evi-
dence strongly supported an inference that Gwathney 
knew of the marijuana in his trailer. IcL_ Specifically, 
Gwathney was the sole operator of the trailer contain-
ing the drugs, the load had not been sealed by the 
packers which meant Gwathney could have accessed 
it, and the high value of the marijuana made it 
unlikely that it would be shipped without the driver's 
knowledge. ld_ 
Diaz distinguishes the facts of his case from those 
presented in Gwathnev, pointing out that he did not 
own the trailer he was transporting, he was operating 
pursuant* 126 to a "hook and drop" arrangement, and 
the trailer he was transporting was locked and sealed 
by the shipper. Diaz claims that these factual differ-
ences precluded any inference that he had knowledge 
of the trailer's contents. Even assuming, arguendo, 
that the facts that Diaz relies on are meaningfully 
distinguishable from Gwathnev, his argument is 
nonetheless unavailing because there remains a host 
(N.M.))) 
of evidence to support the inference that Diaz knew 
about the drugs in his trailer. This evidence includes 
Diaz's sole operation of the truck, the high value of 
the drugs, the box of seals in the tractor which were 
of the same make as the seal on the trailer, the bills of 
lading presented which were the same as those Diaz's 
computer could generate, the receipt for shrinkwrap 
in the tractor and the various other suspicious details 
of Diaz's mode of operation. Given the magnitude of 
this remaining evidence, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in giving the jury the permissive 
inference instruction. 
D. Expert Testimony 
**8 [4] Diaz next contends that the district court 
erred in allowing Officer Smid and Agent Garver to 
testify as expert witnesses regarding the trucking in-
dustry and/or common drug trafficking practices. 
Specifically, Diaz alleges that the district court erred 
in allowing Smid and Garver to offer expert testi-
mony without first ensuring that there was a reliable 
basis for their expertise. 
Before trial, Diaz's counsel filed a motion in limine 
on these grounds, but the district court chose to wait 
until the testimony was offered and objected to be-
fore making its ruling. During the course of the trial, 
however, Diaz's counsel objected on these grounds 
only once toward the end of Officer Smid's re-direct 
testimony and the district court correctly overruled 
Diaz's objection, noting that the challenged testimony 
was not expert in nature. Thus, because any objec-
tions Diaz made were untimely, he has waived this 
issue and we will review the district court's admission 
of this testimony only for plain error. See Macsenti v. 
Becker, 131 R3d 1223. 1230-34 (10th Cir.2001) 
(holding that objections made to expert testimony 
after it was given were untimely and therefore re-
viewing the admission of the testimony only for plain 
error); United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1264 
(10th Cir.1999) (noting that unless the trial court 
rules upon a pretrial motion in limine without 
equivocation, the motion will not preserve an objec-
tion that is not renewed at the time the evidence is 
introduced). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires trial courts to 
assess the reliability of expert testimony which is 
based on scientific, technical, or "other specialized" 
knowledge before admitting it. Dauber't v. Merrell 
(p\ ">m r\ ^rv^™™^ "D^+^r-o XT^ rMr,;™ +^ r\*-;rr TTC n ^ r w™-Vo 
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Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589. 113 S.Ct. 
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); see also Kwnho Tire 
Co., Ltd. v, Carmichael 526 U.S. 137. 141. 119 S.Ct. 
1167. 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Thus, if expert testi-
mony is objected to at trial "the district court is re-
quired to make specific, on-the-record findings that 
the testimony is reliable under Dauheit" United 
States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192. 1207 (10th 
Cir.2009). 
Much of the testimony of Officer Smid and Agent 
Garver was not, however, expert in nature because it 
was not based upon scientific, technical, or "other 
specialized" knowledge. Moreover, to the extent that 
either of the individuals' testimony was expert in na-
ture, not only did the absence of an objection excuse 
the district court from its duty to make "explicit on-
the-record rulings" regarding reliability, see Goehel 
v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 
1083. 1088 n. 2 (10th Cir.2000) ("When no objection 
is raised [to *127 expert testimony], district courts 
are not required to make 'explicit on-the-record rul-
ings ....' "), but the testimony's reliability can also be 
safely inferred from the breadth of each individuals' 
training and experience.— In sum, the district court 
did not err in allowing the testimony of either Officer 
Smid or Agent Garver. 
FN 1. Officer Smid testified that he has pos-
sessed a commercial driver's license since 
1994, he is a certified motor carrier inspec-
tor who has attended a two-week training 
course on conducting inspections, and he 
has conducted approximately 2,500 com-
mercial vehicle inspections, approximately 
fifty of which had resulted in the seizure of 
contraband. Agent Garver testified that in 
his seventeen years as a DEA special agent 
he has been involved in several hundred 
drug investigations during which he has 
learned about various drug trafficking prac-
tices. 
E. Evidentiary Errors 
**9 Diaz also argues that the district court denied 
him his constitutional right to present a defense when 
it refused to allow his handwriting expert to examine 
the original consent form, refused to permit the tele-
phonic testimony of his former employer and ex-
cluded evidence that Diaz lacked a motive to commit 
the crime for which he was charged. We review the 
district court's decision to exclude evidence for an 
abuse of discretion, but review de novo the question 
of whether a constitutional violation has occurred. 
United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231. 1239 (10th 
Cir.2005). 
A defendant is afforded the constitutional right to 
present a defense by the due process clauses of both 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and b> the 
Sixth Amendment's right to compulsory pr-x.-.>? 
This right is, however, not without limits and thi>. :r. 
presenting evidence a defendant "must comply with 
the established rules of evidence and procedure -•. 
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertain-
ment of guilt or innocence." Id, (citation and altera-
tion omitted). "While the trial court may not apply a 
rule of evidence mechanistically to defeat the ends of 
justice," in order to demonstrate that his constitu-
tional rights have been violated a defendant "must 
show that the exclusion of evidence rendered his trial 
fun darnentally unfair...." IdL (quotati ons omitted). 
1. Handwriting Expert 
[5J Shortly before trial, Diaz filed a Motion to Inspect 
the Consent to Search Form in which he requested 
that the district court direct the government to allow a 
handwriting expert to inspect the original consent 
form at his offices in nearby Santa Fe, New Mexico. 
The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the matter, but denied Diaz's motion in a written 
order in which it noted that the government had al-
ready complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 16(a)(1)(E) by allowing Diaz to inspect and 
copy the original consent form and found that deny-
ing access to the original form was not. prejudicial to 
Diaz. Diaz now claims that the district court abused 
its discretion both in its decision on the merits and in 
issuing its order without first holding an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Diaz's argument is unavailing. Not only' did Diaz fail 
to request an evidentiary hearing in his motion, but 
he has also subsequently failed to identify what addi-
tional evidence would have been presented at such a 
hearing that was not already set forth in his motion. 
Further, Rule 16(a)(1)(E) makes no mention of a de-
fendant's right to take custody of a document, but 
instead requires only that the government permit the 
defendant uto inspect and to copy" documents, a step 
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that the government in this case had already taken. 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E). Thus, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in *128 denying Diaz's 
motion or in doing so without first holding an eviden-
tiary hearing. 
2. Telephonic Testimony 
[6] Less than a week before his trial commenced, 
Diaz filed a motion requesting that the district court 
permit his former employer to testify telephonically 
regarding the common practices of the trucking in-
dustry. The district court denied this motion in a writ-
ten order referencing the reasons set forth at a hearing 
on the motion, namely that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 26 requires all witnesses in a criminal trial 
to testify in open court unless otherwise provided by 
statute or by rule. On appeal, Diaz contends that the 
district court erred in issuing its order both because it 
failed to acknowledge its discretion to permit tele-
phonic testimony, and because it failed to exercise 
that discretion. 
**!0 Diaz's argument is without merit. The language 
of Rule 26 unequivocally states that all witnesses in a 
criminal trial must testify in open court unless other-
wise provided by statute or by rules adopted under 28 
U.S.C. 3S 2072-2077. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 26. Diaz 
has failed to point to any statute or rule which pro-
vides such an exception which would apply in this 
case. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in declining to conclude that it had discretion to 
permit telephonic testimony, and/or in declining to 
exercise such discretion. 
3. Motive Testimony 
[71 In his case-in-chief, Diaz attempted to present the 
testimony of Genaro Legorreta, an attorney who at 
the time was representing Diaz in a California 
worker's compensation proceeding. Diaz hoped that 
evidence of his possible worker's compensation re-
covery would establish that he did not have a finan-
cial motive to traffic in marijuana. As Legorreta be-
gan to explain his representation of Diaz, however, 
the district court cut off the testimony, ruling that it 
was irrelevant. Diaz contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in excluding Legorreta's testi-
mony because he claims that the absence of any plau-
sible motive for his engaging in criminal conduct is 
highly relevant. 
a 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
(N.M.))) 
Once again, Diaz's argument is unpersuasive. Even if 
we accept Diaz's proposition that absence of a finan-
cial motive is relevant, given the potential jury confu-
sion that an in-depth discussion of a worker's com-
pensation proceeding might cause, the district court 
had an adequate basis for excluding Legorreta's tes-
timony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In fact, 
the district court mentioned that it believed that if the 
testimony were allowed, "[t]he jury [was] going to 
think this is a civil case." Aplt.App. at 585. As "we 
are required to give the trial court 'substantial defer-
ence' in Rule 403 rulings," United States v. Shum-
wav. 112 F.3d 1413. 1422 (10th Cir.1997) (quotation 
and citation omitted), we conclude that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Legor-
reta's testimony. 
4. Cumulation 
Finally, Diaz contends that even if each of the district 
court's evidentiary rulings were only harmless error, 
viewed cumulatively they infringed upon his consti-
tutional right to present a defense. Diaz's argument 
fails because, as the foregoing discussion demon-
strates, the district court did not err in any of its evi-
dentiary rulings. 
m. 
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM Diaz's 
conviction under 21 U.S.C. (j 841(b)(1)(A). 
C.A.10 (N.M.),2009. 
U.S. v. Diaz 
356 Fed.Appx. 117, 2009 WL 4730422 (C.A.10 
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(2) defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada, Robert C Jones, District Judge, 
Presiding. D.C. No. CR-05-00219-RCJ. 
*122 Before: SCHROEDER. Chief Circuit Judge, 
CANBY and McKEOWN. Circuit Judges. 
MEMORANDUM mi 
FN* This disposition is not appropriate for 
publication and is not precedent except as 
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 
**1 Alejandro Arana-Duarte appeals from the denial 
of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a 
prolonged traffic stop and from his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(l)(A)(viii). The district court's denial of a motion 
to suppress is reviewed de novo and its factual find-
ings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. 
Garcia, 205 F.3d 1182. 1186 (9th Cir.2000). We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. j? 1291, and we 
affirm. The facts of this case are familiar to the par-
ties and we recite them here only to the extent neces-
sary to explain our decision. 
[1] We reject Arana-Duarte's argument that Trooper 
Moonin unlawfully prolonged the stop and broadened 
the scope of questioning by asking him whether he 
was carrying contraband. Even if we assume that the 
Page 2 
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stop was not a consensual encounter after Trooper 
Moonin returned Arana-Duarte's paperwork and told 
him he was free to leave, see United States v. 
Chavez-Valenzuela. 268 F.3d 719, 724-25 (9th 
Cir.2001). amended by 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.2002). 
we conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the 
decision to prolong the stop and broaden the scope of 
questioning. Trooper Moonin testified, among other 
things, that (1) he saw two air freshener units in the 
vehicle and smelled an overwhelming odor of air 
freshener, the smell of which is often used to mask 
the odor of narcotics, see United States v. Roias-
Millan. 234 F.3d 464. 470 (9th Cir.2000) (unusually 
strong odor of perfume emanating from car was sus-
picious as possible attempt to mask smell of illegal 
drugs), (2) there were three cell phones in the car for 
only two passengers, which is suspicious because 
drug couriers are often given a phone by drug dealers 
for use to stay in contact throughout the trip, (3) 
Arana-Duarte's drivers license was from California, 
but the car was registered in his name in Missouri, 
which can be a sign that a drug courier is legitimizing 
a trip by driving a car registered in the destination 
state, (4) Arana-Duarte appeared extremely nervous 
and was not appeased when the officer indicated the 
nature of the stop was for a traffic violation, see 
United States v. Murillo. 255 F.3d 1169. 1174 (9th 
Cir.2001) (unusually nervous behavior is a suspicious 
factor that may contribute to a finding of reasonable 
suspicion), and (5) the responses given to the officer 
when he talked with Arana-Duarte and his passenger 
separately were at times vague and contradictory, 
thus arousing his suspicions as to the trip's purpose 
and their credibility, see Roias-Millan, 234 F.3d at 
470 (vague and conflicting stories from driver and 
passenger was suspicious factor contributing to rea-
sonable suspicion). Considering these factors, there 
was sufficient reasonable suspicion supporting 
Trooper Moonin's brief detention of Arana-Duarte 
after the records check to broaden the scope of ques-
tioning to include whether any contraband was pre-
sent in the vehicle. See, e.g., id.; United States v. 
Perez. 37 F.3d 510. 514 (Qth Cir.l9Q4). 
**2 [2] We also reject Arana-Duarte's argument that 
he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the 
search of his vehicle. The district court's determina-
tion *123 of the voluntariness of consent to search is 
reviewed for clear error. United States v. Todhunter, 
297 F.3d 886. 891 (9th Cir.2002). The totality of the 
circumstances supports the district court's finding that 
Arana-Duarte voluntarily consented to the search. 
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After verbally warning Arana-Duarte about speeding, 
Trooper Moonin returned Arana-Duarte's paperwork E]STD OF DOCUMENT 
and toid him he was free to leave. Arana-Duarte 
thereafter gave separate consent for the search-both 
verbally and in writing. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Arana-Duarte admitted 
that he orally consented to the search in response to 
Trooper Moonin's request. Arana-Duarte also admit-
ted to filling in the proper time and signing the Span-
ish-language search consent form, but testified that 
he did not read the form and believed he was signing 
an acknowledgment of the warning he received for 
speeding. In light of the officer's testimony, the dis-
trict court found Arana-Duarte's explanation that he 
did not read and understand the form was "dubious at 
best." The district court's findings that Arana-
Duarte's testimony was not credible and that his con-
sent was given separately from the warning are sup-
ported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. 
See, e.g., Perez, 37 F.3d at 515 (consent given after 
verbal warning for traffic violation and return of de-
fendant's paperwork found voluntary under the cir-
cumstances); United States v. Gutierrcz-Mederos, 
965 F.2d 800. 803 (9th Cir.1992) (oral consent was 
voluntary despite defendant's claim that his back-
ground and limited ability to speak English prevented 
him from voluntarily consenting). 
Arana-Duarte was not in custody, the officers' guns 
were not drawn, the officers did not indicate that they 
could obtain a warrant if he did not consent, nor was 
there evidence of other coercive tactics. We agree 
with the district court's finding that under the totality 
of circumstances, Arana-Duarte's consent was freely 
and voluntarily given. See United States v. Castillo, 
866 F.2d 107L 1082 (9th Cir.1989) (collecting fac-
tors relevant to determination of voluntariness: (1) 
whether the defendant was in custody, (2) whether 
the arresting officers had their guns drawn, (3) 
whether Miranda warnings were given, (4) whether 
the defendant was notified that he had a right not to 
consent, and (5) whether the defendant was told a 
search warrant could be obtained). 
AFFIRMED. 
C.A.9 (Nev.).2007. 
U.S. v. Arana-Duarte 
244 Fed.Appx. 121, 2007 WL 1852139 (C.A.9 
(Nev.)) 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 2381646 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.)) 
H 
CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF 
LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, 
Eighth District, Cuyahoga County. 
STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee 
v. 
Jermaine BENNETT, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 86962. 
Decided Aug. 17,2006. 
Criminal appeal from Common Pleas Court, Case 
No. CR-463788. 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, 
Pamela Bolton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
Cleveland, OH, for plaintiff-appellee. 
James R. Willis, Cleveland, OH, for defendant-
appellant. 
CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J. 
*1 HI 1} Defendant-appellant, Jermaine Bennett, ap-
peals the decision of the Common Pleas Court deny-
ing his motion to suppress. For the reasons that fol-
low, we affirm. 
(1f 2} In March 2005, the Cuyahoga County Grand 
Jury indicted Bennett on three counts of drug posses-
sion, three counts of drug trafficking, one count of 
possession of criminal tools, one count of having a 
weapon while under a disability, and one count of 
carrying a concealed weapon. The indictment arose 
out of a traffic stop of Bennett's vehicle and the sub-
sequent search of his SUV after a drug-sniffing dog 
alerted to contraband within the SUV. 
(U 3} Bennett filed a motion to suppress, in which he 
argued that 1) the initial stop of his vehicle was 
impermissibly based on his race; and 2) the police did 
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not have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle con-
tained contraband in order to detain it after the traffic 
stop had been completed. 
}^I 4} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing re-
garding Bennett's motion to suppress. 
{H 5} At the hearing, police officer Michael Ship-
pitka testified that he is a member of the High Inten-
sity Drug Task Force ("HIDTA"), a multi-
jurisdictional task force comprised of officers who 
patrol the roads to monitor for any type of drug, 
weapon or terrorist activity. 
(K 6} Shippitka testified that he and his partner, po-
lice officer Gregory Tinnirello, were working as 
HIDTA team members on February 14, 2005. They 
were parked in a patrol car along Interstate-480 at a 
turnaround. Sometime prior to 8:20 p.m., Shippitka 
and Tinnirello observed a silver Ford Expedition 
traveling eastbound on 1-480 and bearing what ap-
peared to be a Texas license plate. The officers ob-
served that the rear illumination light for the license 
plate was not working and, in light of Shippitka's 
experience and training that Texas is a source state 
for large amounts of narcotics, they decided to make 
a traffic stop based upon the lack of rear plate illumi-
nation. 
!K 7} As Shippitka pulled the patrol car behind the 
Expedition, he verified that there were no illumina-
tion lights on the license plate. He then pulled the 
vehicle over. Shippitka approached the driver's side 
of the vehicle and requested the driver's license, reg-
istration, and proof of insurance. All of these items 
were produced. Tinnirello, the "cover officer," stood 
to the rear of the SUV and looked in the vehicle. 
ffl 8} Shippitka testified that while speaking with 
Bennett, he observed an air freshener on the front 
vent in the vehicle, a small rubber band on the floor, 
and several cell phones and a $1,000 denomination 
money wrapper on the center console. Shippitka testi-
fied that these items were indicators to him of possi-
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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ble criminal activity. Shippitka testified that, from his 
training and experience, the air freshener could be 
used to mask drug odors, small rubber bands such as 
that on the floor of the SUV were used by drug deal-
ers to package individual packages of drugs, and drug 
dealers often used one cell phone for business and the 
other for personal calls. Shippitka testified that the 
driver, Bennett, had an Ohio driver's license with a 
local address, but the registration and title to the car 
were in the name of Craig Tandre, who lived in 
Texas. Bennett explained to Shippitka that he had 
purchased the car from Tandre, but had not com-
pleted making payments on it, so Tandre had insisted 
that the title and registration remain in Tandre's 
name. 
*2 (If 9} Shippitka returned to his patrol car to run a 
records check regarding Bennett. This check indi-
cated that Bennett's license was valid, the car was not 
stolen, and there were no warrants out for Bennett's 
arrest. The inquiry did reveal, however, that Bennett 
had a criminal history involving grand theft and re-
ceiving stolen property. Shippitka also ran both Ben-
nett's and Tandre's names through the El Paso Intelli-
gence Center database, which indicated that Bennett 
had previously been questioned by a Drug Enforce-
ment Agency agent regarding $10,000 in his posses-
sion during a trip from Cleveland to Texas and that 
he had a prior drug arrest. In addition, Tandre had 
been stopped at the airport by a DEA agent and ques-
tioned regarding the large sum of money he was car-
rying. 
{*[[ 10} In light of this information, and the items Of-
ficer Shippitka had seen in the SUV, Officer Tinni-
rello requested that Officer John Porter, another 
HIDTA member, respond to the scene with his dog. 
{% 11} Shippitka returned to the SUV and asked 
Bennett to exit the vehicle, and Bennett did. Ship-
pitka advised Bennett that he would not be issuing 
him a citation for the lack of rear license plate illumi-
nation violation, but then asked him about some 
"green vegetable matter" that Tinnirello had observed 
in the rear cargo area of the car. Bennett walked to 
the rear of the car and voluntarily opened the hatch 
and the officers observed what appeared to be grass 
clippings in the cargo area. 
{*([ 12} Shippitka testified that he also saw a couch 
with a big hole in it in the cargo area. Bennett told the 
officers that he had been staying at an extended stay 
hotel for one month and had been forced to buy the 
couch after a friend's dog had torn it up. Shippitka 
found this explanation suspicious, however, because 
Bennett's driver's license showed a local address and 
several of the cushions were missing from the couch. 
Shippitka also observed a tool kit in the wheel well 
and that the carpet had been pulled away from the 
trim in the cargo area. In light of these observations, 
Shippitka thought that the couch might be just a 
"cover load," and that there might be a compartment 
in the rear of the vehicle where Bennett was trans-
porting contraband. 
(U 13} Shippitka then asked Bennett whether he 
could search his vehicle, but Bennett refused. Ship-
pitka told Bennett that he was free to leave, but ad-
vised him that he would retain the car and that a ca-
nine unit would be arriving to sniff the vehicle. Ben-
nett refused Shippitka's offer to call a zone car to 
transport him to a nearby restaurant where he could 
call someone to pick him up and remained at the 
scene. 
flj 14} Officer Porter arrived on the scene at ap-
proximately 8:45 p.m. After Bennett exited his vehi-
cle, Porter walked his dog around the SUV. Shippitka 
testified that he did not see the dog alert on the vehi-
cle, but was advised by Porter that it had alerted 
twice to the front passenger side of the vehicle and 
once to the rear. In light of the alerts by the dog, Of-
ficer Porter then searched the vehicle and found a 
handgun, drugs and other contraband. 
*3 (D 15} The trial court denied Bennett's motion to 
suppress, and, despite a request by the defense for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (and a proffer 
by the defense of same), denied the motion without 
findings. After a bench trial, the court found Bennett 
guilty of all counts and sentenced him to four years 
incarceration and ordered him to pay a $38,500 fine. 
Bennett now appeals from the trial court's order de-
nying his motion to suppress. 
H 16} Initially, we note that Crim.R. 12(F) mandates 
that a trial court "state its essential findings on the 
record" when "factual issues are involved in deter-
mining a motion." Here, in denying the motion to 
suppress, the trial judge stated only, "motion is de-
nied." The court made no findings of fact and gave 
no reasons for its ruling. Moreover, despite defense 
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counsel's request for findings and the judge's promise 
to "reduce it to writing and make findings," the trial 
court did not do so. Nevertheless, we conclude that 
the trial court's failure to provide its "essential find-
ings" on the record in this case is not fatal to a review 
of the trial court's ruling on the motion, because the 
record provides a sufficient basis to review appel-
lant's assignments of error. See, e.g., State v. Ozle-
tree, Cuyahoga App. No. 86285, 2006-Ohio-448. at TT 
15: State v. Kins (1999). 136 Ohio App.3d 377. 381. 
{TI17} In his first assignment of error, Bennett asserts 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. Essentially he contends that 1) absent prob-
able cause, which was not present here, the police 
may not detain a vehicle after their investigation of 
the traffic offense is completed; 2) a drug dog may be 
used only during a traffic stop, but not after the initial 
traffic stop is completed; and 3) even if the dog 
alerted in this case, absent exigent circumstances, 
which did not exist here, the police were required to 
obtain a search warrant prior to searching the vehicle. 
None of Bennett's arguments have merit. 
{f 18} Our standard for review of a trial court's 
judgment regarding a motion to suppress was set 
forth by this court in State v. Curry (1994), 95 Ohio 
App.3d 93. as follows: 
(lj 19} "In a motion to suppress, the trial court as-
sumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best posi-
tion to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness 
credibility. A reviewing court is bound to accept 
those findings of fact if supported by competent, 
credible evidence. However, without deference to the 
trial court's conclusion, it must be determined inde-
pendently whether, as a matter of law, the facts meet 
the appropriate legal standard." (Citations omitted.) 
JH 20} The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Tew v Ohio (1968). 3Q2 U.S. 
L 88 S.Ct 1868. A traffic stop by a law enforcement 
officer must comply with the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement. WTiren v. United States 
(1996). 517 U.S. 806. 116 S.Ct 1769. 
*4 [^ 21} A police officer may effect a traffic stop of 
any motorist for any traffic infraction, even if the 
officer's true motive is to detect more extensive 
criminal conduct. United States v. Mesa (C.A.6 
1995). 62 F.3d 159. 162. When conducting the stop 
of a motor vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer 
may detain the vehicle for a time sufficient to inves-
tigate the reason for which the vehicle was initially 
stopped. State v. Balden, Preble App. No. CA2003-
03-007. 2004-Ohio-184. Generally, the duration of 
the stop is limited to the time necessary to effectuate 
the purpose for which the stop was made. Id. This 
time period includes the time necessary to run a com-
puter check on the driver's license, registration and 
vehicle plates. See Delaware v. Prouse (1979). 440 
U.S. 648. 99 S.Ct. 1391. The detention may continue 
beyond this time frame, however, when additional 
facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that 
which prompted the initial stop. State v. Beltran, 
Preble App. No. CA2004-11-015. 2005-Ohio-4194. 
at TT 16. citing State v. Mvers (1990). 63 Ohio App.3d 
765. See, also, United States v. Hill (C.A.6 1999). 
iy5 r.jci iD6, zo^; Mesa, supra. 
J^ } 22} A lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected 
during a traffic stop to a canine sniff of the exterior of 
the vehicle even without the presence of a reasonable 
suspicion of drug-related activity. Illinois v. Cabelles 
(2005). 543 U.S. 405. 125 S.Ct. 834; United States v. 
Place (1983). 462 U.S. 696. 103 S.Ct 2637: State v. 
Rusnal (1997). 120 Ohio App.3d 24. However, the 
police must have a reasonable suspicion that a vehi-
cle contains drugs in order to detain a suspect beyond 
the time necessary to complete the traffic stop while a 
drug-trained canine is brought to the scene. State v. 
Wilkins, Montgomery App. No. 20152. 2004-Ohio-
3917.atT12:ffz7/. supra. 
fl[ 23} "Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal 
level of objective justification for making a stop-that 
is, something more than an inchoate and unparticular-
ized suspicion or 'hunch' but less than the level of 
suspicion required for probable cause." State v.. 
Jones (1990). 70 Ohio App.3d 554. citing Terry, su-
pra. We determine the existence of reasonable suspi-
cion by evaluating the totality of the circumstances, 
considering those circumstances " 'through the eyes 
of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the 
scene who must react to events as they unfold.' " 
Heard, supra, quoting State v Andrews (1991). 57 
Ohio St.3d 86. 87-88. See, also, United States v. 
Townsend (2002). 305 F.3d 537. 
{f 24} For example, in United States v. Alpert 
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(19871 816 F.2d 958. the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the detention of a suspected drug 
courier's luggage at an airport in order to subject it a 
canine sniff. The suspect was informed that he was 
not under arrest and that he was free to leave. In up-
holding the detention of the luggage, the Fourth Ap-
pellate Circuit noted that police officers who suspect 
criminal activity have authority to make limited in-
trusions based on less than probable cause on an in-
dividual's personal security. The court reasoned that 
such an intrusion is justifiable because it is substan-
tially less intrusive than a traditional arrest and the 
interests of crime prevention and detection and offi-
cer safety support the intrusion if the police have a 
reasonable, articulable basis for suspecting criminal 
activity. The court stated that the duration or brevity 
of the stop is a key consideration in determining its 
intrusiveness. 
*5 H 25} Here, Officer Shippitka testified that he 
and Officer Tinnirello called for a canine sniff of 
Bennett's vehicle because: 1) Bennett's driver's li-
cense showed a local address, but he was driving a 
vehicle with a Texas license place and the vehicle 
was registered to a third party; 2) Shippitka knew that 
Texas is a major source state for illegal drugs; 3) a 
criminal records check revealed that Bennett had a 
prior drug arrest and had been questioned recently by 
a DEA agent about $10,000 in his possession during 
a trip from Cleveland to Texas; 4) the party to whom 
the vehicle was registered had similarly been stopped 
and questioned by a DEA agent at the airport regard-
ing the large sum of money he was carrying; 5) Ship-
pitka had observed an air freshener on the front vent 
of the vehicle and knew that such air fresheners were 
used by drug dealers to mask drug odors; 6) Bennett 
kept both windows of the Expedition down during 
the entire stop even though it was February; 7) Ship-
pitka observed a rubber band of the sort used to 
package drugs on the floor of the Expedition; 8) 
Shippitka observed more than one cell phone in the 
center console of the vehicle and knew that multiple 
phones are often used by drug dealers; 9) Shippitka 
observed a $1,000 denomination money wrapper in 
the center console; 10) Shippitka saw a tool kit in the 
wheel well of the rear cargo area and observed that 
the carpet had been pulled away from the trim in the 
cargo area, suggesting that there was a hidden com-
partment for transporting contraband in the rear of 
the vehicle; 11) Bennett's assertion that he had been 
staying at an extended stay hotel for one month was 
suspicious because his driver's license showed a local 
address; and 12) Bennett's story about the damaged 
couch he was transporting in the vehicle was suspect 
because several cushions were missing from it. 
H 26} We find, contrary to Bennett's argument, that 
under the totality of the circumstances, these facts 
were sufficient to give Officers Shippitka and Tinni-
rello reasonable suspicion that Bennett was involved 
in criminal activity beyond that which prompted the 
initial stop and, further, that his vehicle likely con-
tained drugs. Accordingly, the officers were justified 
in detaining Bennett's car for a short time after the 
initial traffic stop had been completed until the ca-
nine sniff could be conducted. 
{f 27} Bennett's assertion, in reliance on Caballes, 
supra, that a dog sniff may take place only during a 
traffic stop, and not after the stop has been com-
pleted, misconstrues the holding in Caballes. In Ca-
balles, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether a canine sniff during a lawful traffic stop, 
where the officers had no reasonable suspicion that 
the vehicle contained drugs, violated the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court concluded that the sniff did 
not infringe on any constitutionally protected interest 
in privacy, because the sniff would reveal no infor-
mation other than the location of a substance that no 
individual has a right to possess. Id. at 410. No men-
tion was made in Caballes of canine sweeps that oc-
cur after a lawful traffic stop has ended. As the 
United States Supreme Court made clear in Hill, su-
pra, however, an officer may detain an individual 
beyond the reasonable duration of the traffic stop for 
the purpose of completing his investigation when the 
officer has a reasonable suspicion the individual is 
involved in criminal activity other than that which led 
to the initial stop. Thus, in light of the officers' rea-
sonable suspicion that Bennett was involved in drug 
activity, we find no fault with the canine's sweep of 
Bennett's vehicle after the initial traffic stop had con-
cluded. 
*6 m 28} Contrary to Bennett's argument, he was not 
illegally detained after the traffic stop was completed. 
He was informed several times that he was free to go, 
and even that the officers would transport him to a 
local restaurant where he could call someone for a 
ride, but he refused the offer and remained on the 
scene. 
(T| 29} Likewise, Officer Shippitka's question to 
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Bennett regarding whether he could search his vehi-
cle, a question asked after Shippitka had told him he 
would not be issuing a citation, did not amount to a 
seizure of Bennett. "[T]he Constitution does not 
mandate that a driver, after being lawfully detained, 
must be released and sent on his way without further 
questioning once the law enforcement officer deter-
mines that the driver has not, in fact, engaged in the 
particular criminal conduct for which he was tempo-
rarily detained. * * * A law enforcement officer does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment merely by ap-
proaching an individual, even where there is not rea-
sonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, 
and asking him whether he is willing to answer some 
questions. This includes a request for consent to 
search the individual's vehicle. And, this consent is 
not vitiated merely because the valid suspicion of 
wrongdoing for which an individual has been stopped 
proves to be unfounded or does not result in prosecu-
tion and the individual is free to go before being 
asked." United States v. Erwin (C.A.6 1998). 155 
F.3d 818. 820 and 823. (Citations omitted.) 
fl[ 30} Furthermore, contrary to Bennett's argument, 
there was no requirement that the police officers ob-
tain a search warrant after the dog alerted to the pres-
ence of drugs in the vehicle. "A warrantless search of 
an automobile is permissible if probable cause exists 
to believe it contains evidence of a crime. There is 
probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a 
vehicle once a properly trained and reliable drug de-
tection dog alerts positively to the presence of drugs." 
United States v. Perez (2006). 440 F.3d 363. 374, 
citing United States v. Ross (1982). 456 U.S. 798. 
809. 102 S.Ct. 2157. and Hill supra. 195 F.3d at 273. 
See, also, State v. Carlson (1995). 102 Ohio App.3d 
585, 600 ("Once a trained drug dog alerts to the odor 
of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer 
has probable cause to search the vehicle for contra-
band.") Thus, the officers acted within their authority 
in searching Bennett's vehicle following the alerts by 
the dog. 
{11 31} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in de-
nying Bennett's motion to suppress. 
{Tj 32} Appellant's first assignment of error is over-
ruled. 
{\ 33} Bennett's second and third assignments of 
error state, respectively: 
(K 34} "Assuming an 'alert' by a properly trained 
and reliable dog can establish 'probable cause' suffi-
cient to justify a search, the reliability of the dog 
must be established on the record. Since this did not 
happen here, it follows that the court erred if its de-
nial of the motion was influenced by the belief that 
an alert was proven to have occurred." 
*7 H 35} "To the extent it can be inferred (from the 
court's summary ipsi [sic] dixit denial of the motion 
to suppress) that: (A) the trial judge not only deter-
mined that a drug-sniffing dog 'alerted' and to the 
extent it can likewise be inferred (B) the court found 
this dog was appropriately qualified to do so, any 
such rulings would be clearly erroneous and for that 
reason the denial of the motion cannot survive mean-
ingful scrutiny and must be reversed." 
Ill 36} In these assignments of error, Bennett argues 
that the State failed to prove the reliability of the dog 
which alerted. Bennett's motion to suppress did not 
challenge the reliability of the dog, however. As the 
Supreme Court of Ohio made clear in Xenia v. Wal-
lace (1988). 37 Ohio St.3d 216. 218. parties challeng-
ing the legality of a warrantless search or seizure 
have the burden of setting forth the grounds upon 
which they challenge the search or seizure in their 
motion to suppress: 
{K 37} "The prosecutor must know the grounds of the 
challenge in order to prepare his case, and the court 
must know the grounds of the challenge in order to 
rule on evidentiary issues at the hearing and properly 
dispose of the merits. Therefore, the defendant must 
make clear the grounds upon which he challenges the 
submission of evidence pursuant to a warrantless 
search or seizure. Failure on the part of the defendant 
to adequately raise the basis of his challenge consti-
tutes a waiver of that issue on appeal" (Emphasis 
added.) 
{U 38} Bennett did not challenge the reliability of the 
dog or whether it alerted in his motion to suppress. 
Accordingly, he has waived these arguments for pur-
pose of appeal. 
{% 39} Appellant's second and third assignments of 
error are overruled. 
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(TI40} Bennett's fourth assignment of error states: 
(H 41} "Assuming in the wake of the alleged alert 
probable cause to search existed, the absence of exi-
gent circumstances would then be critical, this like-
wise shows the court erred when she denied the mo-
tion." 
warrant, after the drug-sniffing dog alerted three 
times to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. 
{f 49} Appellant's fifth assignment of error is over-
ruled. 
Affirmed. 
{% 42} In this assignment of error, Bennett again ar-
gues that even if probable cause to search the vehicle 
existed, because there were no exigent circumstances, 
the officers were required to obtain a search warrant 
before searching his vehicle. 
(TI 43} As previously set forth in our discussion re-
garding assignment of error one, this argument is 
without merit. 
J" 44} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is 
therefore overruled. 
{H 45} Bennett's fifth assignment of error states: 
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant 
costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for 
this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue 
out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to 
carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's 
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending 
appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 
for execution of sentence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the 
mandate pursuant to Pvule 27 of the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. 
(1f 46} "A trial court's 'essential findings' required to 
be made by Rule 12(F), Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Rule 104(A), as a necessary condition 
precedent to any ruling that probable cause existed 
(whether expressed or inferred), as reviewed de novo 
and will be held to be clearly erroneous where there 
was no evidence to support such 'factual findings.' " 
{* 47} In this assignment of error, Bennett argues 
that because the trial court issued no findings of fact 
in denying his motion, it must be presumed that the 
court found, in light of the alert by the drug dog, that 
probable cause existed to search his vehicle. Bennett 
again asserts that, because the State did not prove the 
reliability of the dog, however, there was insufficient 
evidence from which the trial court could have found 
probable cause. 
*8 ffl 48} As noted earlier, Bennett did not dispute 
the reliability of the dog in his motion to suppress 
and, therefore, has waived this issue for appeal. 
Moreover, as set forth in our discussion regarding 
assignment of error one, it is apparent that the offi-
cers validly stopped Bennett for a traffic violation, 
validly detained his vehicle after the traffic stop had 
ended so a drug-sniffing dog could be brought to the 
scene, and validly searched his vehicle, without a 
ANN DYKE, P.J., and DIANE KARPINSKL J., 
CONCUR. 
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's 
decision. See App.R. 22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); 
Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized and 
will become the judgment and order of the court pur-
suant to App.R. 22(E) unless a motion for reconsid-
eration with supporting brief, per App.R. 26(A), is 
filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the 
court's decision. The time period for review by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio shall begin to run upon the 
journalization of this court's announcement of deci-
sion by the clerk per App.R. 22(E). See, also, 
S.CtPrac.R. II. Section 2(A)(1). 
Ohio App. 8 Dist.,2006. 
State v. Bennett 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. Oklahoma. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Stanislov AVEZOV, a/k/a Stanislov Avezlov, a/k/a 
Robert Bernard, Omar Saadeldin, Defendants. 
Case No. 10-CR-0085-CVE. 
July 29, 2010. 
Background: Defendants who were charged with 
possessing Oxycodone with intent to distribute 
moved to suppress evidence. 
Holdings: The District Court, Claire V Eagan„ Chief 
Judge, held that: 
(1) trooper had reasonable suspicion to extend the 
traffic stop; 
(2) 70-minute length of detention was unreasonable; 
(3) defendants were subject to custodial interroga-
tion; and 
(4) detention of defendants escalated into an arrest 
requiring probable cause. 
Motion granted. 
West Headnotes 
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48^ Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVTKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and 
Length and Character Thereof. Most Cited Cases 
State trooper who conducted traffic stop of vehicle in 
which defendants were traveling as driver and pas-
senger had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
criminal activity was afoot, and thus, trooper's deci-
sion to extend the traffic stop beyond the initial pur-
pose of issuing a traffic citation was reasonable; 
trooper observed objective indications of defendant 
driver's nervousness, and the had been rented by a 
third party who was not present in the vehicle, and 
defendants' stories about their travel plans were in-
consistent, and their stated travel plans involved 
stopping to visit a friend for one night and then driv-
ing for at least 16 hours the next day. U.S C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
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tion Offenses, m General. Most Cited Cases 
A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if 
the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if 
the police officer has a reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred 
or is occurring. U.S C.A. ConstAmend 4. 
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lengthy detention, but must be limited m scope to the 
purpose of the initial traffic stop, a police officer may 
extend the length of the traffic stop for questioning 
beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop only if 
the officer has an objectively reasonable and articu-
lable suspicion that illegal activity hds occurred, or 
the driver voluntarily consents to further questioning 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
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Const Amend 4 
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U S C A Const Amend 4 
£81 Arrest 35 
S^jjFifUPnf 
63.4(1) 
3 511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 Officers and Assistants. Arrest Without 
Warrant 
35k63 4 Probable or Reasonable Cause 
35k63 4(1) k Grounds for Warrantless 
Arrest m General Most Cited Cases 
Arrest 35 c^^ 63.5(7) 
35 Arrest 
3 511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk 
35k63 5(7) k Mode of Stop, Warnings, 
Arrest Distmeuished Most Cited Cases 
Arrest 35 
c^ > 
63.5(9) 
15 Arrest 
3 511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk 
35k63 5(9) k Duration of Detention and 
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Frisk Most 
Cited Cases 
If police officers' actions exceed what is reasonably 
necessary under the totality of the circumstances, the 
stop may only be justified by probable cause or con-
sent, this may occur due to the use of handcuffs, fire-
arms, or other police techniques inconsistent u ith the 
limited scope of an investigation detention, or the 
detention may become so lengthy that the investiga-
tion detention escalates into a de facto arrest 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
£21 Arrest 35 €=> 63.4(2) 
35. Arrest 
3 511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without 
Warrant 
35k63 4 Probable or Reasonable Cause 
35k63 4(2) k What Constitutes Such 
Cause m General Most Cited Cases 
An officer has probable cause to arrest if, under the 
totality of the circumstances, he learned of facts and 
circumstances through reasonably trustworthy mfor-
mofiAii fliot \vr»nl/-? \o*zr\ a r a o c n n o W o n a r c n t i in K^Iio-i <a n i u i i u i i u i u t W u u i u i w u u u. J v u j o i i u u i v f jw iau i i %,\j iywnv v w 
that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
person arrested U S C A Const Amend 4. 
[101 Automobiles 48A €=> 349(17) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349(17) k Detention, and 
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases 
The 70-minute length of state trooper's investigative 
detention of defendants following traffic stop of ve-
hicle m which defendants were traveling as driver 
and passenger, including 54-mmute delay m the arri-
val of a canine unit after the trooper decided to ex-
tend the traffic stop and call for a canine unit to 
search the vehicle, was unreasonable, since the gov-
ernment failed to identify any circumstances that 
would justify a 54-mmute extension of a routine traf-
fic stop U S C A Const Amend 4 
fill Arrest 35 N - / * ^ ^ 6 3 . 5 ( 0 ) 
^5 Arrest 
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3 511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63 5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Fnsk 
35k63 5(9) k Duration of Detention and 
Extent or Conduct of Investigation or Fnsk Most 
Cited Cases 
Officers with reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
occupants of a vehicle are engaged m the unlawful 
transportation of contraband may detain the vehicle 
for a reasonable time to obtain a properly trained dog 
to sniff for contraband U S C A Const Amend 4 
[12] Criminal Law 110 €^> 412.2(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
llOXVIinvD Declarations 
110k411 Declarations by Accused 
i i AI / i n "» r> ~u ru / i  I D ~i,+ ±~ r^~. ~„~i r^~ *. ~~ 
110k412 2(2) k Accusatory Stage of 
Proceedings, Custody Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 c^^ 412.2(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
llOXVIKM) Declarations 
110k411 Declarations by Accused 
110k412 2 Right to Counsel, Caution 
110k412 2(3) k Informing Accused 
as to His Plights Most Cited Cases 
The defendants were subject to custodial interroga-
tion, so as to require Miranda warnings, dunng their 
70-mmute detention following traffic stop of vehicle 
m which they were traveling as driver and passenger, 
state troopers separated defendants and put them m 
different patrol cars while they waited for canine unit 
to arrive to search the vehicle, and trooper engaged m 
conversation with defendant driver for almost the 
entire 54 minutes after he issued a warning citation, 
including asking defendant if he "smoked weed," if 
his passenger smoked weed, and whether the water 
pipes he used at a hookah lounge were similar to 
bongs for smoking marijuana U S C A 
Const \mend 4 
f!31 Automobiles 48A €^> 349(10) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIIfB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349flO) k What Is Arrest or Sei-
zure, Stop Distinguished Most Cited Cases 
Automobiles 48A € ^ 349(17) 
48A Automobiles 
48AVII Offenses 
48AVIKB) Prosecution 
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry, Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349fl4) Conduct of Arrest, Stop, 
or Inquiry 
48Ak349f17) k Detention, and 
Length and Character Thereof Most Cited Cases 
State troopers' investigative detention of defendants 
following traffic stop of vehicle in which defendants 
were traveling as driver and passenger escalated into 
an arrest requiring probable cause, the traffic stop 
lasted 70 minutes and during the 54-minute period of 
time waiting for the arrival of a camne unit to search 
the vehicle, the troopers placed defendants m sepa-
rate patrol cars and engaged them in apparently cas-
ual conversation, but at least two of trooper's ques-
tions concerned defendant's possible involvement m 
illegal activity U S C A Const Amend 4 
[14] Criminal Law 110 €=> 394.1(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
lll'XMIEMdence 
110XVIKI) Competency m General 
U0k3^4 Evidence Wrongfully Obtained 
110k394 1 In General 
110k394 1(3) k Effect of Illegal 
Conduct on Other Evidence Mo^t C^ed Cases 
Under the exclusionary rule, the government may not 
introduce into evidence tangible materials seized dur-
ing an unlawful search or testimony concerning 
knowledge acquired during an unlawful search, the 
court is also required to exclude evidence discovered 
as a result of the exploitation of the illegal conduct, 
and this type of evidence is known as the fruit of the 
— F.Supp.2d — , 2010 WL 3022909 (N.D.Okla.) 
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poisonous tree. U.S.C.A. Const Amend. 4. 
Robert Thames Ralev, United States Attorney's Of-
fice, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
CLAIRE V. EAGAN, Chief Judge. 
*1 Now before the Court is Defendants' Joint Motion 
to Suppress Tangible Evidence, Statements & Fruits 
of Search (Dkt. # 20). They argue that evidence 
seized during a search of a rental car on April 24 and 
25, 2010 should be suppressed, because the Okla-
homa Highway Patrol (OHP) trooper continued the 
traffic stop beyond its initial purpose without defen-
dants' consent and without reasonable suspicion to 
believe that defendants were involved in criminal 
activity. Defendants are charged with possessing 
Oxycodone with intent to distribute in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Court held an evidentiary 
hearing on defendants' motion to suppress on July 23, 
2010. 
L 
On April 24, 2010 around 11:45 p.m., OHP Trooper 
Ryan Smith was on patrol on a section of Interstate 
44 (1-44) known as the Turner Turnpike and observed 
a gray Chrysler 300 pull into the toll booth lanes 
without signaling a lane change. Smith turned on his 
emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop and the ve-
hicle pulled over to the right side of the highway. 
Omar Saadeldin was driving the vehicle and Stanis-
lov Avezov was seated in the front passenger seat. 
Smith approached the vehicle from the passenger side 
and asked the driver, Saadeldin, for his driver's li-
cense. Saadeldin produced a valid Arizona driver's 
license. Smith asked Saadeldin to sit in his patrol car 
while Smith completed a traffic citation and ran a 
records check, and Saadeldin complied with Smith's 
request. 
Smith explained that he observed an illegal lane 
change and Saadeldin acknowledged that he changed 
lanes without using his turn signal. Smith asked 
Saadeldin about his travel plans. Saadeldin stated that 
he had driven to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma from 
Phoenix, Arizona, and he decided to visit a friend in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma before leaving Oklahoma. He 
claimed that he was on his way to visit a friend in 
Tulsa when he was stopped by Smith. Saadeldin 
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asked Smith if he would have to return to Oklahoma 
for a court hearing, and Smith said "no." Smith asked 
Saadeldin where he worked, and Saadeldin stated that 
he owned two hookah lounges in Glendale and Phoe-
nix, Arizona. Saadeldin informed Smith that the ve-
hicle was a rental car, and the rental agreement was 
in the glove box of the vehicle. Smith asked 
Saadeldin who was traveling with him, and Saadeldin 
stated that his friend "Stan" was the passenger. Dur-
ing the traffic stop, Saadeldin regularly engaged in 
conversation without questioning from Smith, and 
Smith testified that he perceived Saadeldin's conver-
sation as a sign of nervousness. 
Smith approached the passenger, Avezov, and asked 
for the rental agreement for the vehicle. Smith also 
asked Avezov about his travel plans, and Avezov 
stated that they were driving from Oklahoma City to 
Tulsa to visit family. Smith testified that Avezov 
seemed extremely nervous and his voice was crack-
ing. Avezov had told Smith that he was sharing driv-
ing duties with Saadeldin and Smith wanted to check 
the status of Avezov's driver's license. Smith spoke 
with Avezov for approximately 40 seconds. The 
rental agreement showed that the vehicle was rented 
by Michael Gutierrez from a Budget rental car loca-
tion in Glendale, Arizona, and Saadeldin was an au-
thorized driver for the rental car. Smith also noticed 
that the vehicle had to be returned to Glendale by 
Monday, April 26, 2010. 
*2 Smith asked Saadeldin where he and Avezov were 
staying in Tulsa, and Saadeldin stated that they were 
driving to a hotel. Saadeldin knew the exact street 
address of the hotel, but he could not recall the name 
of the hotel. Saadeldin clarified that he was visiting a 
friend named "Matthew Rosinski" in Tulsa, after 
further questioning from Smith about Saadeldin's and 
Avezov's purpose for visiting Tulsa. Saadeldin also 
stated that they would be staying in Tulsa for only 
one night, because they had to return the rental car on 
Monday. Smith asked Saadeldin about his occupa-
tion, and Saadeldin explained that a hookah lounge 
was a club or social lounge where guests used "mid-
dle eastern water pipes" to smoke flavored tobacco. 
Smith asked Saadeldin where he and Avezov stayed 
in Oklahoma City, and Saadeldin stated that they 
stayed at the Biltmore hotel on Meridian Avenue. 
Smith also asked Saadeldin if Avezov knew Rosin-
ski. Saadeldin claimed that Avezov had met Rosinki 
one time, but Rosinski was Saadeldin's long-time 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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friend Smith pointed out the inconsistency between 
Saadeldm's and Avezov's statements about their pur-
pose for visiting Tulsa, and Saadeldm explained that 
Rosinki was treated like his family because it was 
such an extended friendship 
Smith returned Saadeldm's driver's license and issued 
a warning citation to Saadeldm Saadeldm prepared 
to leave the patrol car, and Smith requested permis-
sion to ask Saadeldm some additional questions 
Saadeldm agreed to answer a few questions and re-
mained seated in Smith's patrol car Smith asked 
Saadeldm if he had anything illegal in the car Spe-
cifically, he asked Saadeldm about the presence of 
open containers of alcohol, weapons, illegal drugs, or 
large amounts of United States currency in the vehi-
cle, and Saadeldm responded that none of these items 
were m the vehicle Smith asked for Saadeldm's con-
sent to search the vehicle, and Saadeldm refused 
Smith's request on the ground that the vehicle con-
tamed items belonging to Avezov and he could not 
agree to the search Smith asked for clarification 
about his request to search the vehicle, and Saadeldm 
clearly stated that he was not consenting to a search 
of the vehicle Saadeldm asked if he was "good to 
go," and Smith told Saadeldm to stay m Smith's pa-
trol car Smith informed Saadeldm that he would be 
calling for a canine unit and Saadeldm had to wait 
until the canme unit arrived Smith then asked Ave-
zov for his consent to search the vehicle, and Ave-
zo\'s also denied Smiths request for consent Smith 
testified that he relied on three factors as a basis for 
reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop (1) 
Saadeldm's and Avezov's conflicting stories about 
their purpose for visiting Tulsa, (2) the rental agree-
ment was signed by a third party who was not present 
and the vehicle was rented m a "source" state and (3) 
Saadeldm's and Avezov s nervous behavior The traf-
fic stop took approximately 16 minutes from the time 
of the initial stop to Smith's decision to call for a ca-
nine unit 
*3 Smith called for a canine unit to perform a sniff of 
the vehicle and it took 54 minutes for the drug dog to 
arrive During this 54 minutes, Saadeldm remained m 
the patrol car with Smith, and Avezov was placed in 
a separate patrol car with OHP Trooper Paul Lakm 
Neither Saadeldm nor Avezov were given Mnanda 
w arnmgs, but Smith and Lakm engaged m conversa-
tion with Saadeldm and Avezov Saadeldm com-
mented on Smith's laptop computer, and mentioned 
(Ps om 0 Thomson Reuters No 
Page 6 
that he had a laptop computer in the trunk of the ve-
hicle Smith asked Saadeldm if he "smoked weed" 
and Saadeldm denied that he used marijuana Smith 
then asked Saadeldm if Avezov "smoked weed," and 
Saadeldm replied that he did not know Smith asked 
about Saadeldm's business operatmg a hookah 
lounge, and Saadeldm explamed the process for 
smoking flavored tobacco from a water pipe Smith 
suggested that this process was similar to smoking 
marijuana from a "bong " Much of the conversation 
during this time was initiated by Saadeldm, and con-
cerned a wide range of topics, including the equip-
ment in the patrol car, Saadeldm's attendance at Ari-
zona State University, and BlackBernes and cellular 
telephones Saadeldm asked if he could get his cellu-
lar phone, but Smith told him to "sit tight" and did 
not permit Saadeldm to get his phone 
About 20 minutes after Smith called for the canine 
unit, Smith asked Saadeldm if he and Avezov were at 
a basketball game m Oklahoma City Saadeldm said 
that they were at a basketball game between the 
Oklahoma City Thunder and Los Angeles Lakers, but 
they left m the third quarter Smith asked which team 
was w inning the game when they left, but Saadeldm 
claimed that he had been drinking alcohol and did not 
remember Smith noted m his police report that he 
did not detect an odor of alcohol on Saadeldm's 
bieath Dkt # 20, Ex 1, at 1 Smith asked Saadeldm 
about their tickets and the location of their seats, and 
Saadeldm stated that they sat m section 13A or 13B 
Saadeldm said the seats were "prett> high" in the 
Ford Center Smith used his laptop computer and 
found that there was no section 13A or 13B at the 
Ford Center Smith asked how long Saadeldm had 
known Avezov, and Saadeldm replied that he had 
known Avezov for about six or eight months Smith 
asked how well Saadeldm knew Gutierrez, and 
Saadeldm claimed that he knew Gutierrez "very 
well " In the other patrol car, Avezov told Lakm that 
they watched the basketball game from a restaurant, 
but they did not actually attend the game Avezov 
also stated that he had been drinking alcohol, but 
Lakm did not smell any alcohol on Avezov's breath 
Assistant Chief Samuel Byrd of the Meeker Police 
Department arrived with a drug dog, Brutus Brutus 
is certified by the National Narcotic Detector Dog 
Association to detect manjuana, methamphetamme, 
herom, and cocaine See Government Exs 12-15 
Byrd testified that he received a call from OHP 
to On? US Gov Woiks 
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around 12 15 am on April 25, 2010 He completed 
writing a ticket for a traffic stop and left Meeker 
about three minutes later It took him at least 25 min-
utes to drive to the location of the traffic stop and he 
testified that he arrived around 12 45 am Smith tes-
tified that Byrd arrived about 45 minutes after he 
requested a canine sniff of defendants' rental vehi-
cle — Byrd allowed Brutus to become acclimated to 
his surroundings before starting the sniff of the vehi-
cle, and he led Brutus to the front of the vehicle 
Brutus began his sniff at the front bumper on the 
driver's side and walked counterclockwise around the 
vehicle When Brutus completed a full loop around 
the vehicle, Brutus alerted to the smell of illegal 
drugs m front of the vehicle Brutus is a passive alert 
dog and he alerts by sitting Byrd led Brutus on a 
second loop around the vehicle, and Brutus made a 
"head throw" near the trunk Byrd testified that a 
head throw is not a formal alert by Brutus, but it sug-
gests ihai Brutus detects a faim odor of illegal di ugj> 
or that he cannot precisely locate from where the 
smell is coming Brutus again alerted at t*>e front of 
the vehicle after completing his second loop Byrd 
conducted a third loop around the vehicle, and Brutus 
lifted his nose towaid the trunk and alerted at the 
front of the vehicle Based on Brutus' conduct, Byrd 
informed Smith that Brutus had alerted to the pres-
ence of illegal drugs inside the vehicle 
*4 Smith and Lakm conducted a vehicle search and 
found a blue American Eagle bag containing a small 
black container with two baggies of a green leafy 
substance The substance field tested positive for 
marijuana They also found $17,700 m United States 
currency in the bag In a separate computer bag, po-
lice found a laptop computer and 3,000 Oxycodone 
pills Saadeldm and Avezov denied that they were 
aware of the drugs Smith formally arrested 
Saadeldm and Avezov and transported them to the 
Lincoln County jail Smith read Saadeldm his 
Mn anda rights at the jail, and Saadeldm refused to 
talk Lakm read Avezov nis Muanda rights at the j ail, 
and Avezov also refused to speak to police Law en-
forcement officials subsequently sought and obtained 
search warrants for the rental vehicle, as well as three 
laptop computers and six cellular phones found m the 
vehicle 
II. 
IT] Defendants argue that Smith prolonged the traffic 
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stop without reasonable suspicion, and any evidence 
seized after the initial purpose of the traffic stop was 
completed should be suppressed The government 
responds that Smith had reasonable suspicion to con-
tinue the traffic stop for a canine sniff, and the length 
of the detention, including the 54 mmute wait for the 
canine unit to arrive, was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances Both defendants have standing under the 
Fourth Amendment to challenge the validity of the 
traffic stop Biendlin \ California, 551 U S 249, 127 
S Ct 2400, 168 L Ed 2d 132 (2007), United States v 
mute, 584 F 3d 935 945 (10th Cir 2009) 
r2ir3] A traffic stop is treated as an investigative de-
tention, and such a stop is governed by the standards 
set forth m Teirw Ohio, 392 U S 1 88 S Ct 1868, 
20 LEd2d 889 (19o8) United States \ Bradfoid, 
423 F3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir2005) When deter-
mining the reasonableness of a traffic stop, a court 
must make two separate inquiries First, aid the po-
lice officer have a valid reason for initiating the traf-
fic stop Unite d States ^ Bot^, o-O^pina, 71 F 3 d ^ 8 3, 
787 (10th Cirl995) "[A] traffic stop is valid under 
the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an ob-
served traffic violation or if the police officer nas a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or 
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring " Id_ 
Second, a traffic stop must not become an unneces-
sarily lengthy detention, but must be limited m scope 
to the purpose of the initial traffic stop United States 
^ Rice, 483 F 3d 3079. 3 083 (10th Cir2007) A po-
lice officer may extend the length of the traffic stop 
for questioning beyond the initial purpose of the traf-
fic stop only if the officer has "an objectively reason-
able and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has 
occurred, or the dmer voluntarily consents to further 
questioning" United States -\ Ramnez, An9 F i d 
122Q 124" (10th Cir 2007) 
There is no dispute that defendants' rental vehicle 
was pulled over for failing to signal a lane change, 
and that this traffic violation occurred See Dkt # 20, 
at 8 ( In all fairness, it appears that Mr Saadeldm 
admitted to the trooper that he made a last-minute 
lane change ") The government has shown that the 
first prong of Tei n is satisfied 
*5 141 The Court must also consider whether the 
length of the traffic stop was reasonable under the 
second prong of Tern An officer conducting a traf-
fic stop may request a driver's license, vehicle regis-
©2010 Thomson Reuters No Claim to Orig US Gov Works 
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tration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. 
See United States v. Zubia-Melendcz, 263 F.3d 1155, 
1161 (10th Cir.2001). An officer may also "ask ques-
tions about the motorist's travel plans and authority to 
operate the vehicle," in addition to obtaining the rele-
vant documentation, without exceeding the scope of 
an investigative detention. United States v. Alcaraz-
Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252. 1258 (10th Cir.2006). Such 
questioning does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
as long as the questioning does not prolong the traffic 
stop. United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334. 1339 
(10th Cir.2009); United States v. Wallace, 429 F.3d 
969. 974 (10th Cir.2005). Police must have reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to con-
tinue a traffic stop beyond the purpose of issuing a 
warning or citation for the traffic violation. United 
States v. Kovv, 45 F.3d 1450. 1453 (10th Cir.1995). 
Reasonable suspicion is a "particularized and objec-
tive basis for suspecting the person stopped of crimi-
nal activity." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
696. U6 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). An "inchoate and un-
particularized suspicion or 'hunch' is insufficient" to 
support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hall, 
978 F.2d 616. 620 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion 
"represents a minimum level of objective justification 
which is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing 
by a preponderance of the evidence." Alcaraz-
Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1260 (quoting United States v. 
Mcndez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir.1997)). In 
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity, the Court does not evaluate 
the facts in isolation but instead construes them to-
gether based on the totality of the circumstances. 
United States v. Annzu, 534 U.S. 266. 2^4, 122 S.Ct. 
744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). 
Defendants argue that Smith lacked reasonable suspi-
cion to extend the traffic stop beyond the purpose of 
completing a traffic citation, because there was no 
basis for Smith to determine that reasonable suspi-
cion existed and defendants denied Smith's request 
for consent to search the vehicle. They also argue that 
the traffic stop became an arrest at some point after 
Smith issued a warning citation, because defendants 
were not free to leave and there was an unreasonable 
delay before the canine sniff. The government argues 
that Smith observed the following objective factors 
supporting his decision that reasonable suspicion 
existed to continue the traffic stop: 
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• the vehicle was a rental and was rented by a third 
party not present in the vehicle 
• the vehicle was rented in Phoenix, Arizona, 
which is a known "source city" for illegal drugs 
• defendants provided vague and inconsistent an-
swers about their travels plans 
*6 • defendants' travel plans seemed implausible 
• both defendants seemed exceedingly nervous 
Dkt. #27, at 9-13. 
[5] The Court finds that Smith's consideration of 
Phoenix as a "source" city is irrelevant and should 
not be considered in determining if he had reasonable 
suspicion to continue the traffic stop. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affords little or no weight to travel to or from a 
"source" location in the reasonable suspicion analy-
sis. See United States v Lopez. 518 F.3d 790. 799 
(10thCir.2008); United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 
784, 788 (10th Cir.2007). In Guerrero, the Tenth 
Circuit stated: 
The fact that the defendants were traveling from a 
drug source city ... [or state] does little to add to the 
overall calculus of suspicion: "If travel between 
two of this country's largest population centers is a 
ground on which reasonable suspicion may be 
predicated, it is difficult to imagine an activity in-
capable of justifying police suspicion and an ac-
companying investigative detention. Our holding 
that suspicious travel plans can form an element of 
reasonable suspicion should not be taken as an in-
vitation to find travel suspicious per se." 
Guerrero, 472 F.3d at 788 (quoting United States v. 
Santos. 403 F.3d 1120. 1132 (10th Cir.2005)). The 
Tenth Circuit clearly permits a district court to con-
sider vague or inconsistent travel plans as factor to 
establish reasonable suspicion, but the identity of the 
cities or states as "source" locations is not a factor in 
the Court's analysis. 
[61 The government argues that Smith perceived both 
Saadeldin and Avezov as unusually nervous during 
the traffic stop, and this was a relevant factor to es-
- F Supp 2d — , 2010 WL 3022909 (N D Okla) 
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tabhsh reasonable suspicion Extreme nervousness of 
a driver or passenger, in combmation with other fac-
tors, can be a factor used to establish reasonable sus-
picion to continue a traffic stop beyond its initial pur-
pose United States v Salazcu, 609 F 3d 1059 (10th 
Cir 2010) However, this factor must be considered 
with other factors, and it may not be used as the sole 
factor to establish reasonable suspicion In a recent 
Tenth Circuit decision, United States v Simpson, 609 
F3d 1140 QOthCir 2010). the Tenth Circuit stated 
"We have held consistently that nervousness is 'of 
limited significance' in determining whether rea-
sonable suspicion exists " Nervousness is of lim-
ited value m assessing reasonable suspicion for two 
reasons First, it is common for most citizens, 
"whether innocent or guilty-to exhibit signs of 
nervousness when confronted by a law enforce-
ment officer " Further, it is natural for a motorist to 
become more agitated as a stop is prolonged ana 
particularly when the officer seems skeptical or 
suspicious 
Second, unless the police officer has had signifi-
cant knowledge of a person, it is difficult, even for 
a skilled police officer, to evaluate whether a per-
son is acting normally foi them or nervously 
n Id at 1147-48 (citations omitted) The Tenth Cir-
cuit clarified that "[ejxtreme and persistent nervous-
ness 'is entitled to somewhat more weight,' " but a 
court may not rely solely on a police officer's percep-
tion of nervousness and must find objective indica-
tors of extreme nervousness Id at 1147-48 Thus, if 
defendants exhibited extreme and prolonged nerv-
ousness, this is a relevant factor to determine if Smith 
had reasonable suspicion under the totality of the 
circumstances to extend the traffic stop beyond its 
initial purpose 
In this ca^e, Smith testified that he observed objective 
indicia of Saadeldm's nervousness and he determined 
that Saadeldms behavior was an indication that 
criminal actnrty was afoot Smith testified that based 
on his training and experience, he relied on 
Saadeldm's excessive talkativeness and talking with 
his hands, lack of eye contact, yawning and deep 
breathing, coughing, and rubbing of his hands on his 
legs and face as objectrve evidence that Saadeldm 
was nervous beyond what should be expected in an 
ordinary traffic stop However, Smith acknowledged 
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that, before he issued a warning citation, he did not 
observe any yawning and he heaid only minimal 
coughing Tne Court has \iewed the DVD of the traf-
fic stop, and it confirms that Smith was excessively 
talkative and generally failed to make eye contact 
with Smith — Saadeldm did not rub his hands on his 
face or legs, yawn, or cough m an excessive manner 
during the first 16 minutes of the traffic stop How-
ever, the Court finds that Smith's testimony on the 
issue of defendants' nervousness is otherwise credi-
ble, and the behavior Smith observed before he is-
sued a warning citation to Saadeldm could have been 
perceived as an indication of extreme or unusual 
nervousness In particular, Smith could reasonably 
have concluded that Saadeldm's conversation 
sounded like nervous chatter and Saadeldm's de-
meanor could have raised some suspicion that illegal 
activity was afoot As required by Tenth Circuit 
precedent, the Court will not give this factor signifi-
cant ^r controlling weight m the reasonable buspujoti 
inquiry, and the government must show that other 
objective factors supported Smith's decision that rea-
sonable suspicion existed 
The government claims that defendants provided 
conflicting and vague travel plans when responding 
to Smith's questions, and this is a strong factor sup-
porting Smith's determination that reasonable suspi-
cion existed The government also argues that defen-
dants' travel plans were implausible and this raised 
suspicion that defendants were trafficking illegal 
drugs The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the 
use of this factor to establish reasonable suspicion 
White. 584 F3d 935 950 (10th Cir2009) ("Implau-
sible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspi-
cion"), Onited States i Lai am 496 F 3d 1157, 
1164-65 (10th Cir2007) (inconsistent travel plans 
and confusion about travel details may be considered 
m conjunction with other factors to establish reason-
able suspicion), bnned Srates ^  Hunmcmt, 135 F 3d 
H45, 1349 (10th CirlQ98) (listing inconsistent de-
tails about travel plans as a relevant factor m the rea-
sonable suspicion inquiry) 
*8 Defendants claim that the government has not 
identified a true or significant inconsistency m defen-
dants' stones and Smith failed to gather enough in-
formation to determine if defendants' stories were 
actually conflicting There is a clear inconsistency 
between Saadeldm's and Avezov's statements, and 
Smith could have considered these inconsistencies to 
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establish reasonable suspicion Saadeldin represented 
to Smith that he was traveling to Tulsa to visit a 
friend named "Matthew Rosinki" and Aveyoz told 
Smith they were driving to Tulsa to visit family — 
Defendants argue that Smith had no way to know 
whether defendants' stones were actually inconsistent 
or even if both stories could have been true How-
ever, defendants' stories were facially contradictory 
and Smith was not required to conduct an extensive 
investigation on thi^ topic before considering this 
factor The Court may not second-guess Smith's deci-
sion to consider this factor, nor may defendants at-
tempt to explain away the inconsistency after the fact 
Even assuming that Smith made a mistaken assump-
tion that the stones were inconsistent, Smith's belief 
that defendants' stones were contradictory was rea-
sonable under the circumstances See United States v 
Pena-Montes. 589 F 3d 1048. 1052-53 (10th 
Cir 2009) (an officer's mistaken perception of a fact 
is still relevant to tne reasonable suspicion analysis if 
the mistake was objectively reasonable) Smith also 
testified that defendants' travel plans seemed implau-
sible or unusual to him, because defendants were 
dnvmg to Tulsa that night and planned to dnve at 
least 16 hours to Phoenix the following day Smith 
found defendants' travel plans suspicious or implau-
sible, and defendants have offered no explanation 
that would suggest that Smith's suspicion w as unrea-
sonable Smith could reasonably have questioned 
defendants' purpose for making such a lengthy tnp 
for a limited stay m Tulsa, especially when defen-
dants provided only a vague explanation for the trip 
See Kovv 45 F 3d at 1453-54 The short turnaround 
time m Tulsa and the inconsistency between 
Saadeldm's and Avezov's stories provided an objec-
tive basis for Smith to suspect that defendants were 
involved in illegal activity 
£21 The government also argues that defendants' use 
of a rental vehicle and the fact that the vehicle was 
rented by a third party who was not piesent contrib-
uted to the totality of the circumstances supporting 
the existence of reasonable suspicion The status of a 
vehicle as a rented can be considered a factor to sup-
port the existence of reasonable suspicion, because it 
is accepted that drug traffickers frequently use rental 
vehicles to transport illegal drugs United States ^ 
Lxons. 510 F 3d 1225. 1237 (10th Or 2007), United 
States v Contieias, 506 F 3d 1031 1036 (10th 
Cir 2007), bnited States \ Williams 271 F 3d 1262 
(10th Or 2001) It is also relevant that the vehicle 
was rented by a person who was not present Lnited 
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States v Ma. 254 FedAppx 752 756 (10th 
Or 2007) — However, there is no dispute that 
Saadeldin was dnvmg the vehicle and he was an au-
thorized dnver on the rental agreement Defendants' 
use of a rental vehicle and the rental by a third party 
who was not present were objective factors support-
ing probable cause These factors would be entitled to 
more weight if there was some indication that 
Saadeldin was not authorized to dnve the vehicle or 
evidence suggesting that vehicle was rented under 
unusual circumstances, but Smith reasonably consid-
ered these factors to support the existence of reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity was afoot 
*9 The Court finds that Smith had reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that cnmmal activity was afoot, and 
his decision to extend the traffic stop beyond the ini-
tial purpose of issuing a traffic citation was reason-
able Smith observed objective indications of 
Saadeldm's nervousness, and reasonably considered 
this factor as part of the totality of the circumstances 
Smith also considered the status of the vehicle as 
rented and found it unusual that the vehicle was 
rented by a third party who was not present in the 
vehicle Smith testified that he found defendants' sto-
nes about their travel plans inconsistent, and the 
travel plans were implausible if the purpose of their 
trip to Tulsa was a social visit The Court gives no 
weight to Smith's consideration of Phoenix as a 
source city for illegal drugs The Court notes that this 
is a close case and Smith did not have any clear indi-
cations that defendants were engaged in illegal acti\ -
it) However Smith's testimony about the factors he 
considered before he extended the traffic stop was 
credible, and he gathered sufficient objective evi-
dence to determine that reasonable suspicion of ille-
gal activity existed 
[RirQin01 Defendants argue that the investigation 
detention became an arrest, because they were not 
free to leave and the length of the detention was ex-
cessive The government responds that the investiga-
tive detention did not become an arrest, because the 
length of time between the issuance of the traffic cita-
tion and the arrival of the canine unit was reasonable 
An investigative detention may be "transformed" into 
an arrest under the Fourth Amendment under certain 
circumstances United States ^ Hamilton, 587 F 3d 
1199 1215 (10th Or 2009) "[I]f police officers' ac-
tions exceed what is reasonably necessary under the 
totality of the circumstances, the stop may only be 
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justified by probable cause or consent" United States 
^ Mclendez-Gai cia, 28 F3d 1046, 1051 (10th 
Cir 1994) This may occur due to the use of hand-
cuffs, firearms, or other police techniques inconsis-
tent with the limited scope of an investigation deten-
tion, or the detention may become so lengthy that the 
investigation detention escalates into a de facto ar-
rest White, 584 F 3d at 952-53 "An officer has prob-
able cause to arrest if, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, he learned of facts and circumstances 
through reasonably trustworthy information that 
would lead a reasonable person to believe that an 
offense has been or is being committed by the person 
arrested " Lnited States v Rodi izuez-Rodi mtez, 550 
F3d 1223 1227 (10th Cir 2008) (quoting United 
States ^ Munoz-Nava, 524 F 3d 1137 1144 (10th 
Or 2008)) 
I'll] Defendants argue that the length of time be-
tween the completion of the traffic stop and the dog 
sniff was excessive, but the mere fact that defendants 
were not free to leave while Smith waited for a ca-
nine unit to arrive did not automatically escalate the 
investigative detention into an arrest "Officers with 
reasonable suspicion to behe\ e that the occupants of 
a vehicle are engaged in the unlawful transportation 
of contraband may detain the vehicle for a reasonable 
time to obtain a properly trained dog to sniff for con-
traband" United States ^ Mendoza, 468 F 3d 1256, 
1261 (10th Cir 2006) (40 minute detention was rea-
sonable while police waited for nearest drug dog to 
arrive from approximately 50 miles away) Based on 
Tenth Circuit cases, traffic stops totaling 50 minutes 
and delays up to 38 minutes for a canme unit have 
been found to be reasonable See Santos, 403 F 3d at 
1124 (22 minute delay between denial of consent and 
arrival of drug dog was reasonable), Lnited Stales •> 
Cenine, 347 F 3d 865 (10th Cn 2003) (50 minutes 
for combination of traffic stop and dog sniff was rea-
sonable), United States i J illa-Chapano 115 F 3d 
797 802 (10th Cir 1997) (38 minute delay was rea-
sonable) The Tenth Circuit has suggested that a 
lengthier delay may not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment if police were acting diligently to expedite the 
traffic stop but encountered unexpected delays 
United States v Roshoiouzh 366 F 3d 1145 1151 
(10th Cir 2004) 
*10 The government argues that the delay in this case 
was not unreasonable, because a canine unit was not 
available when Smith made his request and it took 
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additional time to obtain a canine umt to search de-
fendants' vehicle The government states and the evi-
dence shows that 54 minutes passed from Smith's 
decision to extend the traffic stop and the arrival of 
the canine umt Smith testified that he was given a 
choice between an OHP canine unit or the next avail-
able camne umt He informed the dispatcher that he 
would prefer an OHP canine unit, but he would ac-
cept the next canine unit that became available Byrd 
testified that he received a call from dispatch around 
12 15 am and left Meeker about three minutes later 
after completing a traffic stop He states that it took 
him approximately 25 minutes to reach the location 
on 1-44 where Smith stopped defendant's vehicle He 
testified that he was not familiar with the area and he 
stopped to ask directions from another police officer 
on his way Smith testified that the traffic stop began 
around 11 45 p m on April 24, 2010 and it took 
about 16 minutes before he decided to extend the 
traffic stop and request a canine unit Smith requesTed 
a canine unit almost immediately after informing 
Saadeldm that he could not leave, and this means that 
it took approximately 14 minutes before dispatch 
contacted Byrd and asked him to assist Smith This 
additional 14 minutes is not attributable to any con-
duct of Smith, as his testimony and the DVD show 
that he promptly requested a canine unit However, 
this does not excuse the delay and it suggests that 
OHP did not act with urgency to obtain a canme unit 
While there is no evidence of bad faith or intentional 
delay, there was a substantial delay before a camne 
unit arrived and the length of the delay exceeds the 
delay approved m any Tenth Circuit decision The 
total time of the traffic stop up to the time of the ca-
nine sniff, including the 54 minutes of delay for a 
canine unit to arme, was 70 minutes This period of 
time reaches the outer boundaries for a limited inves-
tigative detention under the circumstances Other 
circuit courts of appeals have approved delays of up 
to one hour between a request for and the arrival of a 
canine unit if the delay was justified under the cir-
cumstances Lnited States i J cza, n2 F 3d 507 51 S-
16 (7th Cir 1995), Lnited States i Bloomftcld, 40 
F 3d 910 917 (8th Cir 1994), United States v Fiost, 
Q99 F2d 737 (3d CirI9Q3) However, the govern-
ment has not identified any circumstances that would 
justify a 54 minute extension of a routine traffic, and 
the length of the investigative detention was unrea-
sonable 
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ri2iri3] Even assuming that the delay is not pei se 
unreasonable, the Court must also consider whether 
the investigation escalated into an arrest before the 
canine unit arrived and if police needed probable 
cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, to continue 
the detention until the camne unit arrived Smith and 
Lakm separated Saadeldm and Avezov and put them 
in different patrol cars while they waited for the ca-
nine unit to arrive Smith testified that neither 
Saadeldm nor Avezov were given Miranda warnings 
while they waited for the canine unit to arrive The 
government argues that Mn anda warnings were un-
necessary, because defendants were not under arrest 
and they were not subjected to custodial interroga-
tion The government is correct that Miranda v Ari-
zona, 384 US 436 86 S Ct 1602. 16 LEd2d 694 
(1966), is generall> not implicated by a routme traffic 
stop and a Muanda warning is not usually required m 
a valid Tern stop United States ^ Eckhart, 569 F 3d 
1263 1275 (10th Cir2009) However, this was not a 
routine traffic stop Defendants were detained for 
approximately 70 minutes and were held m separate 
patrol cars m the presence of a police officer The 
DVD from Smith's patrol car shows that he engaged 
m casual conversation with Saadeldm for almost the 
entire 54 minutes after he issued a warning citation 
and Saadeldm did not initiate all of the convei sation 
Smith asked Saadeldm if he "smoked weed" and 
asked Saadeldm if the water pipes used at a hookah 
lounge were similar to bongs for smoking marijuana 
Smith also asked Saadeldm if Avezov "smoked 
weed " Even if Smith's questions did not constitute a 
direct interrogation, questioning implying that 
Saadeldm or Avezov engaged m illegal activity 
closely approximates police interrogation and a 
Mn anda warning was required Rhode Island \ hi-
nts, 446 US 291, 100 S Ct 1682 64 LEd2d 297 
(1980) ( Mn anda implies to express questioning or 
its "functional equivalent" that is likely to invoke an 
incriminating response from a suspect) Saadeldm 
was not free to leave the patrol car and he was sub-
jected to questioning about criminal activity Given 
the manner and length of the detention and the nature 
of the conversation, Mn anda warnings should have 
been given to Saadeldm and Avezov if Smith and 
Lakm intended to converse with Saadeldm and Ave-
zov before the canine unit arrived Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the 
investigative detention did escalate into an arrest and 
police needed probable cause to continue the deten-
tion The traffic stop lasted 70 minutes and this alone 
may have transformed the investigation detention 
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into an arrest During the 54 minute period of time 
waiting for the camne unit, Smith and Lakm placed 
defendants in separate patrol cars and engaged defen-
dants in apparently casual conversation However, at 
least two of Smith's questions concerned Saadeldm's 
possible involvement m illegal activity, and Smith 
did not give Saadeldm a Mnanda warning While it 
was permissible for Smith to briefly extend the traffic 
stop if a canine unit was not immediately available, 
this detention became excessively lengthy and it ap-
pears that police used this additional time to gather 
additional information about defendants' background 
and travel plans The Court noted that this is a close 
case as to the existence of reasonable suspicion, and 
probable cause is a higher standard The facts known 
by Smith at the time he called for a canine unit do not 
give rise to probable cause to arrest defendants for 
drug trafficking or any other cnme Thus, the traffic 
stop became an unlawful arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment 
*11 [14] Defendants argue mat any evidence during 
the search of their rental vehicle or discovered as a 
result of that search must be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule Under the exclusionary rule, "the 
government may not introduce into evidence 'tangi-
ble materials seized during an unlawful search [or] 
testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an 
unlawful search " tinned States \ Henderson, 595 
F3d 1198 1201 (10th Or 2010) (quoting Mwias ^ 
United States, 487 U S 533 536 108 S Ct 2529, 
101 L Ed 2d 472 (1988)) The Court is also required 
to exclude evidence discovered as a result of the ex-
ploitation of the illegal conduct, and this type of evi-
dence is known as the fruit of the poisonous tree 
Worn* Sun \ United States, 371 U S 471 488 83 
SCt 407 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) Evidence discov-
ered only as a result of a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion may not be admitted at trial United States ^ 
PetnzicM 468 F ^d 626 6^4 (10th Or 2006) In this 
case, police found two plastic baggies of marijuana 
and $17,700 of United States currency m a blue 
American Eagle bag and 3 000 Oxycodone pills m a 
separate computer bag in defendant's rental vehicle 
Police later obtained search warrants for six cellular 
phones and three laptop computers found in the rental 
vehicle, as well as a search warrant for the vehicle 
itself None of this e\ idence would have been found 
but for the illegal detention of defendant on April 24 
and 25, 2010, and none of this evidence is admissible 
at trial ^ 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' 
Joint Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence, State-
ments & Fruits of Search (Dkt # 20) is granted, and 
any evidence seized during the search of defendants' 
rental vehicle or that was discovered as a result of 
this search is suppressed. 
FN1 The DVD does not clearly show when 
Byrd arm ed, but it does show when the ca-
nine sniff started The amount of time be-
tween the completion of the initial purpose 
of the traffic stop and the initiation of the 
canine sniff is approximately 54 minutes 
The government states that Byrd arrived 54 
minutes after Smith requested a canine unit 
Dkt # 27, at 12 This statement is supported 
by the evidence and the Court finds that de-
fendants were detained 54 minutes while 
waiting for the canine unit to arrive 
the source of this evidence is not clear from 
defendants' motion, and the Court will not 
consider the admissibility of this evidence in 
this Opinion and Order However, this evi-
dence may be the fruit of the poisonous tree 
N D Okla ,2010 
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END OF DOCUMENT 
FN2 The Court questioned Smith as to 
whether he could observe Saadeldm's eye 
movement and facial expressions m the pa-
trol car, and Smith testified that he could see 
Saadeldm's eyes and facial expressions us-
ing his peripheral vision The Court finds 
that Smith's testimony is credible on this 
point 
FN3 The inconsistency about the Lakers 
game may not be considered because Smith 
did not become aware of this inconsistency 
until after he decided to continue the traffic 
stop and call for a canme unit Smith's police 
report suggests that he learned these facts 
before he issued a warning citation, see dkt 
# 20, Ex 1, at 1 but the DVD confirms that 
this topic did not arise until Smith had al-
ready requested a canme unit 
FN4 Unpublished decisions are not prece-
dential, but may be cited for their persuasive 
value See Fed RApp -2 1 l"th Cir Pv 
32 1 
FN5 Defendants argue that other evidence, 
such as recordings of jailhouse telephone 
calls and surveillance videos, may also be 
fruit of the poisonous tree The parties have 
not pro\ ided this evidence to the Court and 
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